DocketNumber: No. X01 CV 99 0160453S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 11626, 28 Conn. L. Rptr. 208
Judges: HODGSON, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 9/22/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In their action, which they have titled "Complaint, Petition and Administrative Appeal, " some of the plaintiffs allege they are New Haven residents who drive, ride bicycles, commute, fish and live in neighborhoods that may be affected by development of the site selected by defendant Long Wharf Galleria, LLC ("Long Wharf") for the development of a large shopping mall, and some of the plaintiffs allege they are residents of Branford and Orange who commute to work and other destinations on Interstate Routes 91 and 95 and state highway 34. CT Page 11627
The plaintiffs seek review of the actions of the Commission in denying them intervenor status in administrative proceedings in which the Commission issued a certificate of operation to Long Wharf. They also appeal from the Commission's issuance of the traffic certificate. In addition, the plaintiffs seek unspecified injunctive relief.
In its motion, the Commission has characterized the plaintiffs' action as an administrative appeal. Because of the title and because many of the allegations included in the forty-four pages of the "Complaint, Petition and Administrative Appeal" appear to be factual allegations in support of the plaintiffs' claim for injunctive relief, the court questioned plaintiffs' counsel at oral argument concerning the apparent intention of the plaintiffs to combine an administrative appeal with a civil action for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs' counsel resisted the court's characterization of the complaint as wholly and exclusively an administrative appeal but did not take the position that the pleading was solely a complaint in a civil action and did not object to the court's deciding the motion to dismiss those portions of the complaint that appeal from the Commission's denial of intervention and the granting of Long Wharfs application for a traffic certificate.
The Commission has not filed an motion addressed to the propriety of the plaintiffs' apparent combining of an administrative appeal with a civil action for injunctive relief. The motion to dismiss is addressed only to the administrative appeal. The court will therefore not decide in this decision whether the plaintiff has validly commenced a civil action as well as an administrative appeal in the pleading that is before this court only on the Commission's motion to dismiss the appeal from its issuance of a certificate of operation.
"In ruling on a motion to dismiss a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader." Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien,
It is also well established that there is no right of appeal from a decision of an administrative agency except as created by statute: "It is fundamental that appellate jurisdiction in administrative appeals is created only by statute and can be acquired and exercised only in the manner prescribed by statute." Munhall v. Inland Wetlands Commission,
The Supreme Court has held that "[t]he legislature intended the forty-five day time limitation for filing of an appeal under the [Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, Conn. Gen. Stats. §
Connecticut General Statutes §
The Commission, by letter, denied the plaintiffs' motion to intervene on September 20, 1999. The forty-fifth day thereafter was November 4, 1999. On November 4, 1999, the plaintiffs served their "Complaint, CT Page 11629 Petition and Administrative Appeal" on Jane S. Scholl, who is identified in the sheriff's return as "Associate Attorney General for the State of Connecticut, whom (sic) is duly authorized to accept service on behalf of the within named defendant: State Traffic Commission." The plaintiffs did not, however, file their appeal with the clerk of the Superior Court until November 10, 1999, the fifty-first day after the denial of the petition to intervene.
The Commission approved Long Wharfs application for a certificate on September 27, 1999. The plaintiffs' appeal was both served and filed within forty-five days of this approval.
