DocketNumber: No. CV94 31 37 15 S
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 1319-TTTT
Judges: HAUSER, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/14/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The plaintiff brings claims against each defendant for violations of CUTPA pursuant to General Statutes §
On December 15, 1995 two motions to strike were filed separately by each of the named defendants, accompanied by a memorandum in support of its' motions. DPS moves to strike counts one, six and nine of the plaintiff's third amended complaint. Family moves to strike counts two, four, five, seven and ten of the plaintiff's third amended complaint. On January 5, 1996, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendants' motions to strike along with a memorandum in support of his objection.
A motion to strike contests the legal sufficiency of a pleading. Practice Book § 152. The motion to strike tests whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief can be granted. Amore v. Frankel,
"In reviewing the granting of a motion to strike, the facts alleged in the complaint must be construed in a light most favorable to the pleader. If facts provable under the allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." RK Constructors, Inc. v. Fusco Corp.,
In counts one and two, the plaintiff's allegations consist of a variety of conduct and practices engaged in by the defendants that allegedly constitute a violation of CUTPA. The defendants' arguments in support of striking these counts are based on two paragraphs in a count that consists of 42 paragraphs. The courts have consistently held that "a motion to strike is not the proper procedural tool to use when seeking to strike individual paragraphs of a count complained in a complaint . . . and it shall not remove such pleading or count so far as the same is applicable to any other cause of action or defense." Kinosh v. Stephen Chevrolet,Inc., Superior Court, Judicial District of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 0506307, (February 10, 1993, Dunn, J.). See also Zavo v. Montanaro, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 313902, (January 25, 1995, Cocco, J.) (holding that a motion to strike a single paragraph is technically improper when the paragraph does not purport to state a cause of action); Jaramillo v. Adis, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 300969 (May 5, 1993, Ballen, J.,
Because the defendants are attempting to attack the legal sufficiency of certain paragraphs in an otherwise viable CUTPA count, their motion to strike counts one and two of the plaintiff's complaint are denied.
The plaintiff alleges that Family failed to comply with General Statutes §
In Krebs v. Wachovia Bank of North Carolina, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 345519, (May 5, 1995, Martin, J.,
Furthermore, the plaintiff has alleged a valid claim for damages under General Statutes §
"A defamation action is based on the unprivileged communication of a false statement that tends either to harm the CT Page 1319-XXXX reputation of another by lowering him in the estimation of the community or to deter others from dealing or associating with him."Gillette v. Town of New Milford, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland at Rockville, Docket No. 054791 (September 16, 1992, Klaczak, J.). See Strada v. Connecticut Newspapers, Inc.,
In count five the plaintiff alleges that the defendant, Family, published a defamatory letter and such letter was published to a third party when its author, David Danilowitz, shared the letter with other employees of Family and DPS. The defendant argues that such intracorporate communications do not constitute defamation.
In addressing the issue of intracorporate communications in an action for defamation, the supreme court held, "[a]lthough intracorporate communications once were considered by many courts not to constitute publication of a defamatory statement, that view has been almost entirely abandoned, and we reject it here."Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
A cause of action in fraud must properly consist of four elements: "(1) a false statement was made as a statement of fact; (2) the statement was known to be untrue by the party making it; (3) it was made to induce the other party to act on it; and (4) the latter party did rely on the statement to his detriment."Billington v. Billington,
The defendants argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege the second element of fraud, that the defendants knew the statements it made were false at the time they were made. In count six the plaintiff alleges that "DPS represented to plaintiff that Family was a "bank" unrelated to DPS when, in fact, DPS and Family were and are related corporations." In count seven, the plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Family falsely represented to the plaintiff that he was required to buy the extended service contract and life and disability insurance. Reading these allegations in the light most favorable to the pleader, such allegations are sufficient to demonstrate that the defendants knew the statements were false at the time they were made. Moreover, "the modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dornfried v.October Twenty-Four, Inc.
Furthermore, "the complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded and do substantial justice between the parties." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. Thus, counts six and seven allege sufficient causes of action for fraud. Therefore, the defendants' motion to strike counts six and seven is denied.
The supreme court has set forth the elements of negligent misrepresentation: "One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment . . . supplies false information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information."Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co.,
The defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to allege that the defendants knew the statements it made were false at the time they were made. In counts nine and ten the plaintiff alleges that DPS and Family, through its agent DPS, represented to the plaintiff that he was required to purchase an extended service contract as well as life and disability insurance, and that such representations were false when made. Although the plaintiff does not specifically state that the defendants' knew the statements were false when made, the counts are still sufficient to withstand a motion to strike. "[U]nder the rules of practice governing pleading, a party may plead legal effect as long as the pleading fairly apprises the adverse party of the state of facts which it is intended to prove." D'Ulisse-Cupo v. Board of Directors ofN.D.H.S., supra,
Accordingly, the defendants' motion to strike counts, one, two, four, five, six, seven and ten of the plaintiff's third amended complaint are denied in their entirety.
LAWRENCE L. HAUSER, JUDGE