DocketNumber: No. SPBR940927841
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 12060, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 112
Judges: TIERNEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 11/14/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Practice Book § 143 claiming that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction since the named plaintiff is the managing agent not the landlord.
The issue raised herein is whether a duly authorized agent of a landlord has standing to maintain a summary process action as the sole named plaintiff. The parties claim that this issue is of first impression in Connecticut.
A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert the lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Southport ManorConvalescent Center, Inc. v. Foley,
The Superior Court has subject matter jurisdiction over summary process action seeking possession of real property. Connecticut General Statutes §
A defective Notice to Quit deprives the court of subject matter jurisdictions. Rosato v. Keller, 5 CLT 325, p. 18.Windsor Properties Inc. v. The Great Atlantic and Pacific TeaCompany, Inc.
The Notice to Quit in this case was signed by Joseph F. Mulvey, Attorney for Landlord. An attorney may properly sign a Notice to Quit for the client. Webb v. Ambler,
The defendants are claiming that although Turnpike Properties may be the managing agent for the landlord, and by statute authorized to execute and issue a Notice to Quit, they have no standing in regards to the property and are not the proper plaintiff. Defendants claim this lack of standing deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction. They cite no housing or eviction cases for this for this proposition but instead rely on general cases on standing. CT Page 12063
Standing goes to the court's subject matter juridiction [jurisdiction].Balance Rock Condominium Association v. Pinarer, 10 CONN. L. RPTR. No. 11, 338 (January 3, 1994). "Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court: nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the right others are forged in hot controversy with each view fairly and vigorously represented." Reitzer v. Board of Trustees ofState Colleges,
With these general concepts of standing in mind the defendants point the court to the language of Second ExeterCorporation v. Harold Epstein,
The Second Exeter case is not on point. In both the examples given, Connecticut General Statutes give trustees the right to sue in their own name, C.G.S.
On the other hand C.G.S. §
This conclusion is buttressed by two Housing Court cases which discuss this subject, neither of which case directly ruled on standing. Arco Management Corp. v. David B. Sperryand Jacqueline Smith, SPNH 8201-719WH (February 4, 1981). (Superior Court, Housing Session/New Haven-Waterbury Vol. I, NH-27) (Foti J.) ruled on a Motion to Strike that a duly authorized management agent for the owner of record of the premises may bring a summary process action on behalf of its principal. In Arco the lease stated that Terrace Heights Apartments was the owner. It appears from the decision, although not specifically stated, that the owner was not named as a party plaintiff. There was no allegation that the owner assigned any rights to the named plaintiff, Arco Management Corp. The complaint alleged "the plaintiff is the duly authorized management agent for the owner of record of the premises. . ." The court held that since agency was pleaded a sufficient legal relationship was alleged.
In a trial decision, Judge West ruled that one of the special defenses that the named plaintiff had no standing was not established by the evidence. In Tartaglia v. RACCorporation d/b/a Glenwood Liquor Locker SPBR 8606-08205 April 16, 1987) (Superior Court Housing Session, Bridgeport-Norwalk, Vol. III SNBR 290) (West J.) the named plaintiff, Tartaglia, was the agent of the owners of a shopping center in Bridgeport. It appears from the decision that the owners of the shopping center entered in a lease with the defendant and the owners were not parties to the subsequent eviction action. The plaintiff presented evidence that he was the legal representative of the owner. The court held that the defendant failed to sustain its burden of proof on its standing special defense by rebutting what the court found to be plaintiff's credible evidence as to its status as an agent. Citing no authority other than C.G.S. §
The defendant further argues that the relief requested by the Turnpike Property's complaint, "a judgment of immediate possession," cannot be granted to the plaintiff since the named plaintiff has not alleged any ownership or possessory interest in the premises superior to the leasehold possessory interest of the tenant. This issue requires the court to either examine facts not alleged in the complaint or render a decision on the ultimate issues in this case. Neither of these actions are permitted to be considered by the court in a Motion to Dismiss. Southport ManorConvalescent Center, Inc. v. Foley, supra p. 16. The plaintiff's argument in this regard is that the plaintiff do not have the "legal interest" necessary to maintain an eviction action. Considerations of legal interests relate to the merits of the case and not proper considerations in a Motion to Dismiss. Considerations of legal interests goes to the merits whereas on the issue of standing the pleadings must meet the two prong test of Maloney v. Pac, supra 320-321; Ducharme v. Putnam, supra p. 139.
The principal issue in a summary process action is who is entitled to possession. Rosa v. Cristina,
The landlord, owner of the premises, can still be joined as a party plaintiff pursuant to C.G.S.
The court notes that a copy of the lease has been filed with the court as Exhibit B of the complaint pursuant to Practice Book § 141. Article Thirty Seven of the lease states "In any case where a dispute arises under this lease, the parties hereto agree that said dispute shall be settled by arbitration to take place in Bridgeport, Connecticut in accordance with the procedural rules then pertaining of the American Arbitration Association or any successor thereto." The issue in this matter regards a determination whether or not Article Eight of the lease was violated by allowing loitering in the vicinity of the building and whether or not certain notice provisions required by law and the lease have been followed. The arbitration clause appears to cover such a dispute.
Such an arbitration clause may fall within the province of C.G.S. §
Although neither party raised the issue of arbitration for the courts review, the court is bound to consider such an issue pursuant to C.G.S. §
The Motion to Dismiss is denied.
Jo-Mark Sand & Gravel Co. v. Pantanella , 139 Conn. 598 ( 1953 )
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Costle , 179 Conn. 415 ( 1980 )
Ducharme v. City of Putnam , 161 Conn. 135 ( 1971 )
Rosa v. Cristina , 135 Conn. 364 ( 1949 )
Vogel v. Bacus , 133 Conn. 95 ( 1946 )
Webb v. Ambler , 125 Conn. 543 ( 1939 )
Windsor Properties v. Great Atlantic Pac. Tea , 35 Conn. Super. Ct. 297 ( 1979 )
Urban v. Prims , 35 Conn. Super. Ct. 233 ( 1979 )
Evergreen Corporation v. Brown , 35 Conn. Super. Ct. 549 ( 1978 )
Duguay v. Hopkins , 191 Conn. 222 ( 1983 )