DocketNumber: No. CV 94 55571 S
Citation Numbers: 1997 Conn. Super. Ct. 7724
Judges: RITTENBAND, J.
Filed Date: 7/21/1997
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
I Breach of Contract
II Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
III Fraud
IV Civil Theft
V Conversion CT Page 7725
VI CUTPA
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on March 26, 1997, and the plaintiff filed its objection on June 12, 1997. Defendants' motion claims that counts Three through Six are barred by the statutes of limitations which for each count is three years, and that all of plaintiff's claims are barred by CGS §§ 33-412 and 33-396 because it has been transacting business in Connecticut without a certificate of authority from the secretary of the state. Plaintiff, in response, claims that some of its claims are for invoices or debts occurring within three years preceding its bringing suit,1 that the parties were engaged in a continuous course of conduct which tolled the statutes of limitations and that there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether plaintiff was "transacting business" in Connecticut.
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
A trial court may appropriately render summary judgment when the documents submitted demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact remaining between the parties and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Burns v.Hartford Hospital,
It should be noted that defendants have submitted certified deposition transcripts and exhibits including discovery responses submitted by the plaintiff. From the invoices contained in these responses, it is clear, as plaintiff claims, that some of the claims are for actions or inactions by the defendants occurring subsequent to February 10, 1991. As to those claims, the statutes of limitations do not apply, and for that reason alone on the issue of statutes of limitations, the motion for summary judgment should be denied.
2. Continuing Course of Conduct:
From the facts in the record, the court concludes that there was a continuing course of conduct between the plaintiff and the defendants from at least March, 1990 until September, 1991. In the deposition of Jim Pefferman of the plaintiff submitted as Exhibit A to the motion for summary judgment, on page 49, lines 22 through 25, the witness agrees with counsel's question that the list of invoices submitted showing invoices (Exhibit 6A to the deposition) in 1990 and 1991 "represents a continuation of what you believe was a practice of Ramondo Recreation, Incorporated starting back in 1989?" Emphasis added.
In Sanborn v. Greenwald,
"When the wrong sued upon consists of a continuing course of conduct, the statute does not begin to run until that course of conduct is completed." Handler v. Remington Arms Co.,
144 Conn. 316 ,321 ,130 A.2d 793 (1957). "[I]n order [t]o support a finding of a continuing course of conduct that may toll the statutes of limitations there must be evidence of the breach of a duty that remained in existence after commission of the original wrong related thereto. That duty must not have terminated prior to commencement of the period allowed for bringing an action for such a wrong . . . . Where [our Supreme Court has] upheld a finding that a duty continued to exist after the cessation of the act or omission relied upon, there has been evidence of either a special relationship between the parties giving rise to such a continuing duty CT Page 7727 or some later wrongful conduct of a defendant related to the prior act." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Blanchette v. Barrett, supra,229 Conn. 275 . The continuous course of conduct doctrine is "conspicuously fact-bound." Id., 276."The continuing course of conduct doctrine reflects the policy, that, during an ongoing relationship, lawsuits are premature because specific tortious acts or omissions may be difficult to identify and may yet be remedied." Id.
In the case at bar, there was a special relationship, business, between the parties and there was later wrongful conduct subsequent to February 10, 1991 right up to September, 1991 all of which were the same type and related back to the same conduct occurring prior to February 10, 1991.
This court, therefore, concludes that the defendants were engaged in a continuous course of conduct that tolled the commencement of the three year statute of limitations until September, 1991 at which time it began. Accordingly, bringing this action on February 10, 1994 did not violate the statutes of limitations. The court believes that the continuous course of conduct is clear from the facts about which there is no dispute. However, if defendants feel that because this is "conspicuously fact bound", further facts are needed, then there is then a disputed issue of material fact. For that reason, for the tolling of the statutes of limitations and for other reasons expressed above, the motion for summary judgment based upon the statutes of limitations claims is denied.
3. "Transacting Business in Connecticut:"
It is not disputed that the plaintiff did not have a certificate of authority to transact business in Connecticut. However, there is a dispute as to whether the plaintiff was transacting business here. "Whether or not a foreign corporation is transacting business in this State under § 33-396 must be determined by the complete factual picture presented in each case." Eljam Mason Supply, Inc. v. Donnelly Brick Company,
There is at least a disputed issue of material fact concerning this ground, and under the facts before the court, the defendants are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.3
Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.
Rittenband, Judge
Bartha v. Waterbury House Wrecking Co. , 190 Conn. 8 ( 1983 )
Stavnezer v. Sage-Allen & Co. , 146 Conn. 460 ( 1959 )
Boucher Agency, Inc. v. Zimmer , 160 Conn. 404 ( 1971 )
Plouffe v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad , 160 Conn. 482 ( 1971 )
Eljam Mason Supply, Inc. v. Donnelly Brick Co. , 152 Conn. 483 ( 1965 )