DocketNumber: No. CV 00 0179856
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 7877
Judges: LEWIS, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 6/8/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The defendant has filed an answer and three special defenses in this present case. The defendant's special defenses allege that: (1) the Texas court which rendered judgment lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant; (2) process in the action was not served upon the defendant so as to give it notice of the action; and (3) the defendant is not known as "Auerbach, Pollack Richardson, Inc." as written in the caption of the Texas default judgment and, therefore, the judgment referred to in the plaintiff's complaint is against a party other than the defendant.
The plaintiff has moved (#104) for summary judgment on the ground that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and this court must give full faith and credit to the Texas judgment. The defendant argues that its special defenses prevent this court from granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. A motion for summary judgment CT Page 7878 shall be granted "if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miles v. Foley,
It is well established that "issues regarding the jurisdiction of a foreign court are determined by the law of the foreign state." Tri-StateTank Corp. v. Higganum Heating, Inc.,
"A [Texas] court may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only if the requirements of both the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the
"Under the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause, a defendant must have certain minimum contacts with the forum such that maintaining suit there will not offend `traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
"The Texas Supreme Court has articulated a three-prong formula to ensure compliance with the federal standard: (1) there must be a substantial connection between the nonresident defendant and Texas arising from action or conduct of the nonresident defendant purposefully directed toward Texas; (2) the cause of action must arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with Texas (specific jurisdiction), or if not, the defendant's contacts with Texas must be continuing and systematic (general jurisdiction); and (3) assumption of jurisdiction must not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In re S.A.V.,
"In determining the latter prong of the Texas formulation, due consideration should be given to (1) the burden on the defendant, (2) the interests of the forum state in adjudicating the dispute, (3) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and (5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. World-WideVolkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,
The Texas long-arm statute states in pertinent part that: "a non-resident does business in [Texas] if the non-resident: (1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; or (2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state." Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. §
With respect to the first two prongs of the Texas standard for determining jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the plaintiff argues that under Texas law the defendant's contacts with Texas were sufficient to establish that the defendant purposefully directed its actions toward Texas. The plaintiff contends that minimum contacts were established because the defendant was doing business in the state by: CT Page 7880 entering into a contract to be performed in Texas; sending a $15,000 retainer check to the plaintiff in Texas; and actively communicating with the plaintiff about the representation while the plaintiff was in Texas. Consequently, the plaintiff argues that the Texas court has specific jurisdiction over the defendant arising from the defendant doing business in the state with the plaintiff and then not paying the plaintiff for its services. The defendant responds that the required minimum contacts are absent in the present case. The defendant contends that the plaintiff performed services in Texas, but that the defendant never purposefully availed itself of any Texas privileges.
In support of its position, however, the defendant attaches only the affidavit of Robert N. Drake, its senior vice president. While Drake states that the defendant lacks the required minimum contacts in Texas, Drake does not dispute in his affidavit the plaintiff's contentions that: (1) the defendant hired the plaintiff to represent it in the Texas action; (2) the defendant mailed a retainer to the plaintiff in Texas; and (3) all correspondence and activity by the plaintiff was done on the defendant's behalf while the plaintiff was in Texas. The court finds, therefore, that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts with Texas for the Texas court to exercise personal jurisdiction. Moreover, the second prong of the standard is also satisfied as the Texas court had specific jurisdiction over the defendant because the cause of action arises out of the defendant's contacts with Texas. See Sydow v. Acheson Co.,
As to the third prong of the Texas standard, the issue is whether the Texas court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The plaintiff argues that the exercise of jurisdiction did not burden the defendant as the defendant could have reasonably expected to be sued in Texas if it breached its contract with the plaintiff. The defendant has not argued in its memorandum that the exercise of jurisdiction in this action offended traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
There is no evidence before this court that the defendant was burdened by the exercise of personal jurisdiction, or that the entering of judgment against the defendant was disruptive of the shared interests of both Texas and Connecticut in furthering substantive social policies. The CT Page 7881 exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant advanced both Texas' interest in protecting the plaintiff; and also the plaintiff's interest in securing convenient and effective relief. See LeBlanc v. Kyle, supra, 28 S.W.3d 102-03. Accordingly, the Texas court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant did not offend notions of fair play and justice, and the Texas court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The plaintiff's second argument is that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute that service of process was served on the defendant and, therefore, that the Texas court had jurisdiction over the defendant. The plaintiff contends that pursuant to Texas statutory law,2 service of process was served on the Texas secretary of state and, subsequently, the secretary of state sent a copy of the process to the defendant with a certified return receipt requested. Process was sent to the defendant's address as it was provided to the plaintiff by the Connecticut secretary of state's office. On September 11, 1999, the Texas secretary of state received the signed return receipt in its office. The plaintiff contends that because the secretary of state sent process to the defendant at its proper address, under the holding in Zuyus v. No'Mis Communications,Inc.,
In Zuyus v. NoMis Communications, Inc., supra,
Finally, the plaintiff argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute that the plaintiff's action was brought against the proper party. The plaintiff argues that service was made at the proper address of the defendant as CT Page 7882 given by the Connecticut secretary of state and that the Texas action was clearly directed against the defendant, but that the name "Pollak" was misspelled and a "c" was added.3 The plaintiff contends that the mistaken addition of one letter to a party's name is a "minor deviation" that does not change the identity of the party against whom the suit was brought. Additionally, the plaintiff asserts that the original letter of retention between the parties spelled "Pollak" properly, but that when the matter was prepared for court in Texas, "Pollak" was misspelled with the additional "c". The defendant does not respond in its memorandum to the plaintiff's argument, but Robert Drake asserts in his affidavit that the plaintiff is seeking to enforce a Texas judgment that is to be entered "against a similarly named defendant."
The defendant has failed to prove the existence of any genuine issue of material fact in dispute as it has not provided any countervailing evidence to prove that it is a misidentified defendant in the plaintiff's action. See supra, Appleton v. Board of Education
"[T]he full faith and credit clause requires a state court to accord to the judgment of another state the same credit, validity and effect as the state that rendered the judgment would give it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Kosinski,
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 8th day of June, 2001.
William B. Lewis, Judge T.R.
Smith v. Smith , 174 Conn. 434 ( 1978 )
International Shoe Co. v. Washington , 66 S. Ct. 154 ( 1945 )
Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China ... , 815 S.W.2d 223 ( 1991 )
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 100 S. Ct. 559 ( 1980 )
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz , 105 S. Ct. 2174 ( 1985 )
Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S. A. v. Hall , 104 S. Ct. 1868 ( 1984 )
Zuyus v. No'Mis Communications, Inc. , 930 S.W.2d 743 ( 1996 )