DocketNumber: No. CV 95-0468756S
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 1287-GGG
Judges: FINEBERG, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/20/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The Plaintiff has filed a counterclaim to Defendant's counterclaim. The allegations of Plaintiff's subject counterclaim in their entirety are as follows:
"First Count
Second Count1. The alleged agreement which is the subject of the Defendant's Counterclaim is unfair and/or deceptive within the meaning of C.G.S. §
42-110b .2. As a result of this unfair and/or deceptive act or practice the Plaintiff has been forced to incur attorneys fees and costs to defend against the Defendant's Counterclaim and if the alleged agreement should be given effect the Plaintiff would suffer the damages and losses sought by the Defendant's Counterclaim.
1. The Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys fees pursuant to C.G.S. §
42-150bb ."
The Defendant asserts that the counterclaim fails to state sufficient claims upon which relief can be granted.
A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Practice Book § 151; Ferryman v. Groton,
The First Count purports to state a claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"), General Statutes §
(1) [W]hether the practice without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers [(competitors or other businessmen)].
A-G foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.,
Normally, a general business practice must be involved and alleged. Quimby v. Kimberly Clark Corporation,
The allegations of the First Count fail to satisfy the foregoing requirements. The Second Count also is devoid of sufficient particularity. The motion to strike is granted.
DAVID L. FINEBERG JUDGE, SUPERIOR COURT