DocketNumber: No. CV940316118S
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 12223, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 133
Judges: McGRATH, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/2/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
On August 16, 1994 the plaintiff, Mary Payson, filed a nine count complaint against the defendant, Paul W. Adams. Payson is suing Adams as an individual and in his official capacity as trustee. The facts alleged in the complaint are as follows. Pursuant to a 1966 trust agreement, a trust was established by Charles Lynn Stone, the plaintiff's father. The trust was established for the benefit of Payson, her spouse and her descendants.
Under the terms of the trust, "[t]he trustee shall, during CT Page 12224 the life of Mary Stone Parsons [now Mary Payson], daughter of the Donor, in his absolute discretion pay any or all of the net income to or for the benefit of Mary Stone Parsons, her spouse or her children. . . ." The trust is to terminate not later than twenty years after the death of Charles Lynn Stone's children. At that time the trustee is required to distribute the trust principal to Mary Payson's then living grandchildren and living issue of any deceased grandchildren.
The trust agreement provides that CityTrust Company, a banking corporation in Bridgeport shall be the successor to Adams as trustee. The trust agreement grants Payson the power to appoint and remove CityTrust Company and its successors to serve as trustee.
Payson alleges in her complaint that despite her numerous requests for an accounting, Adams has never rendered to her or to any court, an account of his actions as trustee. In count one Payson is asking for an accounting pursuant to General Statutes §
Adams filed a motion to dismiss with a supporting memorandum on September 22, 1994. Payson filed a memorandum of law in opposition on September 28, 1994. Adams filed a reply memorandum on October 17, 1994. Payson filed a reply memorandum in further opposition on October 19, 1994.
"A motion to dismiss is the appropriate vehicle for challenging the jurisdiction of the court." Zizka v. WaterPollution Control Authority,
The trust agreement provides that the trustee is to make income payments "in his absolute discretion." Adams argues in his memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss the complaint that Payson is merely an income beneficiary, and therefore, since there is not a mandate that he must distribute any income, Payson does not have standing to bring the action. Payson argues that she has standing pursuant to §
Section
Section 45a-242a provides in part that "[i]f any fiduciary becomes incapable of executing his trust, neglects to perform the duties of his trust, wastes the estate in his charge . . . the court of probate having jurisdiction may, upon its own motion, or upon the application and complaint of any person interested . . . after notice and a hearing, remove such fiduciary." The trust agreement provides Payson with the power to appoint and remove the party or parties who will succeed Adams as trustee. It is clear that this power to appoint and remove future trustees would make Payson an interested party. It is further noted that Payson, as a named beneficiary, has an interest in insuring that Adams is fulfilling his duties as trustee.
Furthermore, Payson, as a beneficiary under the trust, has a right to seek damages for breach of trust by the trustee to the superior court. See Jackson v. Conland,
The discretionary powers of Adams, as trustee, do not affect Payson's standing. Payson, as an income beneficiary, is seeking an accounting from Adams, damages for Adams' breach of fiduciary duties, and the removal of Adams as trustee. It is found that Payson has standing to bring these claims before the court.
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied.