DocketNumber: File 384914
Citation Numbers: 652 A.2d 539, 43 Conn. Super. Ct. 314, 43 Conn. Supp. 314, 1993 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3471
Judges: Blue
Filed Date: 12/3/1993
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2024
I
INTRODUCTION Business is no respecter of state boundaries, but the tax law sometimes is. In this appeal, I am called upon to determine the tax consequences of a sale of corporate stock that occurred in the context of an intricate multistate corporate structure. In making this determination, I am called upon to construe two different Connecticut statutes.
This is an appeal, pursuant to General Statutes §
It is conceded that the appeal was timely filed and that I have jurisdiction. I conducted an evidentiary hearing on September 29, 1993. (Historians may wish to note that this was the first evidentiary hearing held in the Tax Session of the Superior Court.) My findings of fact and conclusions of law are as follows.
This case involves Trans-Lux Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Trans-Lux") and some of its many subsidiaries. Trans-Lux has a colorful history, and the issues before me are in large part rooted in this historical background. Trans-Lux was incorporated in Delaware in 1920. It was founded on a single invention: that of rear-screen projection.
As anyone who goes to the movies knows, motion pictures have traditionally been shown with front-screen projection, that is, the images are cast upon the screen by a projector in front of the screen. This method has several advantages, but it also has two disadvantages. The lights must be turned off for the movie to be seen, and shadows can be cast on the screen. Rear-screen projection, in contrast, comes from the rear of the screen (somewhat in the fashion of television). It can be seen with the lights on, and shadows cannot be cast on the screen.
Rear-screen projection was originally used by a retired English adventurer who loved to show his travel slides in a fully-lit room that allowed his audience to simultaneously gaze upon both his slides and his own handsome features. This use was of limited economic value. The first economically viable use of the technology came in 1924. The founder of Trans-Lux went to the New York Stock Exchange and saw that so many stockbrokers were crowding around the stock ticker *Page 316 that only the biggest and strongest could get through. The ninety-eight pound weaklings were kept away from the ticker by their burlier counterparts. With rear-screen technology, however, the stock prices could be shown on the wall in a fully-lit room for all to see. With this profitable use, Trans-Lux became heavily involved in what might be called the communications industry.
Shortly after this, another profitable use for rear-screen projection was discovered. It could be used in the actual production of motion pictures. In filming a car-chase scene, for example, it is helpful if the car being filmed is actually stationary, and the background behind it appears to move. If front-screen projection is used, however, the actors will cast their shadows on the background. (One can occasionally see this in some early films.) Rear-screen projection solves this problem.
With this use, Trans-Lux became involved in the movie business. The next step was to build rear-screen projection theaters. These theaters could show newsreels while the audience was ambling in to watch the feature attraction. (The lights were not turned off until the feature film began.) Trans-Lux built a number of these theaters, and (this is important) separate corporations were created for each theater. The theaters were originally owned fifty-fifty by Trans-Lux and RKO, but RKO went bankrupt in 1935, and Trans-Lux suddenly had a string of movie theaters. (A famous NewYorker cartoon of this period showed a group of wealthy individuals "going to the Trans-Lux to hiss Roosevelt.")
In the 1940s, newsreels began to disappear with the advent of television. At the same time, front-screen projectors began to be able to show things like Cinemascope that rear-screen projectors could not. Trans-Lux changed all of its theaters to front-screen projection. One consequence of this was that its communications *Page 317 division now used a technology completely different from that of its entertainment division. Below the level of top management, these became completely separate divisions.
The business offices of Trans-Lux were initially located in New York City. In 1970, however, Trans-Lux moved its communications factory to Connecticut. Over the next fourteen years, more and more Trans-Lux employees were transferred to Connecticut, and in 1984, the entire communications division moved to Connecticut.
The entertainment division, however, remained in New York. This was necessary, in terms of the day-to-day operations, because New York (unlike any city in Connecticut) is an "exchange city." The sales offices of studios are called "exchanges," and if one is going to obtain movies from studios for showing in theaters, one must, as a practical matter, do so in a city such as New York or Los Angeles containing these exchanges. Consequently, all Trans-Lux employees who did things like view, lease, and publicize the movies did so out of New York both before and after the communications division moved to Connecticut.
It is thus fair to say that, in terms of their everyday operations, the communications and entertainment divisions of Trans-Lux were divided, with the entertainment division in New York and the communications division in Connecticut. At the level of top management, however, this division did not exist. There was a single board of directors for the entire corporation, a single chief executive officer, a single chief of operations, and a single chief fiscal officer. The board and the chief officers just named essentially straddled both divisions and worked in both states. These were the people who exercised management and control over Trans-Lux's subsidiary corporations. The corporate *Page 318 headquarters were, however, in Connecticut. In 1986, which is the year in question here, most (but not all) of the board meetings were in Connecticut.
