DocketNumber: No. CV-91-0395133
Citation Numbers: 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. 2794, 7 Conn. Super. Ct. 444
Judges: AURIGEMMA, J.
Filed Date: 3/23/1992
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The complaint alleges that the plaintiff's predecessor in interest entered into an oral contract with the defendants by which the defendants agreed to prepare the necessary plans and CT Page 2795 specifications for the construction of a building at 80-100 Pitkin Street, East Hartford, Connecticut, (the "Building"). The Building was substantially completed on or about February 28, 1985. In February of 1985 the plaintiff became aware that the concrete masonry arches in the Building were cracking and deflecting, and that the Building was seriously defective.
The plaintiff commenced this action on May 20, 1991, claiming that the defendants breached their oral contract to prepare adequate plans and specifications and were negligent in their preparation of the plans and specifications for the Building.
In light of this court's holding with respect to the applicability of
In support of their argument that this action is barred by both the oral contract statute of limitations and the negligence statute of limitations, the defendants rely on the case of The R. A. Civitello Company v. New Haven,
The court held that the intent of the seven year statute was "to create a seven year absolute maximum on actions against architects and engineers, based upon the finite barrier of substantial completion, regardless of the nature of the claim, while leaving any other lesser limitations in effect."
The holding in Civitello was based primarily on language of
"(a) Notwithstanding any provision of the general statutes, no action or arbitration, whether in contract, in tort, or otherwise, (1) to recover damages (A) for any deficiency in the design, planning, contract administration, supervision, observation of construction or construction of an improvement to real property; (B) for injury to property, real or personal, arising out of any CT Page 2796 such deficiency . . . or (2) for contribution or indemnity which is brought as a result of any such claim for damages shall be brought against any architect or professional engineer performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision or observation of construction or construction of such improvement more than seven years after substantial completion of such improvement . . . . (d) Nothing in this section shall be construed to extend the period prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any action."
Emphasis indicates portions which were removed by
The court in Civitello placed particular reliance on subsection (d) of
The defendants also rely on Zapata v. Burns,
"The clear mandate of General Statutes
52-584a was to create a seven year absolute maximum on actions against architects and engineers, based upon the finite barrier of substantial completion, regardless of the nature of the claim while leaving any other lesser limitations in effect. R. A. Civitello Co. v. New Haven,6 Conn. App. 212 ,229 504 A.2d 542 (1986)."207 Conn. at 508 .
The defendants claim that the foregoing language reflects the court's interpretation that
The court in Civitello recognized that the fact that "contract and tort actions are specifically mentioned in General Statutes
The plaintiff's interpretation of
The following portion of the legislative history of
Mr. Speaker, what this amendment does it to address the problem of municipalities caught in the kind of cross-fire between contractors and architects in conflicting statutes of limitations. We currently have in our statutes, Mr. Speaker, a seven year statute of limitations for actions against architects and engineers involving deficiencies in design and planning contract administration and so on. What this amendment would do is insure that the seven year statute would apply and that a shorter statute such as the three year general negligence standard or the six year statute on contract matters would not be superimposed on the statute regarding architects. That is to correct a problem that was highlighted, Mr. Speaker, in the case of Civitello vs. The City of New Haven, decided by the Appellate Court earlier this year. I move passage of the amendment, Mr. Speaker.
Remarks by Representative Martin Looney. Connecticut General Assembly House Proceedings, H-435, Vol. 29, Part 11, at 4127-4128 (April 28, 1986).
The foregoing legislative history further supports the plaintiff's claim that
For the foregoing reasons, the defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied.
AURIGEMMA, JUDGE CT Page 2798