DocketNumber: No. CV95-2046
Citation Numbers: 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 882
Judges: BARRY, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 1/15/2002
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In CR91-6-348840T (hereafter referred to as "the Malanson case"), the petitioner was arrested during the night of November 6 to 7, 1991, and arraigned on November 7, 1991 at the Geographic Area (GA) #6 courthouse in New Haven. Tr. (July 24, 2001), at 15. A public defender was appointed at the arraignment to represent the petitioner in the Malanson case. Id. The matter was continued to November 18, 1991, for purposes of the petitioner entering his plea as to the counts in the Malanson case. Resp't Ex. D, at 5. The petitioner, however, testified that he "received a court date to come back in two weeks from the 7th [of November]." Tr. (July 24, 2001), at 16. The petitioner also testified that he was brought back to GA #6 eleven days after the arraignment even though he did not have a court date. Id.
The record indicates that the Malanson case was on November 18, 1991 ordered transferred from GA #6 to New Haven Judicial District, Part A, and was continued to November 26, 1991. Pet'r Ex. D, at 4; also see Resp't Ex. 1. The record also indicates that the information charging the petitioner with the offenses in CR91-6-349449T (hereafter referred to as "the Benedetti case") was filed in GA #6 during the November 1991 criminal term. Pet'r Ex. D, at 46a. The arrest warrants for the Benedetti offenses are dated November 21, 1992; the return on the arrest warrants was November 22, 1992. Id., at 28, 30 and 32. On November 22, 1991, the Benedetti case was transferred to New Haven Judicial District, Part A.Id., at 46a. An appearance by a public defender was filed on November 25, 1991. Id., at 24. Motions for Appointment of Special Public Defender in both the Malanson and the Benedetti cases were filed on November 25, 1991, said motions being granted on November 26, 1991. Id., at 2 and 24. Attorney Donald Dakers was appointed in both cases as a special public defender on November 26, 1991; Id.; and the petitioner entered pleas of not guilty to all counts in both cases. Id., at 1 and 23.
On March 4, 1992, the State's motions to consolidate the Malanson and Benedetti cases for trial were granted. Ultimately, the petitioner was convicted by a jury and a total effective sentence of twenty-five (25) years was imposed on November 6, 1992. Id., at 46b The petitioner appealed his convictions, which were affirmed by the Appellate Court in CT Page 884State v. Yopp,
Count One of the Revised Petition now has a sole claim remaining against trial counsel: that trial counsel "failed to adequately preserve the trial record for an appeal as to whether an identification procedure was unduly suggestive or in violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights." Rev. Pet., at 2.1 Count Two alleges ineffective representation by appellate counsel in that counsel "failed to properly brief the issue as to whether the identification procedure violated [the petitioner's] right to counsel under the
"A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of the conviction has two components. First, the petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient. Second, the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Unless a petitioner makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stricklandv. Washington,
"A reviewing court can find against the petitioner on whichever [Strickland prong] is easier. Valeriano v. Bronson,
A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, however, must establish "(1) that his appellate counsel's performance fell below the required standard of reasonable competence or competence displayed by lawyers with ordinary training and skill in the criminal law, and (2) that this lack of competency contributed so significantly to the affirmance of his conviction as to have deprived him of a fair appeal, thus causing an unreliable conviction to stand." Sekou v. Warden,
As stated previously, both counts of the petition arise out of an identification procedure conducted on November 18, 1991, the date on which the Malanson case was transferred from GA #6 to New Haven Judicial District, Part A. "On November 18, 1991, Benedetti[, the victim in the second case,] was asked to come to the police station to look at some individuals with regard to the crimes committed against him. Detective Mel Cartoceti of the New Haven police took Benedetti to the courthouse. When they entered the courthouse lobby, Cartoceti told Benedetti to look at everyone in the building, including those in the hallway, and to keep in mind the persons who had robbed him. They entered courtroom B. Court was not yet in session and there were ten to twenty other people in the room, including some African-Americans. The sheriff told Cartoceti that `they are going to bring in the individuals.' Twenty-three men came in and sat down. Fourteen were African-American. After looking at the men for a few minutes, Benedetti pointed out the defendant as the man he believed to be the robber who had fought with him for the pistol. Benedetti later indicated he was 80 percent sure of his identification."State v. Yopp, supra,
In his direct appeal, the petitioner raised two claims arising from the Benedetti identification: "that the trial court improperly 1) denied his motion to suppress the identification procedure used by the police in violation of right to counsel under both the
The Appellate Court held that "[t]he evidentiary support for the defendant's
The Appellate Court also found that "[t]he defendant's
Lastly, as to the claim raised on appeal regarding the trial court's admission into evidence the identification procedure being a violation of the petitioner's
The petitioner, who was the only witness at the habeas trial, testified that prior to being arraigned on November 7, 1991 for the Malanson case, he "received a court date to come back in two weeks from the 7th [of CT Page 887 November]." Tr. (July 24, 1991), at 16. The petitioner also testified that he did not have a court date on the 18th of November, that he had a piece of paper indicating his next court appearance, and that he refused to go to court. Id. According to the petitioner's testimony, "when [he] got to GA #6, [he] asked a sheriff downstairs who [he] was familiar with from going to court for a whole year there, [he] asked him, `What am I doing here?' [The sheriff said he didn't know. [The petitioner] asked him where was [his] attorney. [The sheriff] said, `Well, they're trying to locate her now.' [The petitioner] said, `Well, I'm not going nowhere until I talk to her.' Id.