The corporate structure of Trans-Lux must now be described. In the mid-1980s, Trans-Lux owned fifteen or sixteen theaters, nine of which were located in Connecticut. As already mentioned, each individual theater had its own corporation. The board members and officers of the individual theater corporations were board members and top management of the parent company, Trans-Lux. The stock of these individual corporations was originally owned by a holding company called Trans-Lux Theaters Corporation (which, in turn, had been a wholly owned subsidiary of Trans-Lux). The Theaters Corporation became defunct in the 1960s, after which the individual theater corporations became wholly-owned subsidiaries of Trans-Lux.
In 1983, top management of Trans-Lux decided to create another holding corporation for the theaters. The primary reason for this was the limitation of liability. Thus it was that Trans-Lux Texas Corporation ("T-L Texas") was born. The board meeting that authorized this was held in Connecticut. T-L Texas was, as the name implies, a Texas Corporation. Its function was to own all of the stock of the individual theater corporations, and it, in turn, was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Trans-Lux. The board members and officers of T-L Texas were all board members and officers of Trans-Lux. T-L Texas had no separate recognizable existence. It had no office and no employees, and its board meetings were held in conjunction with the board meetings of Trans-Lux.
In 1986, Richard Brandt, then the chief executive officer of Trans-Lux, received an unsolicited offer of staggering generosity from Gulf Western Inc., the parent corporation of Paramount Pictures. The price of a *Page 319 movie theater had traditionally been five times earnings. By the mid-1980s, this had increased to ten times earnings. After some negotiation, Gulf Western offered to purchase ten of Trans-Lux's theaters for the then-record price of fifteen times earnings. Eight of the ten theaters to be sold were in Connecticut, one was in New York City, and one was in Oklahoma. Brandt and the board decided to accept this offer.
In order to accommodate this sale, yet another corporation was born. Trans-Lux Investment Corporation ("T-L Investment") was created shortly before the sale as a wholly-owned subsidiary of Trans-Lux, which, in turn, owned all of the stock of T-L Texas. On the eve of the sale, therefore, the corporate structure of Trans-Lux could be schematically represented as follows:
Trans-Lux | T-L Investment | T-L Texas | _________________________________________________ | | | | | | | | | [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (Individual theater corporations)
On June 25, 1986, the board of T-L Texas met, according to its minutes, "in the Board Room of the Corporation, 110 Richards Avenue, Norwalk, Connecticut" and authorized "the sale of the stock of ten of its theater subsidiaries to an affiliate of Gulf Western Inc. for an aggregate purchase price of $14,700,100." The proceeds were to be paid to T-L Investment and were then available to both divisions of Trans-Lux. It is of the utmost importance that this was a sale of stock and not a sale of assets.
The sale occurred as planned, and the tax consequences of the sale are the subject of this case. When *Page 320
Trans-Lux filed its 1986 Connecticut return, it did not report this income at all. (There is no suggestion of fraud in this, since Trans-Lux did not file a combined return.) When Trans-Lux was audited by the Commissioner, however, the Commissioner asserted his authority under General Statutes §
Trans-Lux has challenged the assessment of deficiency on two different statutory grounds. First, Trans-Lux claim that the adjustment was not, in fact, authorized by §
It has long been established that a state may tax the apportioned net income of a domestic or foreign corporation that conducts a unitary business "which is scattered through several States." Butler Brothers v.McColgan,
Different states address the problem of taxing multicorporate enterprises in different ways. Connecticut's approach is set forth in §
Although §
A number of factors must be considered in construing the statute, and not all of them point in the same direction. On the taxpayer's side, to begin with, I am persuaded that §
In any event, the logic of Altray Co. v. Groppo,
Viewing §
"[C]ourts must construe statutory provisions as they are written . . . and in a manner so as to give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature." (Citations omitted.) Zachs v. Groppo,
Trans-Lux, casting about for words to construe narrowly, has seized upon the phrase "improperly or inaccurately reflected." That, in its view, is a sign that the Commissioner's discretionary powers cannot be implemented in the absence of some real impropriety. I do not agree that this is a fair reading of the statutory text — income may be "inaccurately reflected," for example, without any impropriety at all — but I do not, in any event, write on an altogether clean slate. Judicial authority from other jurisdictions construing substantially similar statutory language, while not technically binding, persuades me that the taxpayer's view should not be adopted.
