DocketNumber: No. CV93303250
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 11127, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 20
Judges: THIM, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 11/10/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Marina Associates seeks to enforce a judgment entered against the defendant in New Jersey. The defendant has filed three special defenses. In the first special defense, the defendant alleges that the plaintiff violated
A motion to strike may be used to test the legal sufficiency of a special defense. Practice Book § 152(5); Nowak v. Nowak,
"As a matter of federal law, the full faith and credit clause requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it." Packer Plastics, Inc. v. Laundon,
The defendant's first special defense is based on
(a) Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any consumer shall . . . .
(2) . . . bring such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity —
(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or
(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of the action.
The defendant alleges that he was a resident of Trumbull, Connecticut, and further alleges that venue for the first lawsuit was more properly situated in the Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Fairfield. The plaintiff claims that these allegations are legally insufficient to raise a defense because (1) the venue provision of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act allows the debt collector to bring suit where the consumer signed the contract sued upon and (2) the defendant waived the privilege of challenging venue by failing to object in the New Jersey court.
The defendant can not rely upon § 1692i to attack the New CT Page 11127-B Jersey judgment. "Venue is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural one . . . . Statutory venue requirements `simply [confer] a privilege not to be required to attend court at a particular location' . . . . Accordingly, it may be waived by the parties . . . ." (Citations omitted.) Savage v. Aronson,
In the second and third special defenses, the defendant claims that the enforcement of a gambling debt is against Connecticut's public policy, as stated in General Statutes §
In Casanova Club v. Bisharat,
In Hilton International Co. v. Arace, supra, the plaintiff obtained a judgment against the defendant in the Superior Court of Puerto Rico based on gambling debts incurred by the defendant in the plaintiff's casino located in Puerto Rico. In upholding the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff casino, the three-judge panel summarized the governing principles as follows:
[a] valid judgment rendered in one State of the United States will be recognized and enforced in a sister State even though the strong public policy of the latter State would have precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim . . . . The court, no matter what its feelings may be on the subject of CT Page 11127-C gambling, is required to obey the command of the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution. The public policy of Connecticut cannot prevail against the command of the federal constitution.
Id., 530.
In the present case, the plaintiff is suing to enforce a New Jersey judgment. The defendant alleges the judgment is based upon the defendant's failure to pay a gambling debt owed to the plaintiff. In the absence of a challenge by the defendant based on the New Jersey court's exercise of jurisdiction, the judgment of the New Jersey court is entitled to full faith and credit. The fact that the public policy of Connecticut forbids the extension of credit for purposes of enabling a person to gamble is not a defense to the enforcement of the judgment. Accordingly, the motion to strike the second and third special defenses must be granted.
The motion to strike is granted as to all three special defenses.
THIM, JUDGE