DocketNumber: No. CV98-0419402S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 10789, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 53
Judges: ALANDER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 9/1/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The plaintiff initiated the subject action against the defendant seeking damages for the loss of business income and relocation expenses arising out of the renovation of the premises which previously served as its place of business. The plaintiff claims that it lost business and was forced to move due to the defendant's failure to enforce special conditions that it had placed on the rehabilitation of the building by its owner and by the defendant's failure to enforce the requirements of the fire safety code and the building code. The defendant has moved for summary judgment claiming that it is immune from Liability for any failure to enforce building or fire safety special conditions or regulations. For the foregoing reasons, the court agrees with the defendant.
"Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Scrapchanskyv. Plainfield,
The plaintiff is a karate school formerly located in the basement of the premises at 102 Broad Street in Guilford. In December of 1996, the defendant issued a building permit to Broad Street Investors, L.L.C. for interior renovations to the first floor of the premises located at 102 Broad Street and occupied by Trailblazers, Inc. The plaintiff alleges in its complaint that the town building official placed a special condition on the permit requiring emergency lighting and exit identification and that the town fire marshall placed a special condition mandating a second means of egress from the basement. The plaintiff also asserts that the state building code and the fire safety code require two or more exits from the basement premises. The plaintiff claims that during construction the second exit from the basement was blocked and all signs identifying the exit were removed. The plaintiff asserts that, despite numerous calls and complaints from the plaintiff, the defendant failed and neglected to enforce the special conditions and the provisions of the building and fire safety codes and that, as a result, it lost business income and was ultimately forced to relocate from 102 Broad Street.
A municipality enjoys governmental immunity for a breach of a discretionary duty, but not for a breach of a ministerial duty.1Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority,
In its complaint, the plaintiff asserts that for approximately seven months, from November 1996 through June 1997, the defendant failed to enforce the special permit conditions and the requirements of the building code and the fire safety code necessitating exit signs and two exits at the plaintiffs leased premises despite numerous complaints by the plaintiff. The defendant contends that any failure to act on its part involved discretionary duties for which it has immunity. The plaintiff counters that the defendant's duties were ministerial because town officials lacked the discretion to refuse to enforce the special conditions or the requirements of the building or fire safety code.
While the plaintiff may be correct that the defendant was obligated to enforce the regulatory provisions at issue here, it does not follow that the defendant was prohibited from exercising any judgment related to enforcement. Enforcement involves not only the issue of whether to enforce proscriptions but also how and when to do so. A claim that a municipality failed to enforce regulatory codes such as the building code and the fire safety code implicates duties that are discretionary. SeeEvon v. Andrews,
The plaintiff also asserts, without any supporting analysis, that one of the three recognized exceptions to the rule of municipal immunity for discretionary acts applies here.2 The plaintiff claims town officials should have known that their failure to act would likely subject an identifiable person to imminent harm. See Shore v. Stonington,
Finally, although the issue was not raised in the plaintiffs brief or in oral argument to the court, the plaintiffs amended complaint cites General Statutes §
In light of the above, the defendant has shown that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is hereby granted.
BY THE COURT
Judge Jon M. Alander