DocketNumber: No. CV-96-0071167S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 6891
Judges: MATASAVAGE, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 5/16/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
It is with some hesitancy that the court approaches a motion to set aside a jury verdict because of the gravity of the issues involved. "There are serious constitutional issues posed by setting aside a jury verdict. This is so because [l]itigants have a constitutional right to have issues of fact decided by the jury . . . The right to a jury trial is fundamental in our judicial system, and . . . the right is one obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict, since the constitutional right of a trial by jury includes the right to have issues of fact as to which there is room for reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men passed upon by the jury and not by the court. . . . Accordingly, a court should move cautiously in CT Page 6892 deciding to set aside a jury's verdict." (Brackets in original; citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Zarrelli v. Barnum FestivalSociety, Inc.,
In this case, the jury received instructions on March 22, 2001, from approximately noon until shortly after 1 p.m. The court adjourned for lunch, and the jury began deliberations at approximately 2:15 p.m. The jury was provided with the exhibits as they began their deliberations. The plaintiff introduced 30 full exhibits and the defendant 36 full exhibits. The exhibits included approximately six hundred pages of hospital and medical records, letters, notes and memoranda.
Shortly after beginning deliberations, the jury passed a note to the marshal, which was contained in a large envelope that was part of an exhibit. Within a few minutes, the jury, apparently realizing its mistake, submitted a second note to the marshal in an envelope provided by the court for that purpose. Both notes requested that the court provide the jury with a copy of its charge.1
The court then met with counsel in chambers, discussed the request for a copy of its charge, and took suggestions from the parties. See Practice Book §
The jury was recalled to the courtroom whereupon the court informed them that they were not entitled to a copy of the charge as a general rule, and that if they wanted to rehear any specific instruction, they should submit another request to the court. Neither counsel took any exception to the court's subsequent instructions to the jury. CT Page 6893
Shortly thereafter, the jury submitted another note to the court. In its request, the jury asked the court to reread the state statute on malpractice. Again, the court met with counsel in chambers, discussed the jury's request, and took suggestions from the parties. Both counsel agreed with the court that the jury was referring to General Statutes §
The jury was recalled to the courtroom whereupon the court reread the charge which dealt with General Statutes §
The defendant cites State v. St. Pierre,
The court precisely followed the procedures outlined in the Practice Book and in St. Pierre. The court does not agree with the defendant that the jury was confused by the instructions. The questions asked by the jury were not indicative of confusion in the minds of the jurors, nor were they interpreted as such by the court or counsel for either party.
At oral argument, the defendant urged the court to consider the jury's confusion in light of the case of Silvester v. Kerelejza,
Under these circumstances, the verdict will not be set aside on the basis of the defendant's claimed error. CT Page 6894
The defendant attacks the court's charge in two respects. First, the defendant claims that the court should have instructed that the jury could award damages on items that the plaintiff claimed, but were in no way compelled to do so, even if they found liability in the plaintiff's favor. Second, the defendant claims that the court gave inadequate instructions regarding plaintiff's counsel's reference to the effects of the jury's verdict on the community.
In reviewing the charge, the court finds that the jury was adequately instructed in both respects. Regarding the award of damages, the jury was instructed to award damages for only those damages proven by the plaintiff, and that the jury was not required to award compensation if they determined that the expenses were not fair, just and reasonable or reasonably related to the proven injuries.3 Further, regarding plaintiff's counsel's reference to the effects of the jury's verdict on the community, defense counsel requested a curative instruction prior to the court beginning its charge. (Transcript of 3/22/01 at 48.) The court indicated to counsel that the issue was dealt with in the court's charge. Id. The court thereafter instructed the jury not to give any award based upon sympathy or improper motive.4 Neither counsel took exception to the court's charge in either respect.