The Appellate Court has ruled, in a case now before the Connecticut Supreme Court, that a party who can make a colorable claim to intervention as a matter of right and who is denied intervenor status in an administrative proceeding cannot await the outcome of an agency's action but must appeal from the denial of intervention within forty-five days of that denial. Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, supra,
The ruling of the Appellate Court in Nizzardo concerns precisely the same issue that is presented to this court, regarding an appeal from precisely the same administrative body. Even the source of the claimed right to intervene, the EPA, is the same in the two cases. The Appellate Court determined that a party seeking to intervene in an administrative proceedings pursuant to §
The plaintiffs have urged this court not to follow the holding inNizzardo but to adopt the approach of federal courts that have ruled that a party who is denied intervention has the option of appealing either after that denial or after the agency's ultimate ruling. The controlling precedent of Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission, supra,
The fundamental test for determining classical aggrievement encompasses a well-settled twofold determination: first, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the challenged action, as distinguished from a general interest, such as is the concern of all members of the community as a whole. Second, the party claiming aggrievement must successfully establish that this specific personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision. MedTrans ofConnecticut, Inc. v. Dept. of Public Health Addiction Services,
Though the plaintiffs urge this court to apply federal concepts of aggrievement, the Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that "[w]e are not required to apply federal precedent in determining the issue of aggrievement. New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission, [
The Commission asserts that the interests alleged by the plaintiffs in their appeal are insufficient to establish aggrievement. Pleading and proof of aggrievement are prerequisites t the trial court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal. Bakelaar v. West Haven,
`193 Conn, 59, 65 (1984); Beckish v. Manaforte,
The plaintiffs allege that they use the roads that will be affected by traffic from the proposed mall to commute to their businesses and jobs and to health care facilities and that they will be delayed and subjected to greater risk of motor vehicle accidents because of increased volume of traffic. Plaintiff John Isaacs alleges that the traffic congestion and delays caused by the proposed mall, in combination with another construction project, will deter customers from shopping at his store as well as others in downtown New Haven. (Appeal, paras.
Plaintiffs Stewart Hutchins and Christel Manning allege that the health and environmental consequences of the increased traffic associated with the mall will substantially interfere with their ability to run and/or bicycle and "enjoy life in New Haven." (Appeal, paras. 17, 24.) Hutchings also alleges that his recreational use of the public waterfront at New Haven Harbor will be less enjoyable because of increased traffic on the adjoining roadways. (Appeal, para. 18.) Plaintiffs Hutchings and Smith allege that increased traffic is likely to produce more air pollution that will aggravate health conditions from which they suffer. (Appeal, CT Page 11632 paras. 16, 48, 49.)
The Commission asserts that the interests alleged by the plaintiffs are general interests affected only in the same way as the interests of the general public, not "specific personal and legal interests [that will be] specially and injuriously affected by the challenged action." Nizzardo v.State Traffic Commission, supra,
Anyone wishing to use the roads at issue has, of course, a right to do so. The plaintiffs have alleged no specific personal legal entitlement concerning their use of these roads nor the volume of traffic on them, as might be present if they were owners of a private roadway. Unlike the plaintiffs who were held to have sufficiently alleged aggrievement in Cohnv. State Traffic Commission, Docket No. 20653 (Conn.Super. April 5, 1987), the plaintiffs do not allege that they own and reside in premises adjacent or in close proximity to the site, such that the traffic design approved by the Commission would imperil their safety in gaining access to or leaving their own homes. In Nizzardo v. State Traffic Commission,
supra,
In those few cases in which the alleged injury was the inconvenience or other consequences of traffic congestion, the courts have based their finding that the plaintiff had standing on the fact that the plaintiff owned a residence or operated a business in the immediate vicinity of the challenged development. In Bright v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
To conclude that all those who use a roadway are aggrieved by administrative actions concerning land development along that roadway that increases traffic would give little effect to the requirement that an appellant allege and prove a "specific personal and legal interest [that] has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision." (Emphasis supplied.) United Cable Television Services Corp. v. Departmentof Public Utility Control,
On its face, §
In Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co.,
We have recently concluded . . . that invocation of the EPA is not an open sesame for standing to raise environmental claims with regard to any and all environmental legislation. In Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Stamford, [supra,]
192 Conn. 247 . . ., we held that §22a-19 of the EPA, which permits any person, on the filing of a verified pleading, to intervene in any administrative proceeding and to raise therein environmental issues CT Page 11635 "must be read in connection with the legislation which defines the authority of the particular administrative agency. Section22a-19 is not intended to expand the jurisdictional authority of an administrative body whenever an intervenor raises environmental issues. Thus, an inland wetland agency is limited to considering only environmental matters which impact on inland wetlands. Other environmental impacts must be raised before other appropriate administrative bodies, f any, or in their absence by the institution of an independent action pursuant to §22a-16 ."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Contrary to the position of the Commission in the instant case, the Supreme Court did not rule that §
The Court explained the scope of its ruling in Connecticut Fund for theEnvironment, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, in Connecticut Water Co. v.Beausoleil, supra,
In Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., [supra,] 192 Conn. . . . 596 . . . and Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Stamford, [supra,]
192 Conn. 250 . . ., we recognized that General Statutes §22a-19 does not expand the jurisdictional authority of an administrative body acting pursuant to a separate act of title 22a to hear any and all environmental matters, but rather, limits an intervenor to the raising of those environmental matters which impact on the particular subject of the act pursuant to which the commissioner is acting. Middletown v. Hartford Electric Light Co., supra, [192 Conn.] 597; Connecticut Fund for the Environment, Inc. v. Stamford, supra, [192 Conn.] 250-51.3
(Emphasis in original; footnote added.)
