DocketNumber: No. MV94-0613469
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 4760, 9 Conn. Super. Ct. 531
Judges: SILBERT, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/2/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
(a) There shall be a pretrial alcohol education system for persons charged with a violation of Section
14-227a . Upon application by any such person for participation in such system and payment to the court of an application fee of fifty dollars, the court shall, but only as to the public, order such information or complaint to be filed as a sealed information or complaint, provided such person states under oath, in open court or before any person designated by the clerk and duly authorized to administer oaths, under penalties of perjury that he has never had such system invoked in his behalf and that he has not been convicted of a violation of Section53a-56b or53a-60d , a violation of subsection (a) of Section14-227a before or after October 1, 1981, or a violation of subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section14-227a on or after October 1, 1985, [and that he has not been convicted in any other state at any time of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same as] Section53a-56b or53a-60d or [subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section14-227a ]. Unless good cause is shown, a person shall be ineligible for participation in such pretrial alcohol education system if his alleged violation of Section14-227a caused the serious physical injury, as defined in section53a-3 , of another person. The fee imposed by this subsection shall be credited to the criminal injuries compensation fund established by Section54-215 . (Emphasis added)
In making his application, the defendant indicated that he had been previously convicted of a violation of Maine Statutes Sec. 1312-B, Criminal Violation of Operation Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor or Drugs or With an Excessive Blood-alcohol Level, but he maintains that the Maine conviction was not for an offense "the essential elements of which are substantially the same as . . . subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of Section
1. Offense. A person is guilty of a criminal violation under this section if he operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle:
A. While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or a combination of liquor and drugs; or
B. While having 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood.
The defendant notes that unlike the Connecticut Statute, Maine law permits a conviction for operating under the influence if a defendant operates a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol content of .08 or greater, whereas the Connecticut statute requires a reading of .10 or greater to support a conviction. A .08 reading in Connecticut would be evidence of the offense of Operation While Impaired in violation of Connecticut General Statutes
Counsel for the defendant and for the state have not offered, nor has this court been able to find, any reported cases concerning this issue, which is apparently one of first impression. Similarly, counsel had not brought to the court's attention any unpublished decisions on this subject, although this court is aware of its own unreported Memorandum of Decision in [State v. Marion L. Sanders], geographical area 10 at New London, Docket No. MV91-0597230 (April 14, 1992), and CT Page 4763 [State v. Steve G. Spaulding], geographical area 10 at New London, Docket No. MV91-0595997 (April 14, 1992), in which this court had occasion to construe South Carolina Code 56-5-2930 in the context of two similar applications for the Alcohol Education Program. Because the issue continues to arise in one context or another and because this court perceives a need for some uniformity in the application of the statute, the court is reducing its opinion in this case to writing in the hope that whether accepted, rejected, modified, reversed or affirmed, it will at least provide a basis for discussion to other courts faced with the same issue.
On the outset, the court notes that each of the fifty states has its own version of a "drunk driving" statute. No statute has been found that contains the precise wording of the Connecticut statute, although all of them have in common the basic elements of "operation," a "vehicle",3 and the concept of being "under the influence", which may be assessed behaviorally or chemically.
Connecticut General Statutes §
"The primary rule of statutory construction is that ``if the language of the statute is clear, it is assumed that the words themselves express the intent of the legislature; [Houston v.Warden],
"The words of (a) statute ``are to be given their commonly approved meaning, unless a contrary intent is clearly expressed.' [Holmquist v. Manson],
When the wording of a statute is not absolutely clear, however, it may be necessary to look behind the wording of the statute to the intent of its drafters. "When we are confronted, however, with ambiguity in a statute, we seek to ascertain the actual intent by looking to the words of the statute itself . . . the legislative history and circumstances surrounding the enactment of the statute . . . and the purpose the statute is to serve". [Rhodes v. Hartford],
"Essential" is defined in Webster's New World Dictionary, Second College Edition, as "of or constituting the intrinsic, fundamental nature of something; basic, inherent." The "essential" elements of subsection (a) of Section
The defendant correctly notes that there are differences between the Connecticut and the Maine statutes, as indicated above. In particular, he points to the fact that the Maine statute provides for conviction on the basis of a Blood Alcohol Content of .08 at the time of operation, whereas our own statute sets the threshold at .10. At oral argument, however, the defendant conceded that his own blood alcohol CT Page 4765 content as measured following the arrest that led to his Maine conviction, was .11, which would have constituted a violation in this state as well.