The petitioner additionally testified that "every time a sheriff came in to take somebody upstairs or bring somebody in to go to court [he] would say, `Hey, did you find [Attorney Chris Perra] yet?' `We're working on it. We're working on it.' They kept blowing me off." Id., at 17. When all the arraignments were called to go upstairs into court, the petitioner was told he had to go upstairs, too, even though he thought he had already been arraigned. Id. According to his testimony, the petitioner was surrounded by five or six sheriffs and made to go upstairs into the courtroom, which was filled with spectators, together with twenty-two or twenty-three individuals who were being arraigned. Id. The petitioner indicated that he was the last one brought into the courtroom.Id. The petitioner also testified that after "the judge called two or three arraignees . . . a sheriff walked up to [him] and . . . whispered . . . `Hey, Yopp, you're in the wrong courtroom. You've got to go back downstairs'." Id. The petitioner then was brought back downstairs and put back in his cell. The petitioner testified that he again asked for Attorney Perra and was told that she was not at the courthouse. Id.
"[T]he petitioner asserts that his trial counsel, Donald Dakers, failed to properly preserve the record to provide appropriate evidence as to Yopp's objection to his presence at a line-up. Pet'r Br., at 1. Attorney Dakers allegedly also "failed to adequately preserve the trial record for an appeal as to whether an identification procedure was unduly suggestive or in violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights." Rev. Pet., at 2. As to the alleged failure to provide appropriate evidence as to the petitioner's objection to his presence at the identification, this Court finds that this claim is without merit. The only evidence in support of this claim is the petitioner's testimony that he was not going anywhere until his attorney, Chris Perra, was there. Attorney Perra did represent the petitioner in the Malanson case; however, she did not represent him in the Benedetti case at the time of the identification, nor did any other attorney, and it was this latter case for which the identification was being made.
The
In Blevins, the "defendant, who was not handcuffed, was driven to the police station and asked to sit in the lobby near the door. He was not guarded, and sat alone. Thereafter, he was asked to step into a small room with a one-way mirror along with [another] man who had been taken into custody[.]" The victim then identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense. Id., at 416. On appeal, Blevins claimed that he was under an implied arrest and had a right to have counsel presentId., at 418. The appellate court, relying on Wade, disagreed and held that identification procedures where a suspect is merely required to provide evidence of physical characteristics do not violate
"As [the Connecticut Supreme Court] has consistently held, a defendant's right to counsel, under the
As the trial court in the petitioner's underlying case ruled in its denial of the motions to suppress the identification, "[t]he fact is that we have two unrelated cases here with similarities. The mere fact that there are similarities does not preclude investigation in an attempt to CT Page 889 identify without having counsel present in the identification process, that same counsel being counsel who is appointed . . . on the other case. . . . The Court is of the opinion that these are separate and distinct cases and the mere fact [that] he was a suspect in one does not mean that the counsel appointed in the first one attached to [the second]." Pet'r Ex. B 1 (Tr., Sept. 23, 1992), at 46-7.
The trial court also found "that the in-court identification process was not suggestive. Again, there was ample opportunity for the victim to view all of the persons in the courthouse. He was advised by the detective that he was to look at all potential — at everybody in the courthouse to see if he recognized anybody. There was no greater emphasis given to those who were being arraigned that day amongst whom was the defendant in this case who had been brought back to court for a second appearance but was not being arraigned. There was no suggestiveness in any fashion whatsoever to that procedure. The victim recognized the defendant. . . . and he said he was 80 percent certain, which would . . . go not to the admissibility of this identification, but to the weight of the evidence and to be weighed by the jury. . . . [U]nder the totality of the circumstances, . . . the in-court identification was reliable and not suggestive and the motion to suppress is denied and an exception will be noted for the record." Id., at 50-1.
This Court finds, based on the foregoing, that the petitioner's claims arising out of the identification procedure are entirely without merit. The petitioner has failed to prove that the result of his criminal trial would have been different and has not undermined the confidence in the outcome of his criminal trial. The petitioner has also not shaken the confidence in the verdict that resulted in his appeal. Since the issue not raised by his appellate counsel lacks merit, the petitioner has not met his burden of proof to show that his appellate counsel failed to pursue a meritorious claim. Consequently, the Court dismisses the petition seeking habeas corpus relief alleging that both his trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective, the former for failing to adequately preserve the trial record for an appeal as to whether an identification procedure was unduly suggestive or in violation of the petitioner's constitutional rights, and the latter for failing to properly brief the issue of the identification line-up.
DAVID M. BARRY, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE