DocketNumber: No. 32 40 87
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 4623, 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 627
Judges: MORAGHAN, J.
Filed Date: 4/6/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
On March 23, 1998, upon an agreement between CYHDA and Larson, the court granted the CYHDA's motion to strike count eight of the complaint. Thus, the only issue now before the court is CYHDA's motion to strike paragraphs 39 through 44 of the amended complaint.
"The purpose of the motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Faulkner v. United Technologies Corporation,
CYHDA argues that paragraphs 39 through 44 of count nine of the amended complaint should be stricken because §
CYHDA's motion to strike is also under attack because "a motion to strike is not the proper procedural tool to use when CT Page 4625 seeking to strike 11 individual paragraphs of a count contained in a complaint. The motion is used'. . . to strike the whole or any portion of any pleading or count which purports to state an entire cause of action or defense . . . and it shall not remove such pleading or count . . . so far as the same is applicable to any other cause of action or defense."' Kinosh v. StephenChevrolet, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 506307 (February 10, 1993) (Dunn, J.); see also Henry v. Perkins, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 313715 (February 14, 1996, Hauser, J.)
The motion to strike is, accordingly, denied.
MORAGHAN, J.