The defendant also emphasizes the different penalties provided by the two statutes for conviction as a first offender, and he notes that the "judgment and commitment" form from the Maine Superior Court indicates the offense of conviction as
A possible standard for determining whether the essential elements of the foreign statute are substantially the same as ours would be whether or not the defendant, if he or she committed the same acts in Connecticut, rather than a foreign state, would have been convicted under Section 227a(a). In the absence of accurate official records, however, such a standard may place too heavy a premium on the defendant's recollection. Moreover, not having been trained in the law, his recollection may bear little relation to the facts necessary for conviction. Such an approach would result in an uneven application of the law in that it would rely on the quality of a defendant's memory or the fortuity of whether or not a usable transcript exists.
Indeed, most convictions for operating under the influence result from guilty pleas rather than trials, and that there is normally no evidence of record in these cases. The factual bases for the pleas stated by the prosecutor are frequently truncated and designed to track the wording of the state statute in question. As a result, the out-of-state prosecutor might not include reference to specific facts that would have been required for a conviction under the Connecticut Statute. Moreover, the erasure statutes of many CT Page 4766 states would make it impossible for a defendant even to obtain a copy of the transcript or record of conviction.
On balance, this court is persuaded that rather than focusing on the factual basis for the conviction, it is required by the statute, as amended in 1989, to focus on the essential elements only. If the essential elements of the foreign statute are clear, and if they are substantially the same as our own, the defendant is ineligible for the Program. The Legislature inserted the phrase "convicted in any other state of an offense the essential elements of which are substantially the same . . ." in 1989. Although less than artfully drafted, it is clear that the amendment was enacted to address a patently unfair situation which existed under the statute as then in effect. A defendant previously convicted of operating under the influence under our law would be statutorily ineligible for the Program, whereas one who had been convicted in another state would be able to qualify for admission. Although it cannot be realistically presumed that the legislature was conversant with the precise language of each of the drunk driving statutes of the fifty states, it can be presumed that it was aware of the fact that all of the sovereiegn [sovereign] states had enacted legislation making operation under the influence a crime and that there were differences in language among those statutes. In that context, the phrase "essential elements of which are substantially the same" renders apparent the legislature's intention to exclude someone who, in another state, had done essentially that which is proscribed by Sec.
A review of the legislative history of the amendment confirms this analysis. Statements made on the floor of the House of Representatives and Senate, "although not controlling, may be judicially noticed and are a strong indication of legislative intent." [State v. Guckian],
Senator Avallone: ". . . it makes people who have been convicted of DWI in other states ineligible for pretrial programs." S.Proc. April 19, 1989, p. 1425.
Representatives Belden: ". . . this amendment would put into the statute that if an individual had been convicted in any other state at any time of an offense that [sic] essential elements of which are substantially the same as those in Connecticut, that he would — that would count as his bite of the apple, so to speak, and that he would not be eligible in Connecticut for pretrial education program and would move on to the next offense." H.R. Proc. April 16, 1989, p. 2839, 2840. "The bill as amended will now indicate that when somebody is arrested for drunk driving in Connecticut and they go through the process, if they have been through the process in some other state, guess what, they're not going to be able to go through our little education program. I think that's a very good step. We'll hopefully protect the public a little more and I appreciate the previous vote very much on behalf of those who do not drink and drive." H.R. Proc. April 16, 1989, pp. 2845-6.
Therefore, this court holds that the three "essential elements" of Connecticut General Statutes Section
The court can conceive, however, of circumstances where, despite the fact that the foreign statute under which a defendant was convicted appears to contain substantially the same essential elements as Section
The defendant's application for admission into the Pretrial Alcohol Education Program is, therefore, denied, without prejudice.
Jonathan E. Silbert, Judge
Millett v. HOISTING ENGINEERS'LICENSING DIV. , 377 A.2d 229 ( 1977 )
Holmquist v. Manson , 168 Conn. 389 ( 1975 )
Hurlbut v. Lemelin , 155 Conn. 68 ( 1967 )
Houston v. Warden , 169 Conn. 247 ( 1975 )
Hartford Hospital v. City & Town of Hartford , 160 Conn. 370 ( 1971 )
State v. Kish , 186 Conn. 757 ( 1982 )
Bell v. Planning & Zoning Commission , 173 Conn. 223 ( 1977 )