DocketNumber: No. CV 28 22 44
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 678, 9 Conn. Super. Ct. 180
Judges: MULCAHY, J.
Filed Date: 1/21/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
A motion to strike tests the legal sufficiency of a pleading; it admits all facts well pleaded, and the allegations of the pleading are entitled to the same favorable construction as a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them. Ferryman v. Groton,
In count three of an earlier revised complaint (File #128), plaintiffs alleged the following:
"6. Pursuant to the terms of the contract between the defendant, Commercial Drywall, and the defendant, Yankee Building Products, as supplemented by course of dealing and usage of trade, on or about February 20, 1989 Yankee Building Products, Inc., delivered approximately 31 sheets of drywall and left it standing on its side against a wall.
On December 28, 1992, Commercial's motion to strike that revised complaint (Counts Three and Four) was granted, the Court indicating: "There is no allegation that the Defendant, Commercial Drywall Corp., controlled the manner of delivery, or directed how delivery should be made, or had any involvement in delivery — Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to give rise to a duty in the Defendant to the Plaintiffs."
The operative pleading at this point is another revised complaint (File #138) dated August 23, 1993. The relevant portions of count three allege, as follows: CT Page 680
"5. On or about February 20, 1989, the defendant Commercial Drywall Corporation, had contracted with Yankee Building Products for the delivery of approximately 387 sheets drywall, which is identified on its package as westroc wallboard panneau, 1/2",
2-4 ', weighing approximately 75 pounds each, to the aforementioned house."6. Said contract is a written contract under the language of Connecticut General Statutes Section
42a-2-201 (2). Said contract, marked Exhibit A and attached to and made a part of this complaint, in conjunction with the course of dealing between the parties and usage of trade established the terms of the agreement between Yankee Building Products and Commercial Drywall, Inc."7. Pursuant to the terms of the contract between the defendant, Commercial Drywall, and the defendant, Yankee Building Products, as supplemented by course of dealing and usage of trade, on or about February 20, 1989 Yankee Building Products, Inc., delivered approximately 31 sheets of drywall and at the direction of Commercial Drywall, as set forth by the contract and course of dealing, left it standing on its side against a wall." (Emphasis added).
Commercial has again moved to strike counts three and four on the basis that plaintiffs have failed to plead a claim upon which relief may be granted. In its supporting memorandum of law, Commercial asserts that (1) the pertinent allegations contained in the 8/23/93 revised complaint are "nearly identical to their previously stricken form" and fail to state a claim, and, (2) the claim against Commercial is barred by the statute of limitations.
The burden rests on the plaintiffs to allege a recognizable cause of action as to Commercial. Such burden requires pleading facts which, if true, establish in law a right to relief, and which fairly apprise the court, and the adverse party, of the claims being made. Rossignol v. Danbury CT Page 681 School of Aeronautics, Inc.,
Construing the allegations of the subject revised complaint in a manner most favorable to the plaintiffs, as is required on the instant motion, the claim appears to be that Yankee delivered the sheets of drywall and, "at the direction of Commercial" placed them standing against the framed wall. Plaintiffs apparently maintain that Yankee's placing of the wallboard sheets against the vertical studding (as opposed to lying them down flat on the floor), allegedly done at the direction of Commercial, constituted negligence which was a proximate cause of sustained injuries and losses. The expanded language of count three of the revised complaint (File #138; 8/23/93) addresses the pleading deficiency which resulted in the granting of the prior motion to strike ("no allegation that the Defendant, Commercial Drywall, Corp., controlled the manner of delivery, or directed how delivery should be made, or had any involvement in delivery"); although the allegations are not drafted with optimal specificity, the language in the third count, read favorably to plaintiffs, asserts (and would allow proof) that Commercial directed how delivery of the sheetrock was to be made.2
Commercial further contends that the revised complaint (File #138) alleges a new cause of action which is barred by the statute of limitation (General Statutes Section
"Ordinarily, the Statute of Limitations must be raised by special defense. . . When the parties agree that the complaint contains all pertinent facts, the issue may be raised by CT Page 682 demurrer."4
Id. at p. 303.
The accident giving rise to plaintiffs' claims occurred on February 20, 1989. Plaintiffs' amended complaint (File #104), filed September 11, 1990, and their second amended complaint, filed September 17, 1990, both alleged that Commercial delivered approximately 31 sheets of drywall and left it standing on its side against a wall.5 In an August 28, 1992 amendment, plaintiffs alleged that Yankee actually delivered the drywall, but pursuant to the contract between it and Commercial, as supplemented by "course of dealing and usage of trade." Thereafter, as indicated, the allegations were further amended to allege that Yankee "delivered . . . drywall and at the direction of Commercial . . . left it standing on its side against a wall." It is Commercial's contention that the amendments from August 28, 1992 created a new cause of action which was brought beyond the expiration of the statute of limitations.
"An amendment to a complaint that sets up a new and different cause of action speaks' as of the date when it is filed." Felsted v. Kimberly Auto Services, Inc.,
For the foregoing reasons, Commercial's motion to strike counts three and four of the revised complaint (File #138, 8/23/93) is hereby Denied.
Mulcahy, J.