DocketNumber: No. CV 96-0473361
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 4109-F, 17 Conn. L. Rptr. 14
Judges: FINEBERG, J. CT Page 4109-G
Filed Date: 5/10/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
This action arises from the attempt by the Plaintiff Pamela J. Byrnes to petition under General Statutes §
If the petition drive was successful, a delegate primary was to be held on May 21, 1996. On April 17, 1996, the last day for the filing of the same, Plaintiff Byrnes sought to file petitions containing more than the requisite number of signatures. The Defendant Eileen S. Horan, Democratic Party Registrar of Voters for the Town of West Hartford, rejected the petitions on the ground that one of the proposed delegates, named as required on the petitions, was not a registered Democrat.
The remaining named Plaintiffs are the ten proposed Byrnes' delegates. By agreement, Patrick Connors, a member of the party endorsed slate, was permitted to intervene as a party Defendant. Since the ruling by the Defendant Horan deprives the Plaintiffs of their otherwise statutory right to a primary, they are parties aggrieved.
It was incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to present a slate of ten delegates. General Statutes §§
One of the proposed delegates, Lorraine Rubinow, in fact was not a member of the Democratic Party, and thus was ineligible. Because of her ineligibility, the rejected submitted petitions did not set forth a full slate of eligible persons as required.
The Plaintiffs claims in essence are as follows:
1. The Plaintiffs Byrnes and Rubinow were misled to their detriment as to Rubinow's party affiliation by a member or members of the Defendant Registrar's Office, and thus the Defendant CT Page 4109-H Registrar is estopped from refusing to accept the subject petitions requiring a Primary.
2. The Defendant Horan had no authority under General Statutes §
9-412 to reject the completed petitions when presented on April 17, 1996.3. Although it is conceded that the Plaintiff Rubinow is not eligible, the remaining Plaintiffs are entitled to replace her as provided in General Statutes §
9-426 .
The complaint is in three counts. Count One seeks relief for the foregoing reasons under General Statutes §
II. THE MOTION TO DISMISS
The Court will first consider the Motion to Dismiss asserted by Intervening Defendant Connors, but not joined in by the Defendant Horan. The gist of the motion is that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the complaint was filed in the Superior Court Clerk's office rather than by its terms being made returnable to a specified judge thereof. The motion relies on the literal language of General Statutes §
Sec.
9-329a . (Formerly Sec.9-449 ). Contests and complaints in connection with any primary. Any elector or candidate aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with any primary . . . may bring his complaint to any judge of the Superior Court for appropriate action.
This Section then sets forth the permissible action to be taken by "such judge" and the timing therefor.
Section
The Complaint has been brought before a judge of the Superior Court and is being acted upon. The motion to dismiss is denied.
III. THE MERITS
A. Estoppel
The estoppel claim is predicated on purported misadvice given by members of the Defendant Registrar's Office. In March 1996, the Plaintiff Rubinow, upon being requested by the Plaintiff Byrnes to serve on the challenge petition slate, telephoned the Registrar's office to inquire of her party affiliation. She testified that an unnamed woman told her that she was a registered Democrat. Byrnes then listed her as a petition delegate. The Court has no reason not to accept Rubinow's testimony.
Plaintiff Byrnes testified that on April 11, 1996, when she brought in the delegate consent forms, she was advised that all was in order by the Assistant Registrar, who then typed the delegate names on the petition forms. Had that not been the case, Byrnes would have timely replaced Rubinow as a delegate.
There are two essential elements for an estoppel: the party must do or say something that is intended to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act in that belief, and the party so influenced must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done. Reinke v. Greenwich HospitalAssn.,
In addition, estoppel against a public agency is limited and may be invoked . . . only with great caution. . . . [I]t is the burden of the person claiming the estoppel to show that he exercised due diligence to ascertain the truth and that he not only lacked knowledge of the true state of things but had no convenient means of CT Page 4109-J acquiring that knowledge.
Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Dubno,
It is conceded that the Plaintiff Rubinow was at all relevant times a registered Republican, and thus ineligible to serve as a delegate on the challenge slate. On March 5, 1996, several weeks prior to her aforementioned telephone call, she had voted in the Republican Presidential Preference primary. After that call, she was given a voting list of registered Democrats from her neighborhood. Her name was not listed, although another resident at her condominium complex address was so listed.
Similar voting lists of registered Democrats had been obtained by the Plaintiff Byrnes and her supporters both before and after she solicited Rubinow. Obviously, Rubinow's name was not on any of these lists. In addition, up-to-date voting lists were available for public inspection n four books and two computer screens on the counter of the Registrar's Office.
The onus was on the Plaintiff Byrnes and her supporters to comply with the pertinent statutory requirements, including to make certain that the entire challenge delegate slate consisted of registered Democrats. Resources therefor were readily available. Estoppel does not lie. Kimberly-ClarkCorporation v. Dubno, supra.
B. Section
General Statutes §
Section
The registrar shall reject any page of a petition which does not contain the certifications provided in section
9-410 , or which is determined by said registrar to CT Page 4109-K have been circulated in violation of any other provision thereof.
Section
The Legislature is presumed to have acted with knowledge of existing law and with intent to create one consistent body of law. Zachs v. Groppo,
Section
Judgment shall enter in favor of the Defendants. No costs are authorized or allowed for or against any party.