The Court ruled in Beausoleil that since the commissioner whose decision was at issue in that case was acting pursuant to the provisions of the Water Pollution Control Act, Conn. Gen. Stats. §§
The Appellate Court has suggested a more limiting construction, ruling that intervention is authorized by §
Similarly, in Connecticut Post Ltd. Partnership v. South CentralConnecticut Regional Council of Govermnents, supra,
If the Appellate Court meant that only an agency with environmental jurisdiction could consider environmental issues raised pursuant to §
The agency in the case now before this court asserts that the plaintiffs lacked standing to intervene in its review of Long Wharfs application because the environmental issues that they sought to raise relate to subject matter that is not within its jurisdiction. It asserts that it is in the same position as the agency in Connecticut Fund for theEnvironment, Inc. v. Stamford, supra,
The statute under which the Commission reviewed Long Wharfs submission is Conn. Gen. Stat.
No person, firm, corporation, state agency, or municipal agency or combination thereof shall build, expand, establish or operate any . . . shopping center or other development generating large volumes of traffic, having an exit or entrance on, or abutting or adjoining, any state highway or substantially affecting state highway traffic within this state until such person or agency has procured from the State Traffic Commission a certificate that the operation thereof will not imperil the safety of the public.
Conn. Gen Stat. §
[I]n determining the advisability of such certification, the State Traffic Commission shall include, in its consideration, highway safety, the width and character of the highways affected, the density of traffic thereon, the character of such traffic and the opinion and findings of the traffic authority of the municipality wherein the development CT Page 11638 is located. If the State Traffic Commission determines that traffic signals, pavement markings, channelization, pavement widening or other changes or traffic control devices are required to handle traffic safely and efficiently, one hundred percent of the cost thereof shall be borne by the person building, establishing or operating such . . . shopping center or other development generating large volumes of traffic . . .
These provisions do not entrust to the Commission authority to determine where a mall or other development that generates large volumes of traffic should be located. They do not confer authority on the Commission to act as a land use or zoning authority. Instead, the authority conferred by these provisions is to review the plans for routing and organizing the traffic generated by the use, so that the builder of such a use will not route the traffic in a way that imperils the safety of the public.
Pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. §
The plaintiffs allege in their appeal that they sought to present to the Commission evidence that the proposed traffic-generator, the Long Wharf mall, would have an impact on air quality and on issues of convenience and quality of life that would be affected by the siting of source of heavy traffic on the proposed site. In the petition to intervene that they submitted to the Commission, (appended to Long Wharfs brief in support of the Commission's motion to dismiss) the plaintiffs sought to have the Commission consider whether a mall should be permitted on the proposed site because "3. Operation of the proposed regional shopping center will generate a substantial volume of motor vehicle trips in addition to those currently taking place on the highways and roads adjacent to the site. The site-generated traffic will discharge pollutants into the air, including carbon monoxide, volatile organic compounds, oxides of nitrogen and particulate matter." The petition alleges that the siting of the mall will "result in unacceptable levels of service at roadways serving the site," (Petition, para. 4.) and that the "cumulative impact of traffic generated by the proposed shopping center, in combination with other transportation projects and background traffic volume in the immediate vicinity, will add to the congest of CT Page 11639 roadways service the site and will result in associated environmental problems. (Petition, para. 5.)