"In determining whether the trial court's instructions are proper, [t]he whole charge must be considered from the standpoint of its effect on the [jurors] in guiding them to the proper verdict . . . and not critically dissected in a microscopic search for possible error." (Brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Geary v.Wentworth Laboratories Inc.,
The defendant also claims that the court should set aside the verdict as the weight of the evidence indicated that the jury did not correctly apply the law on damages. Citing Wichers v. Hatch,
In reviewing the jury's award of damages, "the trial court should examine the evidence to decide whether the jury reasonably could have found that the plaintiff had failed in his proof of the issue. That decision should be made, not on the assumption that the jury made a mistake, but, rather, on the supposition that the jury did exactly what it intended to do, "Daigle v. Metropolitan Property Casualty Ins. Co.,
The jury awarded a total amount of eight hundred thousand dollars. While the amount is certainly not a paltry sum, given the extent of his stroke and resulting disability, the award does not shock the sense of justice of the court, nor does it lead the court to believe that the jury was influenced by partiality, prejudice, mistake or corruption. Therefore, the verdict will not be set aside on that basis.
The applicable statute of limitations in this case is found at General Statutes §
"No action to recover damages for injury to the person, or to real or personal property, caused by negligence, or by reckless or wanton misconduct, or by malpractice of a physician, surgeon, dentist, podiatrist, chiropractor, hospital or sanatorium, shall be brought but within two years from the date when the injury is first sustained or discovered or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered, and except that no such action may be brought more than three years from the date of the act or omission complained of, except that a counterclaim may be interposed in any such action any time before CT Page 6896 the pleadings in such action are finally closed."
While the statute is not written in the clearest of language, the court gave instructions based on the prevailing case law.5 The Appellate Court has most recently addressed the statute of limitations inMountaindale Condominium Association, Inc. v. Zappone,
"In the context of applying §
52-584 to decide whether a particular action was commenced in a timely fashion, we have stated that an injury occurs when a party suffers some form of actionable harm. . . . Actionable harm occurs when the plaintiff discovers or should discover, through the exercise of reasonable care, that he or she has been injured and that the defendant's conduct caused such injury. . . . The statute begins to run when the plaintiff discovers some form of actionable harm, not the fullest manifestation thereof. . . . The focus is on the plaintiff's knowledge of facts, rather than on discovery of applicable legal theories. . . . Although an expert opinion may lead to discovery of an actionable harm; . . . it does not follow that a plaintiff cannot reasonably discover an injury absent verification by a qualified expert. . . . With respect to the language of §52-584 , our Supreme Court has stated, [t]o hold that a claimant has an option to present his claim within one year from the actual discovery of actionable harm rather than from the time when such harm in the exercise of reasonable care should have been discovered would render the latter phrase superfluous and wholly ineffective in requiring reasonable diligence on the part of claimants."
(Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Id., 323-24.
The defendant claims that the court should have charged the jury that the plaintiff had a duty to investigate the potential claim of malpractice. General Statutes §
"The trial court possesses inherent power to set aside a jury verdict which, in the court's opinion, is against the law or the evidence. . . . The trial court should not set a verdict aside where there was some evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have based its verdict, but should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that [the jurors] or some of them were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality. . . . Within these parameters, furthermore, the trial court may set a verdict aside even if the evidence was conflicting and there was direct evidence in favor of the party who prevailed with the jury'. . . . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion. . . . Limiting that discretion, however, is the litigants' constitutional right to have issues of fact determined by a jury where there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded jurors." (Brackets in original; CT Page 6898 citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) American NationalFire Ins. Co. v. Schuss,
The court finds that there was ample evidence presented on the issues of liability and the statute of limitations upon which the jury could reasonably have based its verdict. The plaintiff presented as witnesses Doctors Martin Kohn and Harris Fisk. Doctor Kohn testified that the defendant's agents breached their standard of care by not admitting the plaintiff to the hospital after he appeared in the emergency room on March 10, 1993, with various symptoms of a stroke. Doctor Fisk testified that the hospital's failure to admit the plaintiff and properly monitor him caused his stroke and resulting deficits.
On the issue of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff testified that he did not begin to suspect the defendant's negligence and did not discover actionable harm until such time as he read a magazine article on strokes in 1995.
Therefore, there being some evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have based its verdict for both liability and the statute of limitations, the court will not set the verdict aside.
CONCLUSION:
All of the defendant's post trial motions are denied in their entirety.
Matasavage, J.