DocketNumber: No. CV00 037 90 20
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 17175
Judges: GALLAGHER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/14/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
The defendant filed an answer to the complaint on June 21, 2001. In it, it denies that it is the owner of the property, that it had fill control of the premises, and that it was responsible for security. It admits that it entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff which allowed him to occupy a building on the property, but not that this was in return for the plaintiff's services to Hitchcock Marine and its customers. It denies that Hitchcock Marine agreed that the plaintiff could keep his tools, parts and equipment in the building, or work on boats inside it, or that the tools, personal property and equipment of the plaintiff were destroyed in the fire. Finally, it denies that the fire was caused by its failure to provide adequate and sufficient security for the premises.
On September 25, 2001, Hitchcock Marine filed a motion for summary judgment, accompanied by a memorandum of law, claiming that there is no CT Page 17177 genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The motion was supported by certified copies of the sworn deposition testimony of the plaintiff,2 and copies of the police and fire departments' incident reports regarding the fire. The plaintiff has not filed any opposing affidavits or other available documentary evidence.
"Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co.,
Hitchcock Marine argues in its memorandum that: it could only be liable for the loss of the plaintiff's personal property if it was a bailee of that property; the plaintiff was a licensee, not a bailor; and, because the plaintiff was a licensee, Hitchcock Marine did not breach any duty of care it had to him.
"The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Maffucci v. Royal Park Ltd.Partnership.
"In general, there is an ascending degree of duty owed by the possessor of land to persons on the land based on their entrant status, i.e., trespasser, licensee or invitee." Morin v. Bell Court Condominium Assn.,Inc.,
"A business visitor is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings between them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Laube v. Stevenson,
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that he entered into an oral agreement with Hitchcock Marine, whereby he could operate a business from a building at the rear of the property that was in possession of Hitchcock Marine, in return for providing services to Hitchcock Marine and its customers. From the plaintiff's deposition testimony a factfinder could conclude that the plaintiff was a business invitee, and that he had more than mere permission to be on the premises, because he was invited to be on the premises to make it convenient for him to repair boats for the benefit of Hitchcock Marine and its customers. Deposition of Douglas Balakier, pp. 23-25. Even if the invitation was not an express invitation, "[a]n invitation is implied where one person goes upon the land of another for their mutual benefit." Guilford v. Yale University,
The plaintiff's allegation and deposition testimony does not settle this issue, however, because, although Hitchcock Marine admits that it entered into an oral agreement with the plaintiff which allowed him to CT Page 17179 occupy a building on the property, it does not admit that this was in return for services to Hitchcock Marine and its customers. Furthermore, Hitchcock Marine has not submitted evidence to establish that the plaintiff's occupancy of the building was not in return for his services. It is submitted, therefore, that there is a factual dispute, with regard to the intent of the parties, underlying the question of whether the plaintiff was a licensee or a business invitee.4 "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court's function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist."Nolan v. Borkowski,
If the plaintiff was an invitee, then the duty to the plaintiff owed by Hitchcock Marine is accordingly greater than that owed to a licensee. "A possessor of land has a duty to an invitee to reasonably inspect and maintain the premises in order to render them reasonably safe." Morin v.Bell Court Condominium Assn., Inc., supra,
Because there is a factual dispute with regard to the intent of the parties to the oral agreement, which determines whether the plaintiff was a licensee or a business invitee, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
GALLAGHER, J.