DocketNumber: No. CV 95 0548901
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 6263
Judges: HENNESSEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 6/29/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
In count two the plaintiff alleges common law vexatious litigation for the defendant's filing of the original action as it pertained to K A.
On May 1, 1995, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment along with a memorandum of law in support of his motion. Additionally, on May 15, 1995, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
"The [purpose] of a motion for summary judgment is not to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint, but is to test for the presence of contested factual issues." Bark v. Avitabile,
The defendant argues that summary judgment should be entered in his favor. The defendant further argues that in order to prevail in a vexatious litigation suit, a party must allege and prove that the lawsuit at issue was initiated maliciously and without probable cause and was terminated in the plaintiff's favor. The defendant argues that the standard to be used by the court in determining probable cause is lower than the burden necessary to succeed on the merits. The defendant argues that a party need not establish that he or she will prevail on the merits in order to establish probable cause. Finally, the defendant argues that he had probable cause to bring his suit CT Page 6265 against Konover Construction Company ("KCC") and Konover Associates ("K A") because: (1) It was unclear whether Konover Construction Company or Konover Associates made the final administrative decision to terminate the defendant, (2) Michael Konover ("Konover"), who seems to be in charge of major decisions, is in charge of both KCC and K A, (3) Konover directs both KCC and K A, (4) Konover is the major stockholder in both KCC and K A, (5) Judith Rosenthal, who possessed the power to terminate KCC employees, was herself employed by K A, (6) Stedman's hiring letter was on K A stationary, (7) Stedman's insurance forms were on K A stationary, and (8) in documents prepared by the defendant in response to the CHRO complaint, there was no attempt made to distinguish or to indicate that K A was not involved in this matter in any way.
In response, the plaintiff argues that there are genuine issues of material fact, and therefore, the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied. The plaintiff argues that the defendant was never an employee of Konover Associates and was not terminated by an employee of Konover Associates. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the defendant was paid only by KCC, performed no employee functions for Konover Associates and his wage and tax statements identified KCC as his employer. The plaintiff further argues that Michael Konover was not involved in, nor consulted about, the decision to terminate the defendant. The plaintiff argues that whether the lawsuit was vexatious requires a determination of intent and is, therefore, a question of fact. Accordingly, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied.
General Statutes §
[a]ny person who commences and prosecutes any civil action or complaint against another, in his own name or the name of others, or asserts a defense to any civil action or complaint commenced and prosecuted by another (1) without probable cause, shall pay such other person double damages, or (2) without probable cause, and with a malicious intent unjustly to vex and trouble such other person, shall pay him treble damages.
In Blake v. Ley,
The defendant has stated that he brought a lawsuit against both KCC and K C for age discrimination because it was unclear who actually had control over and made administrative decisions pertaining to Stedman. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorably to the non-movant, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant had probable cause to bring the original lawsuit and whether the defendant acted with malicious intent. Accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Mary R. Hennessey, Judge