DocketNumber: No. CV 90 0305365 S
Citation Numbers: 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 13776, 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 87
Judges: SILBERT, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 12/1/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
This case, in which a jury was selected in early November and in which the evidence is schedule to commence on December 2, 1997, has produced a flurry of last minute would-be dispositive motions on which this court heard oral argument on November 17, 1997. The court decided the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as against the intervening plaintiff on November 26, 1997. It decided the defendant's motion for summary judgment on November 28, 1997. The present motion to strike is the last of CT Page 13777 these three motions.
The University filed a Second Amended Answer and Revised Special Defense to Counts I and II1 on October 16, 1997, asserting that it is immune from suit under the exclusivity provision of General Statutes Sec.
1) joint ventures do not come within the definition of "employer" as defined in General Statutes Sec.
31-275 (10);2) The University was not an employer because it did not pay Dr. Doe for his services;
3) The University is not entitled to immunity because it did not obtain worker's compensation insurance as required by General Statutes Sec.
31-284 (b);4) The University is not a joint venturer because it has failed to allege the necessary element of a profit motive in its affiliation with the Hospital regarding the operation of the residency program; and
5) Dr. Doe was not employed within the scope of the operation of the residency program since he was a student not a teacher.
There are numerous facts in dispute regarding the exact nature of the affiliation between the University and the Hospital with respect to the residency program. At oral argument and in its pleadings, however, the University has acknowledged that the affiliation was not for profit, that the Hospital, rather than the University, was Doe's employer and paid his salary, and that the University neither procured, contributed to, nor reimbursed the hospital for its worker's compensation coverage with respect to Dr. Doe.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to `contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to CT Page 13778 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.'" NovametrixMedical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc.,
In its Second Special Defense, the University claims immunity from suit pursuant to General Statutes Sec.
An employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section shall not be liable for any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained, but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as provided under this chapter . . . All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees . . . arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter.
Because General Statutes Sec.
"Employer" means any person, corporation, limited liability company, firm, partnership, voluntary association, joint stock association, the state and any public CT Page 13779 corporation within the state using the services of one or more employees for pay, or the legal representative of any such employer . . .
The University has acknowledged that it was not Dr. Doe's direct employer but claims that it is entitled to the same immunity by virtue of its having engaged in a joint venture, enterprise or undertaking with the Hospital in the operation of the residency program.
The statute defining "employers" does not specifically include joint ventures, enterprises or undertakings. A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed.McKinley v. Musshorn,
Although the legislature has not included joint ventures within the statutory definition of "employer" for worker's compensation purposes, it has specifically included joint ventures in the definitions of such terms as "firm," "person," or "sponsor" for the purposes of other statutes. See e.g. General Statutes Secs.
Because the legislature has shown that it is aware of the significance of including the concept of joint venture in certain definitions and has done so on numerous occasions, its failure to do so in the context of the definition of "employer" should not be viewed as an oversight. When drafting statutes, the legislature is presumed to act intentionally and with a full breadth of understanding of other statutes and of case law. Doddv. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.,
Notwithstanding the legislature's exclusion of joint ventures from the definition of "employer", the defendant has directed this court's attention to numerous cases in other jurisdictions which have held that an employee of joint venture or enterprise receiving workers' compensation benefits for a work-related injury cannot bring a tort action against another member of the joint venture or enterprise. Indeed, the parties have not directed this court's attention to any published case that has specifically reached a contrary conclusion. Before addressing the cases cited by the defendant, however, it is first necessary to examine the elements of a joint venture. CT Page 13781
Our Supreme Court has defined a joint venture as defined as "a special combination of two or more persons who combine their property, money, effects, skill and knowledge to seek a profit jointly in a single business enterprise without any actual partnership or corporate designation." Electronic Assoc., Inc. v.Automatic Equip. Devel. Corp.,
The defendant has not been able to support with case law its suggestion that its affiliation with a hospital for purposes of its residency program amounts to a joint venture for purposes of worker's compensation law. To the contrary, in Trustees ofColumbia University v. Columbia/Health Care,
The defendant has noted that the precise terms of the affiliation between the university and the hospital are questions of fact, not determinable within the framework of a motion to strike. This is true, and the management of this issue would CT Page 13782 certainly have been made easier if the special defense had been interposed earlier so that, with proper discovery, this issue could have been decided with no facts in dispute in the context of a motion for summary judgment. Time has not permitted such a luxury, however, so this court must determine, within the limited context of those facts which are found in the pleadings or otherwise conceded, whether the defendants have interposed a viable special defense as a matter of law. In that regard, the court notes that the University has acknowledged that the hospital, and not the university paid the plaintiff's salary. Moreover, the University has made no claim that it has complied with the provisions of General Statutes Sec.
