DocketNumber: No. CV94 070 53 25 S
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 3069
Judges: WAGNER, J.
Filed Date: 3/30/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
When the defendant failed to pay the installments of principal due on December 21, 1991 and 1992, the plaintiff, in a prior action, foreclosed on the mortgaged property and obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure on October 25, 1993 with a law day of April 18, 1994. Plaintiff claims that the defendant has failed to make any payments due in 1993 as well as those due and payable at the time of commencing this action and has elected to treat the entire unpaid balance, of not less than $42,000.00, as immediately due and payable.
On November 30, 1994, the defendant filed this motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff's action is barred under General Statutes §§
The defendant claims that since the plaintiff failed, in the foreclosure action, to request a deficiency judgment within thirty days after the time of redemption as required by General Statutes §
Plaintiff argues that the motion to dismiss is not the proper motion with which to respond to the complaint where the defendant makes no claim of lack of jurisdiction. Substantively, the plaintiff claims that because the note contained no acceleration provision, she was limited to proceed on that portion of the debt which was outstanding as of the commencement of the foreclosure action, specifically the principal payments which were due on December 21, 1991 and 1992. Therefore, the plaintiff argues that she could not have proceeded for a deficiency judgment under General Statutes §
In CTB Realty Ventures XXII, Inc. v. Markoski,
"`Under General Statutes [§]
49-1 , a judgment of strict foreclosure extinguishes all rights of the foreclosing mortgagee on the underlying note, except those enforceable through the use of the deficiency judgment procedure delineated in General Statutes [§]49-14 . . . . Such a deficiency judgment, in light of [General Statutes §]49-1 , is, therefore, the only available means of satisfying a mortgage debt when the security is inadequate to make the foreclosing plaintiff whole. . . .'"
Moreover, Section
Although there are no reported cases dealing with the question of an independent action on a note having no acceleration clause after foreclosure we believe that the reasoning in Bank of Hartford, Inc. v. Sereno,
In Sereno, the defendant executed to the plaintiff CT Page 3072 multiple mortgages on three properties to secure a loan to the defendant. The defendant ceased payments and the plaintiff commenced three foreclosure actions to foreclose the three mortgages. A judgment of strict foreclosure entered against one of the properties and title vested in the plaintiff. When the sale of that property did not satisfy the debt, the plaintiff brought a subsequent action to foreclose on the second property, but more than thirty days after title in the first property vested in the plaintiff.
The court reasoned that in a multi-mortgage situation, the mortgagee may proceed in stages and thereby foreclose only on those mortgages needed to satisfy the debt. The court concluded that upon foreclosure of the first property, the plaintiff could not have proceeded to obtain a deficiency judgment since a balance of the debt remained outstanding and was secured by a duly recorded mortgage on the second property; at that point, there simply was no deficiency.
Following this reasoning since one cannot proceed for a deficiency judgment where there is no deficiency, General Statutes §
It is an accepted rule of statutory construction that "those who promulgate statutes or rules do not intend to promulgate statutes or rules that lead to absurd consequences or bizarre results." American Mortgage Corp. v. Hope,
We interpret the statute as not barring further action on sums not yet due under the note at the time of foreclosure. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is denied.
Wagner, J. CT Page 3073