DocketNumber: No. CV 99 71387 S
Citation Numbers: 2000 Conn. Super. Ct. 10189, 27 Conn. L. Rptr. 725
Judges: SULLIVAN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 8/15/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The defendant Edward Hanlon pleads, as his special defense that "The plaintiff has failed to comply with paragraph 21 of the mortgage, a copy of which is attached as an exhibit to this answer by not giving defendant notice of acceleration as called for in the mortgage prior to the bringing of this foreclosure."
The sections of the mortgage upon which this defendant relies are as follows:
Section 21
Lender shall give notice to Borrower prior to acceleration following Borrower's breach of any covenant or agreement in this Security Instrument The notice shall specify: (a) the default; (b) the action required to cure the default; (c) a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; and (d) that failure to cure the default on or before the date specified in the notice may result in acceleration of the sums secured by this Security Instrument and foreclosure or sale of the Property. The notice shall further inform Borrower of the right to reinstate after acceleration and the right to assert in court the nonexistence of a default or CT Page 10191 any other defense of Borrower to acceleration and foreclosure or sale.
Section 14
Any notice to Borrower provided for in this Security Instrument shall be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail unless applicable law required use of another method. The notice shall be directed to the Property Address or any other address Borrower designates by notice to Lender . . . Any notice provided for in this Security Instrument shall be deemed to have been given to Borrower or Lender when given as provided in this paragraph.
The plaintiff moves for summary judgment against defendant Edward T. Hanlon as to liability, claiming that there is no genuine issue of material fact between the parties. Implicit in the motion is the proposition that the defendant's special defense as to failure to accelerate the note is not supported by fact. The defendant Edward T. Hanlon moves for summary judgment, claiming that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the special defense and consequently that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.
The plaintiff submits, with this motion its title search, verifying the listing and the amount of the claimed encumbrances of record. The plaintiff, by affidavit of its assistant vice president, Susan L. Hobbs, makes affidavit as to the default in payments and the amount due as of its date, February 16, 2000. Copies of the assignment to this plaintiff are attached. The defendant submits no documentary proof or affidavit to take issue with any of these factors.
The plaintiff further submits the affidavit of Susan L. Hobbs, Assistant Vice President of the plaintiff stating that she mailed first CT Page 10192 class the Motion of Default to the borrowers "Edward T. Hanlon, Wendy R. Hanlon, 165 South Bolton Road, Bolton, CT 06043" on July 8, 1999. Further that this is the address of the property in this action. From the documentary evidence it is clear that this is the address of the property, and the address to which the mail is to be and was directed to the borrowers.
As to the notice the defendant appears to claim that since the affiant did not personally sign the notice of July 8, 1999 the affiant is not making affidavit as to her own personal knowledge. The notice bears the subscription identity as "collection department". This is of course immaterial because the affidavit states that the affiant personally mailed the notice. The identity of who in the collection department prepared the notice is of no import.
The plaintiff has, by affidavit and documentary proof proven all of the essential elements of the complaint as to liability of this defendant Edward Hanlon.
It is not receipt of the mail which is required. "If a person to whom money is due either by express assent or by a course of dealing from which assent may be inferred, authorize its transmission by mail, the person from whom it was due is relieved of the consequences of a default if it is duly and properly put into the mail." C. R. Parkside LimitedPartnership v. Lorenzana,
In summary, since the defendant signed the mortgage agreeing to the act of mailing, proof of receipt is not required. Lorenzana, supra. Even if this was not the law, yet the fact of mailing creates a presumption of receipt. The ambivalent and conclusory affidavit of the defendant, as aforesaid, does not come close to being a statement of fact such as to rebut the receipt of the notice by he and/or his wife, the co-signator, at the properly described address.
The defendant, in his brief, makes a further argument that a letter purporting to be a notice of actual acceleration, dated August 17, 1999, bearing the caption "Original Copy: Sent Certified, Return Receipt Requested — Second Copy sent Registered Mail" was not supported by an affidavit of mailing nor was the return receipt submitted to the court. The defendant is correct in each of these assertions. However, nothing in the mortgage deed requires that the mortgagee give to the mortgagor a specific further notice that acceleration has taken place . . . To the contrary, paragraph 21 provides: "Lender, at its option, may require immediate payment in full of all sums secured by this Security Instrument without further demand and may invoke any of the remedies permitted by applicable law."
Because the further notice, captioned August 17, 1999 is not necessary to cause acceleration, the mailing, non-mailing, or non-receipt of such notice is totally immaterial. There is no question, of course, but that the amount sought by paragraph five of the complaint (the entire balance of the note, interest, costs etc.) constitutes an unequivocal declaration of the fact of acceleration.
The Appellate Court has determined that proper notice of acceleration is a necessary condition to an action of foreclosure . . ." CitingMortgage, Inc. v. Pronto,
"When there is definitive contract language, the determination of what the parties intended is a question of law . . ." Levine v. Massey,
The language set forth in said Section 21 is clear and definitive. The court has heard nothing in this motion, affidavits, briefs or oral argument to indicate that this section was a subject of discussion between the parties at or prior to execution or thereafter where differing views or positions were proffered by the parties. The words used are the words agreed to and were not the product of opposing views existing at the time of the contract.
The defendant takes the position that in computing the thirty days both the first and the last day of the period must be excluded from the calculations of "a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to the borrower" as the grace period, so to speak, to cure the default.
The defendant claims that in computing the "thirty day" time both the initial day (July 8) and the terminal day (August 7) must be excluded from the calculation. . . ." The day of the act from which a future time is to be ascertained is to be excluded from the calculation. . . ."Austin, Nichols Co., Inc. v. Gilman,
From a counting of the calendar days following July 8, 1999, thirty days thereafter would be August 7, 1999. This is the date set forth in the notice as the last day upon which default must be cured. Otherwise the debt will be accelerated. Had the notice for example said August 6 this would have been 29 days from the date of the letter, and hence would have been less than thirty days from the date of notice. Any date prior to August 7 would have been less than thirty days from the date of notice. Since the date set forth, August 7, was thirty days from the date of notice it could not be less than thirty days from the date of notice. The section states that the date shall not be less than thirty days from the date of notice. This date of August 7 in the notice was in compliance with Section 21 of the mortgage.
The court enters summary judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint, as to liability only. The court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
L. Paul Sullivan