DocketNumber: No. CV 94 73177
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 11472
Judges: STANLEY, J.
Filed Date: 11/16/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
A motion to dismiss is used to assert jurisdictional flaws that appear on the record, or are alleged by the defendant in a supporting affidavit as to facts not apparent on the record.Discover Leasing, Inc. v. Murphy,
Standing to claim a cause of action is a proper ground for a motion to dismiss, because "[s]tanding goes to the court's subject matter jurisdiction." Reitzer v. Board of Trustees of StateColleges,
I. Insufficiency of Process
Carey and Raczka Shaw argue that the plaintiff's complaint CT Page 11474 should be dismissed, due to insufficiency of process, because: (1) the return date stated in the complaint is well over two months after the date of process, in violation of General Statutes §
The writ of summons and complaint on file with the court in this action do conform, on their faces, to all applicable rules of court. It is not clear, however, whether an exact duplicate copy of this original process was served on Carey and Raczka Shaw. Nonetheless, because Carey has conceded that he has not been prejudiced in any way by the process utilized in this matter, Evidentiary Hearing, October 31, 1994, Testimony of Austin Carey, Jr., and because Raczka Shaw has not asserted that it has been prejudiced in any way, the court declines to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on this ground. See Crossroads DevelopmentInc. v. Planning Zoning Commission,
II. Prior Pending Action Doctrine
Carey, Raczka Shaw, and City City Officials have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that there is a prior pending action, in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, involving the same issue raised in the complaint.
Under the prior pending action doctrine, the pendency of a prior suit between the same parties brought to obtain the same end will generally render the latter suit amenable to dismissal. When two separate suits are virtually alike, the second suit is deemed unnecessary, oppressive and vexatious. To determine the applicability of the doctrine, [the court] must examine the pleadings to ascertain whether the actions are virtually alike. CT Page 11475 The prior pending action doctrine . . . has evolved as a rule of justice and equity and not as a principle of absolute law.
(Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Gaudio v. Gaudio,
III. In Personam Jurisdiction
Siegel, O'Connor argues that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed, on the ground that the court lacks in personam jurisdiction over them, because although they constitute a corporation, the plaintiff failed to serve them in accordance with General Statutes §
General Statutes provides, in pertinent part, that: CT Page 11476
In actions against a private corporation, service of process shall be made . . . upon any person who is at the time of service in charge of the office . . . .
The plaintiff has demonstrated that Siegel, O'Connor was served, at their offices, by an indifferent person who handed a copy of the writ of summons and complaint to Paulette Perkins, an employee of Siegel, O'Connor. Evidentiary Hearing, October 31, 1994, Testimony of Juanita Martin. At the time of service, Ms. Perkins was sitting at the reception desk of the law firm, where — in the past — she had accepted papers and documents, had examined such papers and documents, and had directed such papers and documents to the appropriate members of the law firm. Evidentiary Hearing, October 31, 1994, Testimony of Paulette Perkins. The court finds, based on the evidence and testimony before it, that service was made upon an individual "in charge" of the offices of Siegel, O'Connor, in accordance with General Statutes §
IV. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Finally, Carey, Siegel, O'Connor, and Raczka Shaw argue that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed, on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present action, because the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this suit. Specifically, the defendants argue that although a taxpayer may have the legal capacity to maintain an action to enjoin the wrongful expenditures of public funds, and/or may have the legal capacity to compel the reimbursement of public funds unlawfully diverted from the public treasury, "to entitle a taxpayer to maintain an action for the recovery of money for the use and benefit of a municipal corporation, it must appear that the corporation could have maintained the action in the first instance." In response, the plaintiff argues that "such suits may be brought against the public officers or against third persons who have received such funds."
The concept of standing involves the legal right of an individual to seek relief via the judicial system. Sadloski v.Manchester,
Standing is neither a technical rule designed to frustrate aggrieved parties nor a test of substantive rights. Instead, the requirement that a party have standing ensures that courts and parties are not hindered by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests, and protects the rights of others from being affected by precedential judicial decisions that do not involve the individuals or entities with the most at stake and may not have been contested with the appropriate diligence and vigor.
(Citations omitted.) Third Taxing District v. Lyons,
Connecticut courts have "long recognized the capacity of taxpayers of towns and cities to challenge the legality of the actions of their municipal officers by seeking injunctive relief against such action." (Citations omitted.) Highgate CondominiumAssn. v. Watertown Fire District,
Supreme court cases in this area, however, "have required two conditions for the maintenance of actions seeking to challenge municipal conduct: (1) the plaintiff must be a taxpayer of the defendant municipal entity; and (2) the plaintiff must allege and demonstrate that the allegedly improper municipal conduct causes him to suffer some pecuniary or other great injury." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Highgate CondominiumAssn. v. Watertown Fire District, supra,
In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged in his complaint that he is a "taxpayer citizen," and that the "illegal and unauthorized actions" of the defendants have caused him and will continue to cause him "irreparable injury due to a probable increase in his tax burden and a decrease in the local general tax fund . . . ." Accordingly, the plaintiff clearly has standing to bring the within action against the municipal officers he has named in the complaint.
Moreover, the plaintiff has standing to bring the within action against Carey, Siegel, O'Connor, and Raczka Shaw as well. "[I]n the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, [courts] have generally upheld the right of a taxpayer to enforce a cause of action belonging to a municipal corporation . . . where the public officials wrongfully neglect or refuse to perform their duties with respect thereto." 74 Am.Jur.2d § 26 at 231-32, and cases cited therein. Thus, "a taxpayer can maintain an action to compel the restoration of funds which have been unlawfully extracted or diverted from the public treasury . . .," and "[s]uch action may be brought against the public officers concerned, or against third persons involved." Id., 232-33, and cases cited therein.
In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged that the actions of the defendants "constituted gross abuse and fraud, dishonesty, corruption, illegality, arbitrariness, improper motives or influences, plain disregard of duty, waste of public funds, unlawful expenditures, gross abuse of power, gross abuse of discretion and abuse of public trust tainted by collusion, personal gain and bad faith." Additionally, the plaintiff has alleged that despite the fact that the defendants Carey, Siegel, O'Connor, and Raczka Shaw had notice — prior to receiving certain payments from CT Page 11479 the City of Middletown — that their legal fees would no longer be paid by the City of Middletown, they continued to improperly accept said payments. Accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, this court is unable to conclude, based on the record before it, that the City of Middletown has no cause of action against the defendants.
Moreover, the defendants have failed to provide this court with any Connecticut authority that requires this case be dismissed, as against them, under the circumstances as set forth above. Accordingly, the court declines to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint on the ground that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the present matter.
Stanley, J.
Manufacturers Ass'n of Connecticut, Inc. v. Administrator , 20 Conn. Super. Ct. 108 ( 1956 )
Retzer v. Board of Trustees of State Colleges , 2 Conn. App. 196 ( 1984 )
Arminio v. Butler , 183 Conn. 211 ( 1981 )
Bassett v. Desmond , 140 Conn. 426 ( 1953 )
Town of Berlin v. Santaguida , 181 Conn. 421 ( 1980 )
Maloney v. Pac , 183 Conn. 313 ( 1981 )
Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co. , 179 Conn. 541 ( 1980 )