Each employer who does not furnish to the chairman of the Workers' Compensation Commission satisfactory proof of his solvency and financial ability to pay directly to injured employees or other beneficiaries compensation provided, by this chapter shall insure his full liability under this chapter . . . in one or more of the following ways: (1) By filing with the Insurance commissioner in form acceptable to him security guaranteeing the performance of the obligations of this chapter by the employer; or (2) by insuring his full liability under this part . . . in any stock or mutual companies or associations that are or may be authorized to take such risks in this state; or (3) by any combination of the methods provided in subdivisions (1) and (2) of this subsection . . . If the employer fails to comply with the requirements of this subsection, an employee may bring an action against such employer for damages on account of personal injury sustained by such employee arising out of and in the course of his employment or on account of death resulting from personal injury so sustained . . .
The University neither paid Dr. Doe's salary nor did it secure workers' compensation coverage on his behalf. Thus, it did not comply with the terms of General Statutes
Returning to the cases cited by the defendant in support of the proposition that a joint venture should be viewed as an employer for purposes of immunity under a worker's compensation statute, it is apparent that each of these cases has material distinctions from the present controversy. In Boudreaux v. TheSandstone Group,
In Dang v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc.,
Berger v. Mead,
Occasionally, we on this Court find some opinions difficult to write. A party's injury can so strongly call for compensation that we feel strongly inclined to at least allow the case to go to the jury. Unfortunately, as in this case, the law is too clear on the subject. The Legislature has clearly preempted this area thus giving us very little leeway.
Id. at 921. The case involved a police officer employed by one department who was shot during a joint training exercise by police officers employed by another department. The intermediate appellate court applied a somewhat tortured "economic reality" test, which has never been utilized in Connecticut, to determine that both the training unit and the officer's own department were the plaintiff's employers. Although it defined "joint venture" as the undertaking of a single project for profit, the court went on to note that a non-commercial joint enterprise could qualify as an employer under the broadly worded Michigan statute that included within the definition of employer "any other entity . . . that employs one or more persons on a salary, bonus, wage, commission or other basis, whether or not the employer is in a business . . ." Our statute, of course, is not nearly as broad, and this court believes that this case would have been decided differently had it arisen in Connecticut.
The defendant does note that some courts outside of Connecticut have defined "joint venture" without requiring a CT Page 13785 profit motive. See, e.g., Fried v. United States,
Kalnas v. Layne of New York Company, Inc. v. EmceeConstruction Company, Inc.),
In Hudson v. A.C.S. Co., Inc., et al.,
The University seeks the immunity offered by the worker's compensation statutes without having undertaken any of the obligations that would entitle it to such immunity. It has CT Page 13786 alleged in its Second Special Defense that the scope, or common purpose, of the operation of the residency program was to educate and train students participating in the program. Dr. Doe's only participation in the residency program at the time of her injury was as a student. He was not, therefore, involved in the operation of the program to educate and train. Dr. Doe was the object of the program, not its operator, and the University was his teacher, not his employer.
Dr. Doe's only employment was by the Hospital for the purpose of treating its patients. His injury did not occur while performing the business of the affiliation between the University and the Hospital, and, the University is therefore not entitled to immunity from suit under General Statutes Sec.
For all of the above reasons, the plaintiff's motion to strike is granted.
Jonathan E. Silbert, Judge
Conner v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. , 123 Ariz. 291 ( 1979 )
First Mechanics Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Rev. , 91 F.2d 275 ( 1937 )
County of Riverside v. Loma Linda University , 173 Cal. Rptr. 371 ( 1981 )
Hodgman v. Citizens Public Utilities, Inc. , 110 Conn. 571 ( 1930 )
Wall v. Wason , 146 Conn. 32 ( 1958 )
McKinley v. Musshorn , 185 Conn. 616 ( 1981 )
Hudson v. A.C. & S. Co. , 535 A.2d 1361 ( 1987 )
Papp v. Rocky Mountain Oil & Minerals, Inc. , 236 Mont. 330 ( 1989 )
Rhodes v. Sunshine Mining Co. , 113 Idaho 162 ( 1987 )
Global Credit Services, Inc. v. AMISUB (Saint Joseph ... , 244 Neb. 681 ( 1993 )
Dang v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center, Inc. , 490 N.W.2d 653 ( 1992 )
Berger v. Mead , 127 Mich. App. 209 ( 1983 )
Dillard v. Rowland , 520 S.W.2d 81 ( 1974 )
Matter of Pratt & Whitney Co., Inc. , 140 B.R. 327 ( 1992 )
Lawler v. Dallas Statler-Hilton Joint Venture , 793 S.W.2d 27 ( 1990 )
Long v. Springfield Lumber Mills, Inc. , 214 Or. 231 ( 1958 )