DocketNumber: No. CR 96095711
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 9199, 18 Conn. L. Rptr. 172
Judges: MORAGHAN, J.
Filed Date: 11/8/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
On October 16, 1995, while the defendant was serving his sentence in New York, the State of Connecticut requested his transfer to Connecticut for the purpose of commencing criminal proceedings against him for the April 16, 1994 robbery.2 On April 21, 1996, the State filed an information against the defendant on the Connecticut charges. The defendant invoked his right to a transfer hearing (extradition hearing) and appeared in the Dutchess County Supreme Court on April 23, 1996, at which time he was represented by counsel. At the conclusion of the extradition hearing, Perez was ordered transferred to Connecticut.
Sometime in April, 1996, David Wagner, a Connecticut state trooper, requested an interview with the defendant by telephone. The defendant, through personnel at the correctional facility in which he was detained, refused to speak with him. On May 23, 1996, Wagner and another officer arrived at the New York correctional facility for the purpose of transporting the defendant to Connecticut. Wagner orally advised the defendant of his Miranda rights and, after telling Wagner that he understood those rights, the defendant thereafter made certain inculpatory statements to the detectives. When asked by the detectives to sign a written statement reciting the inculpatory statements, the defendant refused, stating that he wished to speak with the prosecuting attorney.
During this trial on charges stemming from the April 16, 1994 robbery, the defendant has moved to suppress the statements he made while in the car with the detectives. The defendant argues that: (1) his right to counsel under both the federal and state constitutions attached at the filing of the information in Connecticut on April 21, 1996; (2) the interrogation by the detectives in the car ride from New York to Connecticut was impermissible because he "was represented by counsel, had declined to speak with Connecticut police regarding the Connecticut charges previously, and had neither expressly nor impliedly waived his right to counsel"; and (3) Detective Wagner's interrogation of the defendant was constitutionally CT Page 9201 impermissible since it was designed to elicit incriminating statements from him in violation of the Supreme Court's ruling inRhode Island v. Innis,
This case presents an interesting question of when a defendant's right to counsel attaches, and what effect the representation of the on unrelated charges in another jurisdiction and again an extradition hearing has on the defendant's right to counsel new charges.
The court begins with the observation that a defendant's right to counsel arises out of both the
The United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant's right to counsel is "offense-specific" and does not attach until "`at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings — whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'" McNeil v.Wisconsin,
The issue in this case is when "adversary judicial criminal proceedings" were commenced against the defendant requiring counsel to be present for any custodial interrogation. While the defendant may be in custody on an unrelated criminal matter, that representation in that other matter does not affect his right to counsel in connection with a new matter in which criminal charges have not yet been filed. State v. Palmer, supra. This is certainly applicable to the present case; the fact that the defendant was in custody in a New York correctional institution had no bearing on his right to counsel in the instant matter. Similarly, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that there is no constitutional right to counsel at an extradition hearing. CT Page 9202State v. Falcon,
At an arraignment, a defendant is advised of the charges against him and enters a plea. Practice Book § 643. By contrast, at an extradition hearing, a defendant is not asked to plead or to make any other decisions that could affect his right to a fair trial. . . . [M]ost courts in other jurisdictions have held that even proceedings contesting extradition are not a `critical stage' in the prosecution requiring the presence of counsel. . . . A hearing contesting extradition is only a summary proceeding, limited to determining whether the necessary documents are in order, whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime, is the person named in the extradition request and is a fugitive from justice.
There is, however, in Connecticut, a statutory right to counsel at an extradition hearing. General Statutes Sec.
The question, then, is whether the defendant's right to counsel had attached at the filing of the information on April 21, 1996. The defendant argues that it did, relying on the language from McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra,
Significantly, the Supreme Court has implied that the right CT Page 9203 to counsel may attach at the time of the filing of an information, but that the right is not effective unless the defendant specifically invokes that right. See State v. Lewis, supra, 612-13 ("Even if the defendant is correct and his right to counsel had attached [when the information was filed], his ensuing statements would not be rendered inadmissible under the
Notwithstanding the murky guidance from the state appellate courts, this court concludes that the defendant's right to counsel under the state and federal constitutions did not attach at the time of the filing of the information by the state's attorney because it did not signal the commencement of adversary juridical criminal proceedings. As the Supreme Court observed inState v. Falcon, supra, the defendant is not formally charged with a crime and does not enter a plea until his arraignment. Until that time, there cannot be said to have been an adversarial judicial proceeding. Notably, an information is ex parte in nature, often filed by the state's attorney without the defendant's knowledge; in this sense, it may be more accurately considered a prelude to a criminal prosecution rather than an adversary proceeding in which the defendant faces charges in open court, at which time counsel is undoubtedly necessary. Accordingly, the court holds that the filing of an information by a state's attorney is not a critical proceeding within the meaning of the
Having concluded that the defendant's
Even when a defendant's
In the instant proceeding, there is no dispute that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights prior to or shortly after entering the car with the detectives. The question, the defendant asserts, is whether, in light of the close custody under which the defendant was held and the type of questioning the detectives engaged in, the defendant could have executed an effective waiver of his
"The inquiry whether the defendant has made a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of his
The defendant's argument that his refusal to speak to Detective Wagner more than one month before the car ride precluded the police from questioning him outside the presence of counsel is not in accordance with the law. Although it is true that once a suspect invokes his
In conclusion, the court rejects the defendant's claims that his inculpatory statements made during his transportation from New York to Connecticut were obtained by the police in violation of his
Moraghan, J.