DocketNumber: No. 312894
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 721
Judges: JOHN M. ALEXANDER, STATE TRIAL REFEREE
Filed Date: 1/10/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
1. Motion for Payment of Excess into Court
2. Objection to said Motion
3. Motion for Order
On November 18, 1991, as a Trial Referee, I filed a Memorandum of Decision concerning the Plaintiff's reassessment CT Page 722 appeal under Eminent Domain. It ordered the Commissioner of Transportation to pay to the Plaintiff the further sum of $53,000 plus interest. This was in connection with the Plaintiff's land in the City of Hartford which was the subject of Condemnation by Eminent Domain provided for by General Statute
The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles claims to hold a mortgage on the subject premises in the sum of $100,000. He has been granted permission by the Court to Intervene in this action because he claims that the mortgage constitutes a lien against the award. In view of these Motions it now becomes pertinent to consider the State's claim that under General Statute
As to the claims concerning interpleader, this is not a tenable ground because the State is both a claimant and an interested party. It is of the essence of an interpleader suit that the plaintiff shall be entirely indifferent to the conflicting claims, asserting no interest in himself in the fund or property in dispute. 45 Am.Jur.2d "Interpleader" Sec. 13 p. 441. In this case the State is a claimant to the award.
As to the State's claims for relief under General Statute
This Statute has been interpreted by our Supreme Court in Kaufman v. Valente
It is noted that the present Statute provides for notice to be given encumbrancers when the action is brought under General Statute
In addition to that Statute it is concluded also that, quite apart from any statutory remedy, there exists at common law a right in the State to proceed against the award. In this connection the following from Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd. Ed. Vol. 2 Section 5.17 is pertinent:
It is well settled that the award [of damages resulting from condemnation by eminent domain] stands in place of the land and is subject to the same liens, and that consequently a lienor may proceed against the award upon general equitable principles, and without the aid of any statute. He may have his lien satisfied out of the fund awarded to the owners of the legal title as compensation for the land in advance of other creditors. [citing cases]. The lien, however, must be in existence when the right to compensation vests and must affect the interest which is taken by eminent domain. Where there is only a partial taking of the property subject to the lien, the lienor is not compelled to accept a proportionate payment but may insist upon complete satisfaction of the lien out of the award.
The Plaintiff claims that the procedure here involved deprives him of his rights as to prejudgment remedies as provided in Chapter 903a of the General Statutes
The Plaintiff also asserts in general terms a lack of due process. However, there appears to be adequate notice and opportunity to be heard and nothing present which is constitutionally offensive.
In view of the foregoing, the following orders are entered:
1. The Motion for Payment of Excess into Court is granted.
2. The Plaintiff's Objection to said Motion is over-ruled.
CT Page 724
3. The Excess sum of $53,000 plus any accrued interest shall be paid to the Clerk of the Court for the Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford and said Clerk shall place said sum in said accounts until directed by the Court to make distribution.
JOHN M. ALEXANDER, STATE TRIAL REFEREE