DocketNumber: No. 113831
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 5542
Judges: SYLVESTER, J.
Filed Date: 5/24/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
General Statutes §
The court's review of the hearing officer's decision is restricted in scope to the determination of "`whether, in light of the evidence, the [hearing officer] has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in the abuse of [his] discretion.'" (Citation omitted.) Buckley v. Muzio,
The issue of the credibility of the witnesses is solely within the province of the hearing officer. Lawrence v.Kozlowski,
The plaintiff argues that the decision of the hearing officer that the plaintiff refused to take a chemical test was legally erroneous as Deely was not statutorily authorized to require the plaintiff to take a urine test after the plaintiff had already agreed to take a breath test. In addition, the plaintiff argues that the agency decision that the plaintiff refused to submit to a chemical test was erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the record.
The defendant argues that the hearing officer correctly found that Deely could require a urine test when the breathalyzer machine was broken. In addition, the defendant argues that the evidence supports a finding that the plaintiff refused to take a chemical test.
"Statutes are to be construed to give effect to the apparent intention of the lawmaking body . . . and where legislative intent is clear, there is no room for statutory construction. When, however, we are confronted with ambiguity in a statute, we look to "`its legislative history, its language, the purpose it is to serve, and the circumstances surrounding its enactment'" to determine the legislative intent." (Citations omitted.)Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pasion,
(a) Any person who operates a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical analysis of his blood, breath or urine.
(b) If any such person, having been placed under CT Page 5544 arrest . . . for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor . . . and, thereafter, . . . having been requested to submit to a blood, breath or urine test at the option of the police officer . . . refuses to submit to the designated test, the test shall not be given; provided if the person refuses or is unable to submit to a blood test, the police officer shall designate the breath or urine test as the test to be taken.
(Emphasis added.) General Statutes §
General Statutes §
This reading is consistent with the legislative intent. Public Act 83-534 changed the implied consent statute in order to allow the police officer rather than the accused to designate the test. 26 S. Proc., Pt. 13, 1983 Sess., p. 4425. Senator Owens stated that this amendment gives the police the right "to select the first chemical test that's to be used, the one that they're comfortable with, the one that they've worked with be it blood, breath or urine." 26 S.Proc., Pt. 13, 1983 Sess., pp. 4425-26. The word "first" refers to the fact that the police may choose the first test administered, and the accused may then request a second test. See 26 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19, 1983 Sess., p. 6677.
The purpose of the implied consent law "is to get drunk drivers off the road." 26 H.R. Proc., Pt. 19, 1983 Sess., p. 6711. The 1983 amendments were enacted in order to plug loopholes that allowed drunk drivers to continue driving. 26 S. Proc., Pt. 13, 1983 Sess., pp. 4421-22.
A reading of the statute that bars a police officer from administering a urine test after finding out that the breathalyzer machine is broken contravenes the purpose of the implied CT Page 5545 consent laws. Furthermore, allowing the plaintiff to refuse the urine test in this situation creates a loophole in the law that contravenes the legislative intention to tighten loopholes with the 1983 amendments, which specifically changed the law in order to allow the police to choose the test to be administered.
Therefore, the interpretation of the statute which is consistent with the purpose of the legislation should be adopted by the court. Accordingly, the hearing officer did not misapply the law when he found that the police officer could require that the plaintiff take a urine test after the plaintiff consented to a breath test.
"If a person refuses to take either the blood test or the test designated by the police officer in lieu thereof, no chemical analysis or test shall be given, and the person shall be deemed to have refused to submit to a chemical analysis." Regs., Conn. State Agencies §
Deely testified at the department hearing that the plaintiff said that he would not take a urine test. (ROR, Item 2, p. 19.) Deely also testified that he asked the plaintiff a couple of times to take a urine test and that he told the plaintiff that he would administer the test two times with a thirty minute interval between the tests. (ROR, Item 2, pp. 19-20.) The plaintiff testified at the department hearing that he stated to Deely that he did not have to urinate and that he was not given any additional opportunities to take the test. (ROR, Item 2, p. 25.)
In determining whether "the agency made an incorrect decision based on the evidence before it, the court applies the CT Page 5546 substantial evidence rule, which allows reversal of a decision only if the conclusion reached was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record." Dorman v. DelPonte,
The evidence on the record shows conflicting testimony between Deely and the plaintiff. A determination of whether the plaintiff refused the urine test is a question of the credibility of the witnesses which is within the province of the agency. Accordingly, the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.
SYLVESTER, J.