DocketNumber: No. CV93 0306212S
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 12563, 13 Conn. L. Rptr. 96
Judges: MAIOCCO, J.
Filed Date: 12/12/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
On October 18, 1994, Thomas filed a motion to strike the fourth count of the second revised complaint, which is the breach of contract claim that is directed at him, on the ground that Connecticut does not recognize a patient's cause of action against a dentist for breach of contract based upon medical negligence. Thomas also filed a memorandum of law in support of his motion to strike.
On October 19, 1994, Fichera filed a motion to strike the second count of the second revised complaint, which is the breach of contract claim that is directed at him on the ground that the plaintiff has failed to allege a claim that would entitle her to recovery. Fichera did not file a memorandum of law.1
On November 2, 1994, Picarazzi filed an objection to both Fichera's and Thomas's motions to strike and a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to strike.
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest . . . the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint. The court must construe the facts in the complaint most favorably to the plaintiff." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Novametrix Medical Systems, Inc. v. BOC Group, Inc.,
In his memorandum of law, Thomas argues that the fourth count, which is for breach of contract, is merely a reiteration of the allegations in the third count for medical malpractice. Thomas cites Barnes v. Schlein,
The plaintiff Picarazzi argues that the breach of contract claims, counts two and four, should not be stricken. Picarazzi cites White v. Bridgeport Radiology Assoc., P.C.,
There appears to be two lines of Superior Court decisions regarding the relationship between a medical malpractice claim and a breach of contract claim. "To be separate from a malpractice claim, the plaintiff must allege that the defendant doctor assured or warranted a specific result, as opposed to a situation where the doctor makes a generalized statement that the result will be good. . . ." (citations omitted.) White v.Bridgeport Radiology Assoc., P.C., supra, 10 Conn. L. Rptr. No. 7 at 223. "The action in contract is based upon a failure to perform a special agreement." Malone v. Caldwell,
However, the other line of cases do not require a special agreement. A breach of contract case is "entirely separate from malpractice, even though they both, as here, may arise out of the same transaction. . . . The two courses of action are dissimilar as to theory, proof and damages recoverable."Camposano v. Claiborn, supra, 2 Conn. Cir. Ct. 137. "[T]he second count of the complaint [for breach of contract] should not be stricken. Two distinct causes of action may arise from one wrong. Hickey v. Slattery,
This court believes that the former line of cases represent a better reasoned approach. By requiring a special agreement, these cases eliminate those cases where the plaintiff "has merely alleged that the defendant impliedly agreed to meet the requisite standard of care, or, in essence, impliedly agreed not to commit malpractice." Malone v. Caldwell, supra, 6 Conn. L. Rptr. 324-25 (granting a motion to strike a breach of contract claim that repeated the allegations of a medical malpractice claim.
This case more closely resembles Malone v. Caldwell, supra. The gravamen of Picarazzi's complaint is that each defendant breached his contract by performing the dental and periodontal services negligently. It is clear that these counts (two and four) sound only in negligence. See Donnelly v. CandlewoodObstetrics-Gynecological Assoc., P.C., supra,
Accordingly, the motion to strike count two (#125), on behalf of the defendant Thomas, and the motion to strike count four (#127) on behalf of the defendant Fichera are granted, and the objections thereto are overruled.
MAIOCCO, J.