DocketNumber: No. CV91 0397565
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 7775
Judges: WAGNER, J.
Filed Date: 8/1/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Pomeranz Drayton Stabnick for plaintiff.
Michael E. Riley for defendant.
Brian E. Prindle for intervenor.
On October 17, 1990, Hamilton Standard filed an action against Brewer Electric pursuant to General Statutes §
On June 10, 1993, Hamilton Standard filed the present action against Brewer to recoup workers' compensation benefits it paid to Pierce, in accordance with General Statutes §
Brewer argues in support of its motion for summary judgment that Pierce's action is barred by the two-year statute because her motion to intervene in the present action was not filed or granted within two years of the date of the accident which gave rise to this action, October 18, 1988. Brewer claims that because Pierce was not a party to the original action, which was dismissed, her complaint in this action is not "saved" by the accidental failure of suit statute like that of Hamilton Standard.
Pierce argues in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that under General Statutes §
In Rowland Products, Inc., the court held that the general negligence statute of limitations, General Statutes §
The reasoning in Rowland Products, Inc. has been explicitly rejected in the recent Appellate Court decision in Packtor v. Seppala AHP Construction Co.,
In Packtor, the plaintiff employee, Packtor, was injured on September 13, 1987. Packtor filed an action to recover damages for personal injuries against J.M.H. Associates in 1990. Packtor's employer, Stop Shop, intervened in the plaintiff's action within the thirty day period provided in §
The Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision granting summary judgement on both the complaint and intervening complaint. With respect to Stop Shop's intervening complaint, the court stated:
In this case, the employee's cause of action is limited by the personal injury statute of limitations found in General Statutes §
52-584 . Packtor's injury occurred on September 13, 1987. Stop Shop did not initiate any action until it filed a motion to intervene on August 27, 1990, well beyond the two year statute of limitations. Stop Shop's derivative right to reimbursement was, therefore, CT Page 7778 time-barred pursuant to §52-584 .
Id. 432. The court noted that "Stop Shop could have exercised its right to commence a direct action against the third party tortfeasor under General Statutes §
In this case, following the Appellate Court's reasoning in Packtor, Pierce could have filed a direct action against Brewer Electric within the two-year negligence statute of limitations. Pierce sustained her injuries on October 18, 1988 and did not initiate her action until she intervened in the action brought by Hamilton Standard in July, 1991, beyond the two year negligence statute of limitations.
Since Pierce's cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment against Pierce is granted.
Wagner, J.