DocketNumber: No. CV90 0266582 S
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 55
Judges: SPEAR, JUDGE CT Page 56
Filed Date: 1/17/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
1. The trusts in question prohibit the trustees from dealing with or disposing of principal or income of the trust property for less than an adequate or full consideration, and prohibit them from allowing the settlor to borrow the capital or income of the trust estate without adequate interest and security.
2. Defendants breached the terms of the trusts by allowing the settlor to mortgage trust property as security for a loan for the settlor's benefit without the required interest or security.
3. Thereafter, defendant Bergman resigned as trustee.
4. Plaintiff learned of the trusts and the aforementioned mortgage of trust property after the death of her father.
5. As a result of the actions of the trustees, plaintiff has lost substantial amounts of money.
Plaintiff brought this suit against defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and willful default of fiduciary obligations and negligence. She seeks monetary damages, costs, interest and attorney's fees. Defendant Bergman has asserted the special defenses of statute of limitations and laches which plaintiff moved to strike on the grounds of legal insufficiency.
A motion to strike is the proper vehicle to challenge the legal sufficiency of a special defense. Connecticut Practice Book 152 (rev'd. to 1978, as updated to November 30, 1990); Krasnow v. Christensen,
I. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DEFENSE
It is true that breach of trust (count one in plaintiff's complaint) is an equitable claim against which the limitations defense is ordinarily ineffective, MacDonald v. Hartford Trust Company,
By way of a first special defense, defendant alleges that "plaintiff's claims are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations." Defendant Bergman's Answer, Special Defenses and Crossclaim re Amended Complaint, p. 3 (emphasis added). Thus, by the express language of the pleading, defendant asserts the defense as against all counts in plaintiff's complaint. "If the motion to strike is addressed to the entire defense, it will be [denied] if the defense is good as to one count or theory even if it is bad as to another. Stephenson, Connecticut Civil Procedure, Vol. I, Sec. 131(b), p. 550." Natale v. Greenwich Board of Education,
II. LACHES DEFENSE
"Each pleading shall contain a plain and concise statement of the material facts on which the pleader relies. . . ." Connecticut Practice Book 108.
A motion to strike admits all facts well pleaded but does not admit legal conclusions. Maloney v. Conroy,
The defense of laches consists of two elements: (1) an unreasonable, inexcusable delay; and (2) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Berin v. Olson,
In his special defense defendant Bergman has asserted no facts to support his legal conclusion that plaintiff's claims are barred by laches. As the defendant has failed to allege sufficient facts to support such a defense, as mandated by Connecticut Practice Book 108, plaintiff's motion to strike the defense of laches is granted.
E. EUGENE SPEAR, JUDGE