DocketNumber: No. CV 96 0150073
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 13430, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 302
Judges: LEWIS, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 10/21/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The plaintiff did not file an objection to the referee's report as authorized by Practice Book §
The case began on November 20, 1995 with the filing by the plaintiff of a mechanic's lien on the defendant's property in the amount of $52,918. On January 18, 1996, the plaintiff commenced an action to foreclose this lien. On April 12, 1996, the plaintiff filed an offer of judgment in the amount of $40,000 in accordance with General Statutes §
The attorney trial referee conducted a trial and then submitted a report to the court containing his factual findings, conclusions and recommendations as required by Practice Book §
Based on these findings of fact, the attorney trial referee concluded that: (1) the plaintiff was owed $37,755 for the breach of the landscaping contract and $6,493 for providing containers and disposing of debris, a total due the plaintiff of $44,248; (2) because of the negligent rebuilding of a portion of the stone wall, the defendant was entitled to recover $8,700 on its counterclaim; (3) the defendant wrongfully withheld the money it owed to the plaintiff which is therefore entitled to recover General Statutes §
The defendant does not object to the imposition of prejudgment interest based on General Statutes §
The defendant's second objection concerns offer of judgment interest. It is the defendant's contention that such interest should not be imposed for several reasons. The first argument is that when the defendant's recovery of $8,700 is set off against the plaintiffs recovery of $44,248, the net recovery is less than $40,000, the amount specified in the offer of judgment. The next claim is that the offer of judgment was based on a one-count complaint seeking the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, which was later ruled to be invalid, and that no other offer of judgment based on breach of contract was ever filed. The defendant claims that it could not have accepted the offer of judgment when it was filed because it was based on an invalid mechanic's lien. When the complaint was subsequently amended on June 24, 1996 to include an allegation of breach of contract, which was the basis on which the attorney trial referee recommended judgment for the plaintiff, the defendant argues that there should have been a new offer of judgment based on a valid cause of action.
Thus, the issues are whether prejudgment interest is suspended during a successful appeal, whether the award to the defendant should be set off against the award to the plaintiff, whether recovery of offer of judgment interest should be based on the net figure after a successful counterclaim, and whether an offer of judgment based on a cause of action later ruled to be invalid is still operative after the complaint is amended.
As to prejudgment interest under General Statutes §
Whether prejudgment interest should be imposed on the total award to CT Page 13433 the plaintiff or only on the net amount after setting off the recommended award to the defendant involves the relationship between a counterclaim and a set off. Practice Book §
General Statutes §
The defendant also claims that during the pendency of the appeal to the Appellate Court regarding the propriety of a mechanic's lien, that is, from July 22, 1997 to February 16, 1999, prejudgment interest should be suspended. The plaintiff agreed to accept $40,000 in its offer of judgment. Once the complaint was amended on June 24, 1996, to include a claim of breach of contract, the defendant could have paid that amount and settled the case. It chose to keep litigating even after the plaintiff added a count of breach of contract, and the appeal regarding the mechanic's lien had nothing to do with the breach of contract claim.
However, until the plaintiff amended its complaint on June 24, 1996 to add a breach of contract claim, which cause of action was the basis for recovery from the defendant, the plaintiff had not set forth a valid cause of action because the mechanic's lien was subject to being vacated and an action to foreclose the lien was improper. It seems most logical and just to commence the running of prejudgment interest on the date when the plaintiff first pleaded a valid cause of action. Thus, prejudgment interest at 8% per year from June 24, 1996 to the date of judgment amounts to $22,389. The addition of interest to $44,248 results in a judgment for the plaintiff for $66,637. CT Page 13434
As to offer of judgment interest, the plaintiff filed such an offer on April 12, 1996. General Statutes §
Whether the recommended award of $8,700 on the defendant's counterclaim should be a set off against the plaintiff's recovery was discussed in connection with the awarding of prejudgment interest and involves the distinction between a counterclaim and a set off. The defendant's complaint against the plaintiff concerning the rebuilding of a portion of a stone wall was clearly a counterclaim. Hence, the defendant's recovery should not be set off against the plaintiff's recovery.
In the court's view, there was no obligation on the part of the plaintiff to file a second offer of judgment after it added a count claiming breach of contract, or after the Appellate Court decision involving a mechanic's lien for the reasons noted previously in connection with prejudgment interest, viz., that the appeal did not involve a breach of contract.
The plaintiff therefore is entitled to offer of judgment interest at 12% a year, but again it appears to be most equitable and logical to begin the offer of judgment interest not when the original complaint was filed with the court in January of 1996, but rather starting on June 24, 1996, the date when the complaint was amended to include a claim of breach of contract, the ultimate basis for recovery. There is no logical reason why a defendant should entertain and/or accept an offer of judgment based on a cause of action, the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, which was not a proper or valid cause of action. Therefore, offer of judgment interest should begin on June 24, 1996, and run to the date of judgment. This interest at 12% per year amounts to $50,577, which, when added to the judgment and prejudgment interest, amounts to a total judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $117,214. Judgment also enters for the defendant to recover from the plaintiff the sum of $8,700 on its counterclaim as recommended by the attorney trial referee, but without offer of judgment interest or prejudgment interest.
Since both parties prevailed on their complaint and counterclaim, attorney's fees and taxable costs are not awarded to either party. CT Page 13435
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 21ST day of October, 2002.
William B. Lewis, Judge (T.R.)