DocketNumber: No. CV98-0492622
Citation Numbers: 1999 Conn. Super. Ct. 2190
Judges: McWEENY, J.
Filed Date: 2/16/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The facts underlying this appeal are not in dispute. CSEA and the Division were parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("agreement") for the Division's Inspector and Supervisory Inspector employees. (Return of Record ("ROR"), Full Stipulation of the Parties ("Stipulation"), p. 2, ¶¶ 3-4.) The agreement expired on June 30, 1994 and included a provision for reopening negotiations on the issues of wages for the 1993-1994 contract year. (ROR, Stipulation, p. 2, ¶ 4.) Following the rejection of a wage reopener arbitration award by the General Assembly, the CT Page 2191 reopener wage issues were combined with negotiations for a successor to the expiring collective bargaining agreement. (ROR, Stipulation, p 2, ¶ 5.) The parties were unable to reach an agreement and entered into binding interest arbitration pursuant to General Statutes §
In accordance with General Statutes
Thereafter, on May 16, 1996, CSEA filed an amended complaint (SPP-18, 211) with the Board alleging that the Division had violated the Act Concerning Collective Bargaining for State Employees ("SERA") by failing to pay interest on the arbitration award for the Inspectors unit pursuant to General Statutes §
On November 19, 1997, the Board in its final decision dismissed CSEA's complaint finding that the Division did not violate SERA by failing to pay interest on the retroactive wage payments pursuant to the arbitration awards. Specifically, the CT Page 2192 Board determined that the award was issued at a time when the legislature was not in session and therefore could not have considered it within sixty days from its issuance.
"Thus, there was no way for the legislature to approve or reject the award ``pursuant to
On December 31, 1997, CSEA filed the present administrative appeal challenging that portion of the Board's final decision dealing with the Division's failure to pay interest on retroactive wage payments. Briefs were timely filed by the parties and oral argument was heard by this court on October 20, 1998. The parties agreed at oral argument that the dispositive claim before this court is the construction and application of General Statutes §
"The standard of review of an agency decision is well established. Ordinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a statute applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the statutes' purposes . . . An agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight by the courts. . . . Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion. . . . Furthermore, when a state agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny the agency is not entitled to special deference. . . . It is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law. . . ." (Brackets omitted; citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Assn. of Not-For-Profit Providers for the Aging v. Dept. ofCT Page 2193Social Services,
In the present case, CSEA maintains that §
In opposition, the defendants maintain that the statute requires payment of interest only on "overdue" payments. According to the defendants, the payments were not overdue because the legislature did not have an opportunity to consider the award within sixty days from its issuance because the legislature was not in session until March of 1996.
The relevant statutory provisions that are the subject of CSEA's appeal provides as follows:
Whenever a monetary settlement is awarded pursuant to an interest arbitration proceeding conducted pursuant to section
5-276a , and such award is not rejected by the legislature pursuant to section5-278 , and payment is not made in accordance with the terms of such settlement within sixty days of the date such award was issued, the party liable for such payment shall be required to pay interest, at the rate of five per cent per annum, on such overdue payment, calculated from the date the award was issued.
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes
If the General Assembly is in session, it shall vote to approve or reject such agreement or award within thirty days after the date of filing. If the General Assembly is not in session when such agreement or award is filed, it shall be submitted to the General Assembly within ten days of the first day of the next regular session or special session called for such purpose. The agreement or award shall be deemed approved if the General Assembly fails to vote to approve or reject such agreement or award within thirty days after such filing or submission. The thirty-day period shall not begin or expire unless the General Assembly is in CT Page 2194 regular session. For the purpose of this subsection, any agreement or award filed with the clerks within thirty days before the commencement of a regular session of the General Assembly shall be deemed to be filed on the first day of such session.
General Statutes §
No cases have been cited, nor have any been found, which address the issue presently before the court. Nonetheless, the history on interest arbitration of state employee collective bargaining disputes is helpful in understanding the statutes at issue. Interest arbitration was first established for state employees by Public Act 1986, No.
Thereafter, the legislature enacted Public Act 1987, No.
Public Act 1989, No.
The provisions of
According to the rules of statutory construction "a court must construe a statute as written. . . . Courts may not by construction supply omissions . . . or add exceptions merely because it appears that good reasons exist for adding them. . . . The intent of the legislature, as this court has repeatedly CT Page 2195 observed, is to be found not in what the legislature meant to say, but in the meaning of what it did say. . . . It is axiomatic that the court itself cannot rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. That is a function of the legislature." LeoFedus Sons Construction Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals,
Applying the above principles, this court finds that a plain reading of §
The Board was also in error in concluding that there was no way for the legislature to approve or reject the award within sixty days of its issuance because at the time the award was submitted, the legislature was not in session. General Statutes §
The plaintiff's appeal is sustained and the Board's decision is vacated. The Board is directed pursuant to §
Robert F. McWeeny, J.