DocketNumber: No. CV92 03 96 68
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 11505
Judges: CURRAN, J.
Filed Date: 11/16/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The parties have stipulated that the assessment levied on Lot of the subdivision is proper. As to Lots 5, 6, 11 and 12 the assessment was improper. The assessments on the remaining lots namely Lots 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 10 remain in issue and their validity remains for the court to determine.
Section
"At any time after a municipality by its Water Pollution Control Authority, has acquired or constructed a sewerage system, or portion thereof, the water pollution control authority may levy benefit assessments upon the lands and buildings in the municipality which, in its judgment, are especially benefitted [benefited] thereby whether they abut on such sewerage system or not, and upon the owners of such land or buildings, according to such rule as the water pollution control authority CT Page 11506 adopts, subject to the right of appeal as hereinafter provided. . . . . ."
Section
". . . . . . Any person aggrieved by any assessment may appeal to the Superior Court for the Judicial District wherein the property is located. . . . . . The judgment of said court either confirming or altering such assessment shall be final."
Pursuant to the authority contained in Connecticut General Statutes §
Section 7 of these regulations reads as follows:
"An assessment made under
7-249 of the Connecticut General Statutes shall consist of ``a lot area charge' on each lot in the District, and a "unit area charge' on each unit in a building especially benefitted [benefited] thereby"
Section 8 reads that:
"In case of property or buildings which W.P.C.A. believes to be especially benefitted [benefited], or where furnishing of sewers results in a disproportionate increase in the cost of the sewerage system, W.P.C.A. may levy an assessment without regard to the lot area and building area charges set forth above which is appropriate to the special benefit accruing to the property."
Referring to §
"Special assessments demand that special contribution in consideration of a special benefit, shall be made by the persons who receive it. The demand for the special contribution is justified by the fact that those who are to make it, while they are made to bear the cost of the public work are supposed to suffer no pecuniary loss thereby, because their property is increased in value to an amount at least equal to the sum they are required to pay." Vaill v. Sewer Commission,
"The burden of proving that a special benefit assessment is invalid because it exceeds the particular dollar benefit accruing to the land is on the property owner. As is true in all cases the plaintiff must prove the allegations of his complaint. The standard of proof is that of a fair preponderance of the evidence. FaithCenter Inc. v. Hartford,
In reviewing assessments of the type imposed under general statutes §
The monetary value of the special benefit conferred upon a piece of property by the presence of a sewerage system must be calculated by the difference between the market value of the realty, with and without the sewerage system, even though such a measurement may mean that the cost of the sewerage system cannot be fully recouped by the town. Id. 29, Carlson-Lang Realty Co. v.Windom,
The only evidence presented to the court was the testimony of the plaintiff Weisman and the various exhibits introduced by both the plaintiffs and the defendant. The plaintiff Peter Weisman testified to a mortgage which was given to the Town to entice it to construct the subject sewerage system. The proceeds of the underlying note were to be used by the Town of Oxford to be paid over to the W.P.C.A. of Naugatuck for the rental due it for the use of its sewage facilities (See Defendant's Exhibit 1). IN addition, the plaintiff Weisman testified further as to a utility easement that he and the other plaintiffs granted to contiguous property owners. (Defendant's Exhibit 2).
The plaintiffs contend that the W.P.C.A. of Oxford in adopting their regulations, (Defendant's Exhibit 3), also adopted a schedule of rates. The schedule of rates distinguished between improved and unimproved property and further distinguished between properties, based upon the distance the property was located from the sewer line. These rates differed from lots abutting on the street where there was a sewer line; to lots 500 feet away; to lots 1000 feet away. There is no rate listed for that area beyond 1000 feet. Both sides have admitted that all of the lots remaining in issue are beyond the 1000 feet line. (See plaintiff's Exhibit A). The rates listed are on a diminishing scale, $3,000.00 per acre for an unimproved lot abutting a street with a sewer line; $2400.00 per acre for a lot a portion of which is within 500 feet of a line and $1800.00 per acre for a lot a portion of which is within 1000 feet of a line. The lots from which the assessment has been appealed all of which are in excess of 1000 feet are uniformly assessed at $3000.00 per acre.
The plaintiff contends that the W.P.C.A. recognized the diminishing benefit to property based upon its distance from the sewer line and that if it wished to do so it could have easily expanded its schedule to include the property beyond the 1000 foot line.
The defendant relies upon §
"The Water Pollution Control Authority may levy benefit assessments upon the land and buildings in the municipality which, in its judgment are especially benefitted [benefited] thereby, whether they abut on such sewerage system or not and upon the owner of such land and buildings, according to such rule as the Water Pollution Control Authority adopts. . . ."
"Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the WPCA Regulations allows for the levying of this special benefit ``without regard to the lot area and building area changes set forth above, which is appropriate to the special benefit accruing to' the property." (See Defendant's brief, Pg. 3).
Neither party introduced any evidence as to the value of the properties either before or after the assessment.
"The presumption of a correct assessment is one of public policy. As such, the plaintiffs had the burden of producing substantial countervailing evidence as to its invalidity with the burden of proving sufficient facts to put the presumed fact of correctness into issue. (Citation omitted) A presumption in favor of a party, that a particular fact is true, shifts the burden of persuasion to the proponent of the invalidity of that fact, and that burden is met when, by the particular quantum of proof, the validity of the fact has been rebutted." Holland v. Holland,
While the plaintiffs' argument may be a cogent one, nevertheless, there has been no evidence of an expert nature showing any difference in the value of the land either before the assessment or after the assessment. The plaintiff has not overcome the presumption of validity.
Judgment may enter for the defendant.
THE COURT
CURRAN, J. CT Page 11510
City of Bridgeport v. Schwarz Bros. , 131 Conn. 50 ( 1944 )
Bishop v. City of Meriden , 114 Conn. 483 ( 1932 )
Faith Center, Inc. v. City of Hartford , 39 Conn. Super. Ct. 142 ( 1982 )
Vaill v. Sewer Commission , 168 Conn. 514 ( 1975 )
Appeal of Cohen From Board of Street Commissioners , 117 Conn. 75 ( 1933 )