DocketNumber: No. CV99-0268822S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 6505, 29 Conn. L. Rptr. 522
Judges: BOOTH, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
Filed Date: 5/9/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
Travelers filed a motion for summary judgment on March 10, 2000, on the ground that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Travelers asserts that the interpretation of policy language is a question of law for the court. Travelers filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion for CT Page 6506 summary judgment. The plaintiffs have filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment.
"The standard of review for summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. . . . Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of any material fact . . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mafucci v. Royal Park Limited Partnership,
The plaintiffs argue in opposition to the motion for summary judgment that the attack by the two dogs constitutes two occurrences under the insurance policy because each dog has a separate and distinct ability to cause harm and damage, and that each dog was able to attack Yi-An Sun as a result of several distinct and different acts by the Bradys. The plaintiffs claim that the Bradys allowed one dog to roam free and that they failed to attach an electronic dog collar to the other dog. The plaintiffs also claim that the Bradys left a gate open that allowed both dogs to roam free. The plaintiffs argue that these separate acts of negligence create a crucial factual determination for the fact finder at trial.
Travelers argues that the definition of occurrence in the Bradys' insurance policy is not ambiguous. Travelers contends that the number of occurrences is determined by the event that triggers liability on the part of the insured. Travelers asserts that the alleged attack of Yi-An Sun by the two dogs was a continuous, uninterrupted event that resulted in injury to him. Accordingly, Travelers argues that the court should find that the attack by the two dogs constitutes one occurrence under the Bradys' homeowners insurance policy.
"[A]n insurance policy is a contract that is construed to effectuate the intent of the parties as expressed by their words and purposes. . . . [U]nambiguous terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning." (Brackets in original; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. AetnaCasualty Surety Co.,
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra,
In the present case, the term occurrence is defined in the homeowners insurance policy issued to the Bradys by Travelers Insurance. The policy defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, which results, during the policy period, in: (a) bodily injury; or (b) property damage." (Plaintiffs Brief, Exhibit Q, p. 1, ¶ 5.) Based on the definition in the policy and the recent ruling by the Supreme Court inMetropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra,
"In identifying the occurrence or occurrences for insurance purposes, courts have applied three tests. . . . Some courts have concluded that an occurrence is determined by reference to the underlying cause or causes of the damage. . . . Other courts have concluded that an occurrence is determined based on the effect of the accident. . . . Finally, a third group of courts have concluded that an occurrence is determined by reference to the event or events triggering liability on the part of the insured." (Citations omitted) Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. AetnaCasualty Surety Co., supra,
The plaintiffs do not dispute that both dogs attacked Yi-An Sun. The plaintiffs state that "Yi-An Sun was jogging in the area of Whitney Avenue and Ralston Street in Hamden, Connecticut, when he was attacked, bitten, mauled and knocked to the ground by the two dogs owned by the Bradys, causing him to suffer injuries and losses set forth below." (Complaint, ¶ 5.) The plaintiffs further describe the incident in their brief. "On August 1, 1998, Dr. Sun was jogging in the area of Whitney Avenue and Ralston Street in Hamden, Connecticut, when he was menaced and attacked by both dogs. . . . Dr. Sun ran from the dogs, flailing his arms to keep them at bay. . . . However, both dogs pursued him, causing him to step off the sidewalk and run into the street. . . . While Dr. Sun was fleeing down the street, one eyewitness, Cynthia Eber, reported that Dr. Sun was knocked to the pavement a total of three times by the Rottweiler, and not at all by the Doberman. . . . After the second knockdown both dogs bit him in the legs." (Emphasis added.) (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 6.) The plaintiffs contend that the attacks constitute two separate occurrences because the underlying conduct, or causes of the bodily injury is the Bradys' negligent behavior with respect to each of the two dogs. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 17.) The plaintiffs claim that it is for the fact finder to determine whether the Bradys' actions constitute the same general conditions or two distinct and individual causes of Yi-An Sun's bodily injuries. (Plaintiffs' Brief, p. 21.) The plaintiffs urge the court to look to the underlying causes of the attack rather than the attack itself. It is true that there may be facts in dispute concerning the underlying cause of the attacks, but there are no facts in dispute concerning the event which triggered liability.
In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Casualty Surety Co., supra,
Kevin E. Booth Judge of the Superior Court