DocketNumber: No. CV 93 0525280
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 6889
Judges: HENNESSEY, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 7/18/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
On May 21, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a two count complaint against the defendant, Geico General Insurance Co. In count one of the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that the defendant breached and violated the terms of the plaintiffs' automobile insurance policy in refusing to make payment on the plaintiffs' underinsured motorist benefits claim regarding the injuries allegedly sustained by Margaret Matyskiela. Similarly, in count two of the complaint the plaintiffs allege that the defendant also breached and violated the terms of the plaintiffs' automobile insurance policy in refusing to make payment on the plaintiffs' underinsured motorist benefits claim regarding the injuries allegedly sustained by Carl Matyskiela.
On April 4, 1994 prior to filing an answer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. In support thereof, the defendant submitted a memorandum of law, a copy of the complaint filed by the plaintiffs against Diane Yourous and Serge Shamelt, two affidavits of Lina Peculic dated, July 30, 1993 and November 24, 1993, a copy of Serge Shamelt's answers to the plaintiffs' interrogatories, a copy of the police accident report, and a copy of the estimate of damage report regarding Serge Shamelt's vehicle. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs filed a memorandum of law and a copy of General Statutes §
The following facts are undisputed. At the time of the accident, the plaintiffs were covered by an insurance policy issued by the defendant that gave the plaintiffs, in addition to other insurance coverage, uninsured/underinsured motorist protection in the sum of $100,000 per person/$300,000 per occurrence. Affidavit of Lina Peculic dated July 30, 1993. Diane Yourous and Serge Shamelt were also covered by insurance at the time of the accident. Their insurance policy, which provides them with single limit liability of $300,000, was also issued by the defendant. Affidavit of Lina Peculic dated November 24, 1993; answer of Serge Shamelt to question #7 of the plaintiffs' interrogatories.
"Pursuant to Practice Book § 384, summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Scinto v. Stamm,
"To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact." (Citations omitted.) Esposito v. Wethered,
The defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because, at the time of the accident, the amount of liability insurance on the tortfeasor vehicle was not less than the plaintiffs' underinsured coverage. It follows, the defendant argues, that the tortfeasor vehicle was not "underinsured" as a matter of law and that, therefore, summary judgment must be rendered in its favor.
In response, the plaintiffs argue that, "[w]hile it is undisputed that the tortfeasor carried a $300,000.00 single limit policy, it is completely unknown how that policy will be distributed amongst the two (2) named [p]laintiffs." Plaintiffs' memorandum of law dated April 21, 1994, p. 4. For example, the plaintiffs argue, "if Carl Matyskiela recovered $250,000.00 and Margaret Matyskiela recovered $50,000.00, then Margaret would be able to pursue an underinsured motorist claim and Carl would not." Plaintiffs' memorandum of law dated April 21, 1994, p. 4. The plaintiffs argue that the amount actually recovered by an individual plaintiff must be compared with the individual plaintiff's uninsured coverage amount before it can be determined whether the tortfeasor's vehicle is underinsured. Thus, the plaintiffs argue, genuine issues of material fact will continue to exist regarding whether one of them is underinsured "until the liability actions pending against the tortfeasors are resolved." Plaintiffs' memorandum of law dated April 21, 1994, pp. 5-6.
In order for an insured individual to make an underinsured motorist claim, the tortfeasor's vehicle must have been "underinsured," under General Statutes §
An "underinsured vehicle" is defined, in General Statutes
§
a motor vehicle with respect to which the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of liability under the uninsured motorist portion of the policy against which claim is made under subsection (b) of this section.
In determining whether a motor vehicle is `underinsured' the total of all liability insurance coverage available to an individual claimant must be compared to the amount of underinsured motorist coverage in each of the policies against which the victim has a claim. Only "[i]f the total of the liability insurance is less than the uninsured motorist limits of the individual's policy, . . . [does] the uninsured motorist coverage become applicable." Covenant Ins. Co. v.Coon, supra,
Under General Statutes §
The plaintiffs' reliance, in their memorandum of law, onStephan v. Pennsylvania General Ins. Co.,
did not dispute the fact that the claimants were covered under their uninsured motorist policies. Rather, in both cases the issue was whether the language of the claimant's policy permitted the insurance company to reduce the damages owed to the claimants by taking credit for payments made to others injured in the accident.
Florestal v. Government Employees Ins. Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. 128409 (Dean, J., April 4, 1994). In the present matter, in contrast, the defendant insurance company is contesting the plaintiffs' claim that they are covered by their uninsured motorist policies. The analysis set forth above must be utilized to determine whether the tortfeasor vehicle was underinsured at the time of the accident.
In the present case, the amount of liability coverage potentially available to the plaintiffs is $300,000, while the amount of the plaintiffs' underinsured motorist coverage is only $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. Thus, the amount of liability coverage potentially available to the plaintiffs is not less than the amount of the plaintiffs' underinsured motorist coverage. Therefore, the vehicle owned by Serge Shamelt and operated by Diane Yourous, which allegedly collided with the plaintiffs' vehicle and caused the plaintiffs to sustain injuries, was not "underinsured" within the meaning of General Statutes §
Mary R. Hennessey, Judge