Section
The original antecedent of both New York tax code provisions — i.e. § 211(4) and (5) — was enacted by 1920 N.Y. Laws c. 640, § 9. Under the 1920 law, any corporation owning or controlling substantially all of the stock of another corporation "liable to report under this article" could be "required to make a consolidated report showing the combined entire net income" of both corporations. In People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist,
The 1920 law was substantially changed by 1925 N.Y. Laws c. 322, § 1. The 1925 law made it explicit that the consolidated report provision could be implemented where the parent corporation was subject to the taxing power of New York even where the subsidiary was not. It also added the following provision: "In case it *Page 326 shall appear to the tax commission that any arrangement exists in such a manner as to improperly reflect the business done, the segregable assets or the entire net income earned from business done in this state, the tax commission is authorized and empowered, in such manner as it may determine, to equitably adjust the tax and to eliminate any assets included in the segregations thereof, provided only that any income directly traceable thereto be also excluded from entire net income."
This provision was again substantially modified by 1944 N.Y. Laws c. 415, § 2. It is the 1944 law that created the present language both of N.Y. Tax Law § 211(4) and (5) and of Connecticut General Statutes §
Section 211(5) provided, in relevant part, that: "In case it shall appear to the tax commission that any agreement, understanding or arrangement exists between the taxpayer and any other corporation or any *Page 327 person or firm, whereby the activity, business, income or capital of the taxpayer within the state is improperly or inaccurately reflected, the tax commission is authorized and empowered, in its discretion and in such manner as it may determine, to adjust items of income, deductions and capital, and to eliminate assets in computing any allocation percentage provided only that any income directly traceable thereto be also excluded from entire net income, so as equitably to determine the tax."
The first significant case to construe § 211(4) and (5) was Wurlitzer Co. v. State Tax Commission,
The New York Court of Appeals gave the New York State Tax Commission even more leeway in CampbellSales Co. v. New York State Tax Commission,
In light of Campbell, it is clear that the New York courts have given the State Tax Commission wide discretion under § 211(4) and (5) and that the decisions of the Commission will be upheld if they have a rational basis. This standard is similar to previous lower court precedent in New York, which had held that the decisions of the State Tax Commission under § 211(4) are reviewable only by an abuse of discretion standard. SeeSapolin Paints, Inc. v. Tully,
Trans-Lux acknowledges the New York heritage of §
Trans-Lux's argument is not without persuasive force. In adopting § 211(5), but not § 211(4), it is obvious that the legislature, to the extent that it thought about the problem at all, chose not to adopt all of the statutory devices available to the New York State Tax Commission. But to recognize this fact is only to begin the necessary analysis. The crucial question is, what does § 211(4) provide that § 211(5) does not? The distinction between the two subsections was nicely summarized by Judge Jones dissenting in the Wurlitzer
case. "[S]ubdivision 5 . . . authorize[s] corrective adjustment of individual items by reallocation of income and deductions; subdivision 4 authorize[s] a consolidated return where the number or complexity of unfair individual items [makes] the use of subdivision 5 inappropriate."Wurlitzer Co. v. State Tax Commissioner,
supra,
The broad, discretionary view that New York courts take of § 211(4) and (5) is similar to that taken by the federal courts in construing the somewhat analogous provision of
Substantively, it is significant that courts of other jurisdictions reviewing statutes analogous to §
With this authority in mind it is appropriate to return to §
In making his decision, the Commissioner is not prohibited from adjusting items of income between two corporations that are, for other purposes, separate taxable entities. See Moline Properties v. Commissioner,
Turning to the facts of the present case, I see no grounds for concluding that the Commissioner abused his discretion under the statute. T-L Investments and T-L Texas, while not sham corporations, were certainly shell corporations, entirely owned and controlled by Trans-Lux and with no officers or employees who were not also officers or employees of Trans-Lux. Moreover, the gain realized from the sale of the theater corporations was available for the use of Trans-Lux. Consequently, even though I find no fraud, tax evasion, or other impropriety on Trans-Lux's part, the Commissioner was well within his powers in finding that an arrangement existed whereby Trans-Lux's income was inaccurately reflected. Section
Because I find that §
The general approach of §
This statutory provision, which, as mentioned, both parties concede to be controlling here, has been augmented by regulation. Section
Section
When these tests are applied to the facts of this case, a considerable potential for confusion exists at the outset because more than one corporation is involved. Is the "company" referred to by the regulation the parent corporation (i.e., Trans-Lux) or one of the subsidiary corporations (i.e., T-L Investment or T-L Texas)? These questions arise because §
A second potential for confusion exists in this case because Trans-Lux not only conducted activities in different states but conducted different types of activities in those states. Trans-Lux has spent much effort in describing its various activities in New York, but it must now be asked whether those activities, colorful as they may be, are relevant for purposes of the standards that have been identified above.
