DocketNumber: No. CV 88 0097669
Citation Numbers: 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. 3309
Judges: LEWIS, J.
Filed Date: 3/1/1994
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that in 1986 he leased a 1986 Datsun to defendant at a monthly rental, but that on or about September 1, 1988, the defendant ceased making the required monthly lease payments and that there was a balance of twenty nine monthly payments due and owing to plaintiff. The defendant filed six special defenses claiming that plaintiffs acceptance of the return of the car in 1988 constituted an accord and satisfaction; that plaintiff failed to comply with various provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code regarding resale of repossessed collateral; that the contract was rescinded because plaintiff brought the suit in this state rather than in New York; that the contract between the parties was one of adhesion and was CT Page 3310 unconscionable; that the contract violated the Connecticut statute relating to retail installment contracts, the Retail Installment Sales Financing Act (RISFA). General Statutes
The case was referred to Attorney Melvin J. Silverman, an attorney trial referee, in accordance with General Statutes
The attorney trial referee drew certain conclusions from these findings of fact as follows: (1) that the defendant did not sign an installment sales contract, but rather signed a lease, including an option to purchase the vehicle, as alleged by plaintiff in its complaint; (2) that because of the delay in reselling the vehicle and the unexplained addition of approximately 5000 miles prior to such sale, defendant is entitled to a credit for the wholesale value of the vehicle at the time it was returned to plaintiff, viz., $11,550; (3) that the reasonable value of plaintiff's attorney's fees was $6,772.50; (4) that subtracting the wholesale price credit and payments previously made from the gross damages, which are comprised of the unpaid monthly payments plus the purchase option payment, resulted in damages of $7,762, plus attorney's fees, for a total of $14,534.50 due plaintiff; (5) that prejudgment interest should be awarded but commencing on August 22, 1991, the date the lease would have been fully paid and terminated; (6) CT Page 3311 that the terms of the lease were not unconscionable, and defendant knew precisely what he was doing when he signed the lease; (7) that defendant did not prove an accord and satisfaction as he voluntarily turned the car back to plaintiff; (8) defendant was fully compensated for plaintiff's unexplained delay in reselling the vehicle and the addition of some 5000 miles of use before the sale because of the recommendation that prejudgment interest not commence until the date the lease would otherwise have ended: and (9) that the federal Consumer Leasing Act had not been violated because it applies only to consumer leases under $25,000, and the payments due on the lease in this case totalled over $30,000.
Pursuant to Practice Book 438, the defendant Gentile moved to correct the report. He argued that the findings of fact should be amended so as to reflect his contention that the contract he signed was a retail installment contract, not a lease, viz., "a lease masquerading as a sale." In response to the defendant's motion to correct, the referee issued a supplemental report dated September 9, 1993, which reiterated his conclusion that the transaction at issue was a lease and not a retail installment sales contract, and therefore he declined to make the corrections to his report requested by defendant.
The usual review of an attorney trial referee's report by this court consists of two tasks, according to Thermoglaze, Inc. v. Morningside Gardens, Co.,
This court's authority in reviewing an attorney trial referee's recommendations is a limited one, in any event. As our CT Page 3312 Supreme Court has held: (1) the trial court may not "retry the case"; (2) a court may not find additional facts or reject facts found by the referee unless, in the words of Practice Book 439, "a material fact has been found without evidence or the (referee) has failed to find an admitted or undisputed fact, or has found a fact in such doubtful language that its real meaning does not appear"; and (3) a trial court may not engage in "fact-finding contrary to the report of the referee." Dills v. Enfield,
Since we must accept the referee's findings of fact in the absence of any exceptions to the report, this court's task, according to Bernard v. Gershman, supra, 656, is to determine whether the conclusions of fact and law "are legally and logically correct and whether they find support in the facts found by the referee." Practice Book 440. The Appellate Court added in Bernard that "[w]here evidence is in conflict, its probative force is for the trier of fact to determine." Id.
The referee found that the defendant knowingly signed a tease of a motor vehicle and that he had breached the agreement by failing to make the required monthly lease payments. He also concluded that the defendant had not proved his counterclaim which contended that the transaction in question was in actuality a retail installment sale. The defendant Gentile did file objections to the acceptance of the referee's report. Practice Book 440, which repeat the arguments found in the motion to correct that the transaction in this case was a retail installment sale.1
The agreement in question is clearly entitled a "lease" as is the second document captioned as a lease with an "open-end purchase option." Both documents are replete with references to its being a "lease" and that title to the vehicle remains with the lessor until and unless the lessee exercises his option to purchase. ("This is an agreement of lease only; title to Vehicle shall remain at all times in Lessor.") Section
In distinguishing a true lease from a security agreement in the guise of a lease, the court must ascertain the parties' intent. Granite Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Acme Pump Co., Inc.,
Because of this finding of fact as to the nature of the agreement between the parties, the court agrees with the referee that judgment should enter in favor of the plaintiff because no material error in his report has been found, or any other sufficient reason why the report is unacceptable. Practice Book 443. The court finds that, in the words of Practice Book 440, his recommendations were "properly reached on the basis of the subordinate facts found."
Judgment is entered in accordance with the referee's report in favor of the plaintiff to recover $14,534.50, and in favor of the plaintiff with respect to defendant's counterclaim. With respect to interest, the referee recommended that plaintiff be awarded prejudgment interest of 10% per year from August 22, 1991. Prejudgment interest is authorized by General Statutes
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 1st day of March, 1994.
William B. Lewis, Judge CT Page 3314