DocketNumber: No. CV 97 0074906
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 892
Judges: PICKETT, STATE JUDGE REFEREE.
Filed Date: 1/15/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On December 8, 1997, the defendant filed a motion to strike counts three and five of the plaintiffs' complaint on the basis that the exclusivity provisions of the Product Liability Act preclude breach of warranty and CUTPA claims. Pursuant to Practice Book § 155, the defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion to strike. On January 8, 1998, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Faulkner v.United Technologies Corp.,
In support of the motion to strike, the defendant argues that the exclusivity provision of the PLA, General Statutes §
The plaintiffs argue that the motion to strike count three should not be granted because count three alleges harm not within the scope of the PLA. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that their claim for breach of warranty alleges harm in the form of monetary losses rather than damage to property or personal injury. Count five should not be stricken, according to the plaintiffs, because CUTPA claims are not specifically abrogated by the PLA. As well, the plaintiffs argue that the CUTPA claim is not the functional equivalent of their PLA claim because the CUTPA claim alleges facts not contained in the PLA claim.
The plain language of General Statutes §
In deciding the issue of whether a CUTPA claim may be pleaded in conjunction with a PLA claim, this court applies the functional analysis test. "The functional analysis test recognizes the distinction between the issues of manufacture, design, and marketing addressed by the PLA and the issues of conduct addressed by CUTPA, while at the same time acknowledging the exclusivity of the PLA where warranted." Fiondella v.Chrysler Motors Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford-New Britain at New Britain, Docket No. 469048 (March 13, 1996, Fineberg, J.) (
"For a product liability action based on negligence, [the] plaintiff must plead and prove that the product was defective and that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury. [Conversely], [a] court should employ the following criteria when determining whether a practice violates CUTPA: (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)]. All these criteria need not be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness and a practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser degree it meets all three." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Geissler v. Ford
CT Page 895Motor Company, supra,
In their CUTPA claim, the plaintiffs incorporate the allegations contained in their PLA claim. Additionally, however, the plaintiffs include allegations of relying on particular statements made by the defendant. As well, the plaintiffs include an allegation that the frame of the motor-home was painted to conceal its actual condition. Finally, the CUTPA claim invokes the "immoral, oppressive and unscrupulous" language of the cigarette rule. Such allegations are not necessary to support a product liability claim in negligence. These allegations, however, may support a CUTPA claim if proven. Because the plaintiffs' CUTPA claim is not functionally identical to their product liability claim, the motion to strike count five is denied.
For the reasons discussed, the motion to strike is granted as to count three and denied as to count five.
HON. WALTER M. PICKETT, JR.State Judge Referee