DocketNumber: No. CV920510410
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 1690, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 523
Judges: MALONEY, J. CT Page 1691
Filed Date: 2/21/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The facts necessary to the court's decision on the plaintiff's motion are undisputed and fully set out in this court's earlier decision and the decision of the Appellate Court. See the decision of this court (Sferrazza, J.), filed February 17, 1993 and
General Statutes §
The hearing officer for the motor vehicle department based the decision to suspend the plaintiff's license on the report of Dr. Klaus, an emergency room physician who had treated the plaintiff after a motor vehicle accident. Dr. Klaus's report was, in turn, based on information that she received from Dr. Hornblow, a neurologist who had treated the plaintiff earlier. This information was to the effect that the plaintiff suffered from a seizure disorder and that Dr. Hornblow believed she should not operate a motor vehicle. The plaintiff testified in opposition, claiming that the information that Dr. Klaus had was only secondhand and no longer reflected her condition accurately. The hearing officer nevertheless gave greater weight to the letter from Dr. Klaus than to the plaintiff's testimony and concluded that the plaintiff did "not meet the minimum physical standards for safe operation of a motor vehicle on the highways of Connecticut." Acting in behalf of the commissioner, the hearing officer rendered a final decision suspending the plaintiff's motor vehicle license until she provided medical evidence of her fitness to drive. CT Page 1692
In its decision on the plaintiff's appeal to this court, the court (Sferrazza, J.) affirmed the decision of the hearing officer, holding that it is not the function of the court to retry the case or substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence for that of the hearing officer. That holding is, of course, in accordance with well established, deeply rooted principles of administrative law.
The Appellate Court disagreed with this court's conclusion that Dr. Klaus's letter constituted sufficient and substantial evidence. It held, therefore, that the evidence was not sufficient to support the hearing officer's decision. In so holding, the Appellate Court gave considerable weight to the plaintiff's testimony at the administrative hearing and discounted Dr. Klaus's report as hearsay based on further hearsay. The Appellate Court reversed this court's decision, therefore.
In the present motion, the plaintiff argues in essence that the Appellate Court has ruled that the hearing officer's decision was without substantial justification as a matter of law. This court disagrees.
Section
The hearing officer in this case had the initial responsibility under the law to weigh the evidence in the record. He then had the responsibility to make findings of fact based on that evidence. The only evidence the hearing officer had was the medical report indicating the plaintiff's lack of ability to operate a vehicle and the plaintiff's testimony in opposition. As noted, the hearing officer determined that the medical report constituted the weightier evidence and accordingly rendered his decision suspending the plaintiff's license to operate a vehicle. The justification for that decision was, therefore, evidence in the record that was material and relevant and logically supported the decision. CT Page 1693
The Appellate Court's later opinion — that the evidence used by the hearing officer was insufficient — required that his decision and the decision of this court be reversed. The Appellate Court's opinion did not, however, automatically render the hearing officer's decision as being "without any substantial justification."
As indicated above, this court finds that the hearing officer's decision did not lack justification. It does not, therefore, provide a basis for an award of fees and costs under §
The plaintiff's motion is denied.