It is helpful to begin with the words of §
In the present case, the intangible assets sold consisted of the stock of the individual theater corporations. Given this fact, it is irrelevant, under the statute, that the day-to-day business of running the theater corporations — e.g. the business of selecting motion pictures to be shown and negotiating their sale or lease — was conducted in New York. The question is, who managed or controlled the stock? It is entirely clear from the evidence that the employees who screened the films, for example, in New York had nothing to do with managing or controlling the stock. The persons who managed or controlled the stock were Mr. Brandt and, perhaps, a few other top officers and directors. These persons — the real managers and controllers for statutory purposes — performed their managing and controlling functions in both Connecticut and New York, but it is clear from the evidence that this activity predominately occurred in Connecticut. Not only was the actual board meeting that authorized the sale of the theater corporation stock held in Connecticut, but it is clear from the evidence that the headquarters of Trans-Lux were in Connecticut and that at least the bulk of the decisions concerning the management and control of the stock were made in Connecticut.
The analysis becomes more complex, however, when one turns to the regulation. The regulation — which both parties concede is controlling here — turns from the exclusive statutory focus on management and control of the intangible assets themselves to a broader consideration of a number of alternative factors, at least some of which involve the day-to-day business of the corporation.
The regulation presents a series of analytical choices. The initial choice to be made is whether one looks for the corporation's "principal place of business" or a "separate and distinct" office responsible for the "routine corporate activities" involving the particular intangible *Page 336
assets in question. Section
The term "principal place of business" does not appear in the statute. Our Supreme Court defined the term at an early date as the place "where the governing power of the corporation is exercised;" MiddletownFerry Co. v. Middletown,
The regulation's "nerve center" test is a test initially articulated by the federal courts for use in determining whether or not those courts have diversity jurisdiction in cases involving multistate corporations. Under
The nerve center test has the virtue of being "a pleasant and alluring figure of speech." Kelly v. UnitedStates Steel Corp.,
If a federal court were analyzing Trans-Lux for purposes of determining the presence or absence of diversity jurisdiction, it would go on to consider "the place where the corporate activities or operations are carried out." 1 Moore, supra, ¶ 0.77 [3.-3], p. 800.111; seeKelly v. United States Steel Corp., supra,
The alternative to the nerve center test under §
The most important question to be answered when considering the phrase "overall, active management" is "management of what?" Is it management of the corporation at the highest level or is it management of the corporation at the level of its day-to-day activities? The answer to this question is provided by the word "overall." This refers not to day-to-day corporate affairs but to corporate affairs "as a whole." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1606 (1966). It follows that the "overall, active management" test looks to the management of the entire corporation. In a corporation that conducts its day-to-day activities in more than one state, this test necessarily looks to management at the highest, corporate-wide level.
In the case of Trans-Lux, it is reasonably clear that the location of its "overall, active management" was in Connecticut at the time of the sale in question. The fact that most of the meetings of the board of directors occurred in Connecticut is one factor that must be considered. This is not, of course, a determinative factor, since boards of directors can usually meet where they please. "One can easily picture a peripatetic board which holds its meetings in in some spot where the climate is favorable and recreational opportunities abound."Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., supra, 284 F.2d 852. It is clear from the evidence in this case, however, that the undoubted salubrious qualities of Norwalk, Connecticut played no role in the board's decision to meet in that fair city. Rather, the evidence is overwhelming that Norwalk was chosen as a site for the board meetings because that was the site of the corporate headquarters. The active management of the corporation *Page 340 at its highest level was located in Connecticut. And at least most of the corporate decisions with respect to the sale of the theater corporation stock were made in Connecticut. I conclude that the "principal place of business" of Trans-Lux was in Connecticut, and that the Commissioner's apportionment of the gain from the sale of the stock to Connecticut was correct.
For the reasons stated above, the appeal is dismissed.
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First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals , 126 Conn. 228 ( 1940 )
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Edison California Stores, Inc. v. McColgan , 30 Cal. 2d 472 ( 1947 )
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Allied-Signal, Inc. Ex Rel. Bendix Corp. v. Director, ... , 112 S. Ct. 2251 ( 1992 )