No allegation in the petition to intervene is addressed to the issues of particular traffic patterns for entering and leaving the facility or safety markings in the traffic pattern for the proposed mall. All of the allegations are concerned with the determination whether a mall is a use that should be permitted by the Commission at the proposed site in view of the existing traffic in the area.
The Commission does not dispute in its motion that clean air is a natural resource, and it does not dispute that it was engaged in reviewing the roadway plan for regulating traffic in the environs of the proposed development. It points out, however, that the topic before it was not whether a mall should be developed at the site, but whether the proposals for routing and otherwise regulating traffic to and from the mall would result in a pattern that would not "imperil the safety of the public," the standard imposed by Conn. Gen. Stat. §
The plaintiffs were asking the Commission to determine not the adequacy of Long Wharfs plan for organizing traffic but whether a mall should exist on the site at all, because of the prospect that it would generate large volumes of traffic that would result in air pollution. The plaintiffs were asking the Commission to exercise the powers of a land-use regulator. These powers are not within the Commission's jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has not, however, as the Commission asserts, further limited intervention pursuant to §
Contrary to the plaintiffs view, the Commission is not an agency charged with determining what uses may be made of particular sites, and it has no authority to decide whether a mall should exist on the site chosen by Long Wharf. Its jurisdiction extends only to review of the plan for operating the roadways of the facility and regulating the traffic entering and leaving the site in a manner that would not imperil the public.
The plaintiffs do not have standing to require the Commission to consider whether Long Wharf should be permitted to develop a mall on the CT Page 11640 site on the basis of asserted harm to the public trust in natural resources from creation of traffic caused by the siting of the mall. Unlike Connecticut Post Mall Limited Partnership, which has also filed an appeal from the Commission's granting of Long Wharfs application, the plaintiffs have raised only issues outside the subject matter that the Commission had authority to regulate.
Similarly, in the case before this court, the action of the State Traffic Commission in reviewing Long Wharfs plan for traffic management is not the action that causes the harm of which the plaintiffs complain. They are complaining about the siting of the mall and the authorization for the particular location to be used as a mall. Nothing in the statutory authority of the Commission empowered it to make that determination.
The plaintiffs apparently reason that because a denial of a traffic certificate would have stopped development of the mall, granting of a certificate caused their harm. The test for aggrievement in the context of an administrative appeal is not, however, a mere matter of causation in fact, rather the administrative agency must have made the decision that harms the plaintiffs interest. In this case, the decision that the plaintiffs challenge is the land use decision to permit the siting of the CT Page 11641 mall in the particular location at issue. Nothing in Conn. Gen. Stat. §§
The plaintiffs have not pleaded facts that sufficiently allege classical aggrievement from the Commission's final action on the application.
The motion to dismiss their administrative appeal is therefore granted. As has been explained above, the plaintiffs have combined a civil action with their administrative appeal. The court dismisses only the portion of their pleading that is the appeal from the decision of the Commission.
Beverly J. Hodgson Judge of the Superior Court
Mystic Marinelife Aquarium, Inc. v. Gill , 175 Conn. 483 ( 1978 )
McDermott v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 150 Conn. 510 ( 1963 )
Beckish v. Manafort , 175 Conn. 415 ( 1978 )
Tucker v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 151 Conn. 510 ( 1964 )
City of New Haven v. Public Utilities Commission , 165 Conn. 687 ( 1974 )
Bright v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 149 Conn. 698 ( 1962 )
Farricielli v. Connecticut Personnel Appeal Board , 186 Conn. 198 ( 1982 )