DocketNumber: No. CV 99 0590885 S
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 4642, 32 Conn. L. Rptr. 49
Judges: BEACH, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 4/8/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The first count of the complaint alleges that Jackson drove negligently and caused the accident. The second count alleges that at the time of the accident Jackson was operating in the course of agency or employment by the local church so that it is liable as a result of both common law and §
The international church has moved for summary judgment, on the grounds, as to the third count, that it did not own the car and that, in any event, Jackson was not acting as its agent or employee at the time of the accident, and, as to the seventh count, that it did not supervise Jackson. Both parties submitted materials regarding the nature of the relationships between the local church and the international church and between both churches and Jackson. I have reviewed the materials and the authority submitted by the parties and I find that summary judgment is not appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
Summary judgment should be granted "if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Section 17-49 of the Practice Book. A material fact is one which will make a difference in the result. Barrett v. SouthernConnecticut Gas Company,
The third count, it will be recalled, alleges that Jackson negligently caused the accident and injuries and that in performing his duties as pastor of the local church, he was acting under the control and supervision of and as an agent for the international church, and that the international church is therefore vicariously liable under both the common law and §
In the context of the third count, I first consider the claim of agency pursuant to §
First, I reject the notion that an inquiry into the nature of the CT Page 4645 ownership interest constitutes an impermissible invasion of the state into ecclesiastical issues. Although the corporate or business structure of a church organization may, to some degree, reflect its theology, it is not in itself theology, and neutral principles of secular law may be applied to parse incidents of ownership. See, e.g., Rosado v. BridgeportRoman Catholic Diocesan Corporation,
Even so, I do not believe that the situation is so entirely clear that there is no issue of genuine fact as to the ownership interest. Although I do not believe that complexity alone is a sufficient reason to deny a motion for summary judgment, the language of Gould v. Mellick andSexton,
Even if the issue of ownership is not removed from the case, however, the issue still remains whether the presumption in §
A second set of cases holds that the presumption is, for lack of a better term, a version of a "vanishing presumption", that is, one which is operative until persuasive contrary evidence is introduced, at which point it ceases to be operative. These cases indicate that in order for the presumption to vanish, and a directed verdict or summary judgment thus to be a possibility, the trier must find proven facts which fairly put the issue in question. See Schimmelpfennig v. Cutler,
Our cases suggest that the presumption is a hybrid of sorts: the presumption ceases to have any effect only when the countervailing evidence is so strong that it cannot rationally be disbelieved. Bogartv. Tucker,
I have analyzed the presumption on the facts of this case by first assuming, for this purpose, that the international church is an owner. This of course may very well turn out not to be true, but, as noted above, I feel constrained to make that assumption at this point for the purpose of the motion for summary judgment. I then turn to the issue of agency. As a general proposition, of course, one can have permission to operate a car and at the same time not be an agent of the owner; the general test is whether the operator is performing some task for the owner's benefit at the time. See, e.g., Mastrilli v. Herz,
A factual situation fairly similar to the facts in the case at hand arose in Atwell v. City of Middletown,
The facts submitted in the case at hand show that the defendant Jackson was returning from a personal social visit with family on a Saturday. The plaintiff suggests that because a pastor is always on duty and, more specifically, because he was intending to work on the next day's service, Jackson was, under the broad interpretation of agency, performing something for the benefit of his employer at the time. Under the authority of cases such as Mastrilli, I cannot say for a certainty that a CT Page 4647 trier could not find that he was doing something tangentially for the benefit of his employer.
A final issue for resolution as to the presumption raised by the third count is whether there is any genuine issue of fact as to whether Jackson was acting for the benefit of the international church, even if he was in some way acting for the benefit of the local church. Again, I find the intricate relationship between the entities not to be clear enough to be resolved as a matter of summary judgment.
The above discussion disposes as well of the issue regarding the common law notion of agency. Although the evidence regarding agency is slim, I cannot find that there is no genuine issue of fact, as applied to the principles of law outlined above. Summary judgment as to the third count is, then, denied.
The seventh count may be resolved more summarily. That count it will be recalled, claims that the international church negligently supervised Jackson, and thereby caused injury to the plaintiff. The international church introduced materials tending to show that it was more a credentialing agency than an employer or supervisor, and that it did not directly hire or supervise personnel. The plaintiff introduced materials tending to show that the international church was the hiring and firing authority, directly or in a coordinating role, and that complaints were submitted to and resolved by it. One or more complaints related in some ways were pending before the international church at the time of the accident.3 If the international church were only a licensing agency, then it presumably would not be liable any more than the grievance committee would be liable for the misdeeds of an attorney; if it were truly a supervising authority, then there may be substance to the claim. The facts of the relationship are disputed, and the resolution of the issue may depend on credibility and interpretations of the various documents, the historical contexts of the documents, and so forth. In short, the issue cannot be resolved on summary judgment.4
The motion for summary judgment is denied in its entirety.
____________________, J. Beach
Sutphen v. Hagelin , 32 Conn. Super. Ct. 158 ( 1975 )
Mitchell v. Resto , 157 Conn. 258 ( 1968 )
Masse v. Jonah , 27 Conn. Super. Ct. 206 ( 1967 )
Barrett v. Southern Connecticut Gas Co. , 172 Conn. 362 ( 1977 )
Neville v. Adorno , 123 Conn. 395 ( 1937 )
Atwell v. City of Middletown , 16 Conn. Super. Ct. 395 ( 1949 )
Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp. , 45 Conn. Super. Ct. 397 ( 1998 )
Koops v. Gregg , 130 Conn. 185 ( 1943 )
Mastrilli v. Herz , 100 Conn. 702 ( 1924 )