DocketNumber: No. CV90-0701176
Citation Numbers: 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. 10806, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 120
Judges: GILL, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 11/8/1991
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The facts are as follows: Prior to April 29, 1989, Modern entered into an agreement with Cornerstone Building and Realty, Inc. (hereinafter "Cornerstone"). The agreement provided that Modern would install cabinetry at a house under construction on land then owned by Cornerstone. On or about April 29, 1989, Cornerstone contracted to sell the house to the plaintiffs. The sales contract included a $7,000.00 "allowance" for cabinetry. Modern began work on June 15, 1989 and installed kitchen cabinets on or about July 10, 1989. Bookcases were installed on or about August 25, 1989. At the closing it was discussed that a vanity had not been installed by mistake. This was done on November 13, 1989. The costs of the latter was 383.00 or about 1.5% of the total mechanic's lien amount. Modern sent Cornerstone three invoices for this work. On September 11, 1989, Cornerstone conveyed the property to plaintiffs CT Page 10807 and provided them with the following documents: a sworn lien waiver with the "signature" of Modern's president; a Chicago Title Insurance Company Mechanic's Lien Affidavit, and a Warranty Deed. (The "signature" on the lien waiver was found to be unauthorized and a forgery by the court on September 11, 1989). On or about February 6, 1990, Modern filed a lien upon the property in accordance with section 39-34 of the General Statutes in the amount of $21,276.00. On June 28, 1990, Modern faxed a copy of a Release of Mechanic's Lien to plaintiffs' counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel did not record the faxed copy.
"The purpose of a mechanic's lien is to give one who furnishes materials or services ``the security of the building and land for the payment of his claim by making such claim a lien thereon. . . ."' H S Torrington Associates v. Lutz Engineering Co.,
Section
"[a] mechanic's lien is not valid, unless the person performing the services or furnishing the materials, (1) within ninety days after he has ceased to so do, lodges with the town clerk . . . a certificate in writing . . . ."
Nevertheless, if the work has been substantially completed, j "the courts have ruled that a lienor may not, by a delayed provision of some trivial amount of work or materials, extend the time for filing the lien. Martin Tire and Rubber Co. v. Kelly,
The plaintiffs argue that the ninety day statutory limitation section
The lien is ordered discharged. CT Page 10808
By the court;
CHARLES D. GILL JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT.