DocketNumber: No. CV94 31 42 24 S
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 9493, 22 Conn. L. Rptr. 437
Judges: NADEAU, J.
Filed Date: 7/16/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The law firm, as a third party plaintiff, filed a two-count third-party complaint against an accounting firm alleging that they failed to comply with their professional responsibilities by disclosing the plaintiffs' financial information to a certain bank without the plaintiffs' consent. The law firm alleges that if the accounting firm had disclosed to the plaintiffs that it had relayed financial information to the bank the plaintiffs would not have completed the real estate transaction, for such disclosure would have brought the plaintiffs to a fuller understanding of the proposition and ultimate transaction which they would have rejected. The law firm claims it is "entitled to contribution/apportionment if a judgment is rendered in favor of the main Plaintiffs in this action."
On April 29, 1998, the accounting firm filed a motion to strike the law firm's third party complaint on the ground that it alleges a purely commercial loss, which they assert is not recoverable in a third party action for contribution. The law firm filed an objection to the motion to strike, arguing that apportionment among joint tortfeasors should be allowed as a matter of common law in negligence actions involving commercial losses. The matter was heard by the court on June 22, 1998.
In examining the historical meaning of the phrase "damage to property," the Supreme Court has held that "the reference in §
The law firm alleges that the accountant was negligent in breaching his professional responsibilities as a certified public accountant, and that this breach caused the plaintiffs' loss. This court declines to accept the contention that the phrase "damage to property" does not encompass a purely commercial loss in the context of the apportionment portion of the statute, in light of the Supreme Court's holding that as a matter of common law purely commercial losses are recoverable under thecomparative negligence portion of the statute, which utilizes the same phrase.3 Accordingly, the accounting firm's motion to strike the law firm's third party apportionment complaint is denied.
NADEAU, JUDGE