DocketNumber: No. (X02) CV 97-0151482-S
Citation Numbers: 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2778, 34 Conn. L. Rptr. 193
Judges: SCHUMAN, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 2/27/2003
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The history of this case is tortuous, but can be briefly summarized. In 1988, the plaintiff, R.T. Vanderbilt Company, Inc., filed suit against the defendant, Continental Casualty Company, Inc., in federal court seeking insurance coverage for the cleanup of environmental contamination at the plaintiff's Bethel facility. In 1989, the plaintiff accepted a $1.3 million settlement of the suit from the defendant. In 1992 and 1994, EPA sent the plaintiff PRP letters informing it of its potential liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA),
In 1997, the plaintiff filed this suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendant must defend and indemnify it in connection with the PRP letters.1 In an earlier summary judgment decision, the court (Sheldon, J.) held that there was a triable issue of fact concerning whether the release of liability from the 1988 suit also released the defendant in this suit. The parties have now filed additional cross motions for summary judgment. The central question is whether the 1965 and 1968 policies impose on the defendant a duty to defend the EPA actions.2 The operative language in the 1965 policy provides that the defendant shall: "defend any suit against the insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on account thereof, even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may make such investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient." The 1968 policy provides: "the company shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the CT Page 2779 insured seeking damages on account of such . . . property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, and may make such investigation and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient . . ."
The Connecticut appellate courts have not decided the question of whether a PRP or similar administrative action constitutes a "suit" within this type of language.3 Courts applying Connecticut law and attempting to predict the outcome in our Supreme Court are divided. Compare Stamford Wallpaper Company, Inc. v. TIG Insurance, No. 3:95CV00058 (AVC), slip op. at 5-11 (D. Conn. June 7, 1996) (PRP letter constitutes "suit"), EDO Corp. v. Newark Insurance Company,
Having reviewed these decisions, the court concludes that the better reasoned hold that a PRP letter is not a "suit." The basis of this conclusion is as follows. First, the term "suit" denotes court proceedings. It is not ambiguous. See Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. NationalFire Insurance Co., supra, 18 Cal.4th 879. Therefore, the rule that the court should interpret ambiguous insurance policy terms in favor of the insured, see Beach v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co.,
Finally, the policies in this case, as do many, provide not only that the insurer shall "defend any suit" but also that the insurer "may make such investigation, negotiation, and settlement of any claim or suit as it deems expedient." (Emphasis added.) Interpreting "suit" to mean a proceeding filed in court helps preserve a distinction between the terms "claim" and "suit" used in these policies. See Foster Gardner, Inc. v.National Fire Insurance Co., supra, 18 Cal.4th 870-71.4 In contrast, construing the term "suit" to include prelitigation claims obliterates this distinction. Such an approach violates the rule that "[e]very provision [of a policy] is to be given effect, if possible, and no word or clause eliminated as meaningless, or disregarded as inoperative, if any reasonable meaning consistent with the other parts of the policy can be given to it." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hammer v. Lumberman'sMutual Casualty Co.,
There is no dispute in this case that the plaintiff has not requested the defendant to defend it in connection with a suit filed in court. Accordingly, the defendant has no duty to defend.
Judgment shall enter for the defendant. It is so ordered.
Carl J. Schuman Judge, Superior Court