DocketNumber: No. CV 00 0271466
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 16188
Judges: WIESE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/18/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
On March 21, 2001, Ilowitz filed an amended answer and special defenses. The first special defense alleges that Ilowitz did not publish the report. The second special defense alleges that the report is privileged pursuant to General Statutes § 19-17b. The third special defense alleges that Ilowitz's statements are protected under a qualified or conditional privilege.
Ilowitz moves for summary judgment on the ground that there are no CT Page 16189 genuine issues of material fact and that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because his statements are protected by a qualified or conditional privilege. Ilowitz submits the following in support of his motion; his affidavit, the affidavit of his attorney, Robert Hirtle, a copy of the complaint and statement of demand, a copy of his amended answer and special defenses, certified deposition testimony of Pepin, a photocopy of the police accident report that Bajek was involved in, a copy of an Application for Benefits filed by Bajek's mother, a copy of a Proof of Claim signed by Bajek's mother. Also submitted by the defendant a narrative report issued by Pepin addressing Bajek's treatment, Pepin's Progress Report, billing statements related to Nationwide's claim concerning Bajek, a letter from Pepin's attorney to Nationwide, a copy of a letter sent by Pepin's attorney to Nationwide requesting that it pay Pepin's claim, a copy of a letter sent by Ilowitz to Bajek's parents regarding the independent medical exam and report, and a copy of Ilowitz's independent medical report.
On June 14, 2002, Pepin filed a memorandum in opposition arguing that Ilowitz's statements are not protected by a qualified or conditional privilege. Pepin submits his affidavit, the affidavit of his attorney, Frank Carrano, a copy of his complaint and statement in demand, a copy of the independent medical report issued by Ilowitz, a copy of Ilowitz's amended answer and special defense, photocopies of his uncertified deposition testimony,1 Nationwide's letter denying payment to Pepin, a copy of a letter sent by Pepin's attorney to Ilowitz requesting a copy of his independent medical report and Pepin's medical reports concerning Bajek's treatment, a copy of a First Report, dated July 9, 1996, a Progress Update regarding Bajek, dated October 18, 1996, two copies of Supplemental Reports regarding Bajek, dated December 20, 1996 and February 10, 1997, respectively and a Final Report, dated March 14, 1997.
Ilowitz moves for summary judgment on the ground that the statements he made were protected by a qualified or conditional privilege he shared with Nationwide. Ilowitz contends that the comments he made satisfy the elements necessary to establish the existence of a qualified or conditional privilege. Ilowitz argues that he and Nationwide share a "common business interest" and that "as Nationwide's agent, [he] shares the same interests, as well as his contractual obligation to Nationwide to develop a full and fair opinion on the medical merits of the claim." (Defendant's Memorandum, pp., 12 and 7, respectively.) Ilowitz concludes that his comments were made within the scope of the Nationwide's request, rendered in good faith and published to the proper party, in this case, Nationwide.
Pepin argues in opposition that Ilowitz's statements are not protected by a qualified or conditional privilege. Specifically, Pepin argues that Ilowitz's statements made to Nationwide were not: "(1) related to a protected interest; (2) limited in scope to their purpose; (3) made in good faith; (4) on a proper occasion; and (5) sent in a proper manner to proper parties only." (Plaintiff s Memorandum in Opposition, p., 1.) Pepin asserts that Nationwide and Ilowitz do not share a same common interest because statements made by an independent doctor hired to conduct an independent medical examination and report for an insurance company do not rise to a common business interest. Finally, Pepin argues in the alternative that if the court finds that Ilowitz's statements are protected by a qualified or conditional privilege then a material issue of fact exists as to whether he has abused that privilege.
"[A]gency is normally a question of fact." Hallas v. Boehmke Dobosz, Inc.,
Ilowitz sets forth the elements to establish the existence of a qualified or conditional privilege in order to prove that his statements were protected by the privilege. Ilowitz relies on his argument that asNationwide's agent he shares a common business interest with Nationwide, therefore, his statements are protected by a qualified or conditional privilege. Ilowitz has raised an issue of material fact regarding whether he was acting as an agent to Nationwide when he allegedly made those statements about Pepin. Ilowitz's reliance on his status as agent of Nationwide is a question of fact that must be decided by the trier of fact. The court cannot address, as a matter of law, the issue of whether Ilowitz's statements were protected by a qualified or conditional privilege until it is determined whether Ilowitz was acting as an agent of Nationwide at the time he allegedly made the statements about Pepin. Accordingly, Ilowitz has failed to satisfy his burden of showing the absence of a material fact. therefore, he is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
BY THE COURT
___________________ PETER EMMETT WIESE, JUDGE