DocketNumber: No. CV 00-0598424-S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 15763
Judges: FINEBERG, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/19/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
A motion to strike is the proper vehicle to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint, counterclaim or cross-complaint, or of any prayer for relief therein. Practice Book CT Page 15764 §
Paragraphs 8 and 9 of the complaint purport to refer to an alleged contractual relationship between the Plaintiff and Advest. Paragraph 8 refers to an "engagement agreement," set forth as Exhibit A to the complaint, forwarded by Advest on or about January 3, 1997, "outlining the terms of the services to be provided by Advest to Mr. Winford." Paragraph 9 refers to a revised agreement, set forth as Exhibit B to the complaint, forwarded by Advest on or about January 9, 1997, "outlining the terms of the services to be provided by Advest to TCP/TCPI."
Exhibits A and B were not annexed to the complaint. However, by agreement of counsel at the hearing, the Court was furnished with copies of Exhibits A and B, with consent to consider them as part of the complaint as so alleged therein. This use is permitted by Practice Book §
Exhibit A is addressed to "Mr. Kent K. Winford, President, Target Re, Ltd." Although signed on behalf of Advest, Exhibit A is not signed by anyone else. There are three sets of lines under the caption "Agreed and Accepted [on behalf of] Target Re, Ltd," each set containing a line for the signature of the person so signing on behalf of Target Re, Ltd., and a line for insertion of that person's title. Thus, it does not appear CT Page 15765 that it was intended that these persons were to be signing in their individual capacities.
Exhibit B is addressed to "Mr. Mark Kottler, Chairman, Target Capital Group." It bears a signature on behalf of Advest, and, similar to the signature page format on Exhibit A, three sets of lines under the caption "Agreed and Accepted [on behalf of] Target Capital Partners" for signature and insertion of that signatory's title. These sets bear the signatures on behalf of Target Capital Partners respectively of Kottler as Chairman, Sims as Executive Vice President, and Winford as Executive Vice President. Clearly, Exhibit B is not signed, nor does it purport to be so signed, by either Winford, Kottler or Sims in their individual capacities.
Advest avers that its motion to strike the First Count must be granted because the complaint, as supplemented by Exhibits A and B, neither alleges nor provides that the Plaintiff was a party to any contract with Advest. The Court concurs. Whatever his interest may have been in the partnership and subsequent corporation, or by reason of his foregoing alleged contract with Kottler and Sims, the Plaintiff was not a signatory to Exhibit B in his individual capacity, and thus is not a party to it. Because the Plaintiff is not a party to the contract, he may not assert a claim against Advest for breach of the contract. Coburn v. Lenox Homes,Inc.,
Perhaps in recognition of this obstacle, Plaintiff in his opposition memorandum dated October 24, 2000 purports (page 3) to claim that he is a direct or third party beneficiary of the contract. "The proper test to determine whether a [contract] creates a third party beneficiary relationship is whether the parties to the [contract] intended to create a direct obligation from one party to the [contract] to the third party." (Emphasis in original.) Gateway Co. v. DiNoia,
The complaint fails to allege, nor does Exhibit B so provide, that the Plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the contract between Advest and Target Capital Partners. Facts not alleged in the complaint cannot be considered in ruling on a motion to strike. Novametrix Medical Systems,Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc.,
The motion to strike the First Count of the complaint is granted. CT Page 15766
The motion to strike the Fourth Count is granted.
Not all business relationships implicate the duty of a fiduciary. Hi-HoTower, Inc. v. Com-Tronics, Inc., supra,
The Defendant contends that the Second Count does not adequately allege facts that Advest owed any duty to the Plaintiff, as its duty was solely with the partnership (Target) of which Plaintiff was a partner. Advest bases this contention, at least in part, on the ground that the Plaintiff was not a party in his individual capacity to any contractual relationship with Advest, and that therefore there was nothing upon which to support a fiduciary relationship. CT Page 15767
Plaintiff apparently bases his fiduciary duty claim on the allegation that Advest acted as an investment advisor. Paragraph 37 of the Second Count provides in part that "Advest, as an investment advisor to the founding partners owed each a fiduciary duty. . . ." Paragraph 40 of this count alleges that "[a]t all times material hereto, the plaintiff relied on the advice and instruction of Advest to protect his equity interest in TCP/TCPI and took no further action to protect his equity interest in TCP/TCPI."
The term "investment advisor" is defined in the Connecticut Uniform Securities Act ("CUSA"), General Statutes §
Other than the conclusory allegation of Paragraph 37, there is nothing in the complaint, as supplemented by Exhibit B thereto, that Advest was acting as an investment advisor to the Plaintiff in his individual capacity or otherwise owed him a fiduciary duty.
The motion to strike the Second Count is granted.
Section
Plaintiff does not allege that he was a buyer of any securities, or that Advest advised him "as to the value of securities or their purchase or sale." Gorga v. Uniroyal Chemical Corp.,
The motion to strike the Third Count is granted.
(1) [W]hether the practice without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)]
A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.,
In order to allege a CUTPA violation properly, the Plaintiff must allege, inter alia, that the acts complained of were performed in the conduct of a trade or commerce. General Statutes §
The Eighth Count alleges that Advest was engaged in trade or commerce CT Page 15769 (Paragraph 42); that Advest, acting together with Kottler, Sims and TCP/TCPI1, conspired to prevent Plaintiff from benefitting from the business of TCP/TCPI by committing acts that were deceptive, fraudulent and manipulative (Paragraph 43); that the actions of Advest constituted a violation of §
The motion to strike the Eighth Count is denied.
David L. Fineberg Superior Court Judge
Amodio v. Cunningham , 182 Conn. 80 ( 1980 )
Conaway v. Prestia , 191 Conn. 484 ( 1983 )
Knapp v. New Haven Road Construction Co. , 150 Conn. 321 ( 1963 )
Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank , 188 Conn. 281 ( 1982 )
Coburn v. Lenox Homes, Inc. , 173 Conn. 567 ( 1977 )
Stowe v. Smith , 184 Conn. 194 ( 1981 )
Gorga v. Uniroyal Chemical Corp. , 45 Conn. Super. Ct. 24 ( 1996 )
Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. , 92 S. Ct. 898 ( 1972 )