DocketNumber: No. CV 91 0283824
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 7480
Judges: LEWIS, J.
Filed Date: 8/7/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Prior to October 1, 1989, the property had been assessed at $283,010. However, effective February 10, 1989, the zone was changed from residential to limited office (Monroe Code 117-1500, et seq.). The Quinns did not appeal the zone change, which affected approximately 68 acres including the land of the plaintiffs. The new zone permits business, professional and financial offices on lots having a minimum of 1.5 acres.
As a direct result of the zone change the assessment of the subject premises was increased to $607,670 on the grand list of October 1, 1989, which, at a rate of 70%, translated into a fair market value of $868,100. General Statutes
The plaintiffs did not appeal this new assessment on the list of 1989, but did appeal the same assessment on the next grand list of October 1, 1990 to the defendant Board; General Statutes
The plaintiffs claim that the increased assessment, which was concededly based solely on a change of zone, violates their rights under General Statutes
The standard of review in an appeal pursuant to General Statutes
As was said in Midway Green Corporation v. Board of Tax Review,
General Statutes
The issue in this case is whether the assessor was justified in increasing the assessment due to the change of zone. The answer is yes, according to Ralston Purina Co. v. Board of Tax Review,
Thus, the assessor was justified in revaluing the plaintiffs' property upon the occasion of a zone change. The plaintiffs did not contest or submit any evidence with respect to the amount of the new assessment, but only challenged the right of the assessor to make a revaluation based on a new zoning classification. In their post-trial brief, the plaintiffs for the first time comment on what they believe to be a mistake on the assessor's part in overvaluing their property.
The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that defendant's valuation of their property was overvalued and hence illegal; Stamford Apartments Co. v. Stamford, supra, 589; and by offering no evidence on this subject at the trial the plaintiffs did not sustain this burden.
The plaintiffs also point out that, during the public hearing of the Monroe Planning and Zoning Commission when it was considering the change of zone, the commission's chairman stated his belief that property in the new zone would continue to be taxed as if it were still in the prior residential zone, until a property owner actually began an office use. The plaintiffs claim that statement prevents the assessor and the defendant Board from increasing their taxes because concededly the Quinns did not convert their home to office use.
I know of no authority that a member of a planning and zoning commission, or the whole commission for that matter, can bind the assessor whose duty it is to assess property. The theory of estoppel only applies to a municipality when the official in question is responsible for the governmental function sought to be estopped. Kimberly-Clark Corporation v. Dubno,
The plaintiffs also claim an unconstitutional taking of their property because of the increased real estate taxes. However, the town of Monroe did not take the Quinns' property, but rather increased their taxes on the theory that the plaintiffs' land was now more valuable because, as a result of the zone change, it could be used for office purposes.
It is our belief that the plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proving that defendant's valuation of their property was excessive. As a result they are deemed not to be aggrieved. Gorin's, Inc. v. Board of Tax Review,
I therefore find that the fair and actual market value of the plaintiffs' property was, as of October 1, 1990, $868,100, and that the defendant's assessment of $607,670 was not unreasonable, and thus the appeal of the plaintiffs is dismissed.
So Ordered.
Dated at Bridgeport, Connecticut, this 7th day of August, 1992.
WILLIAM B. LEWIS, JUDGE