DocketNumber: No. CV 960151514S
Citation Numbers: 1996 Conn. Super. Ct. 7156, 18 Conn. L. Rptr. 291
Judges: KARAZIN, J.
Filed Date: 12/2/1996
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
In their claims against International, the plaintiffs allege that they notified International of their dissatisfaction with the work performed pursuant to the plaintiffs' contract with HSA, International's franchisee, and that International has failed to direct its franchisee to correct the alleged defect. In addition, the plaintiffs allege that International, as the franchisor of HSA, is legally obligated to indemnify the plaintiffs for damages resulting from HSA's alleged breach of contract.
On May 17, 1996, the defendant, International, filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of this motion, the defendant submitted CT Page 7157 a memorandum of law along with an affidavit by Dennis J. Johnson, International's chief executive officer. On June 17, 1996, the plaintiffs submitted a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant's motion along with an affidavit by Diane Moore, the plaintiff.
"Because a lack of personal jurisdiction may be waived by the defendant, the rules of practice require the defendant to challenge that jurisdiction by a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Knipple v. Viking Communications, Ltd.,
In its supporting memorandum, the defendant argues that as a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Florida, that has not transacted business in Connecticut or solicited business in the state, the long-arm statute, General Statutes § 33-411, does not subject it to jurisdiction in Connecticut merely because of the activities of a local franchisee in this state. Even if the requirements of General Statutes § 33-411 had been satisfied, the defendant argues that the exercise of jurisdiction over International by this court would offend traditional notions of due process because the defendant does not have sufficient "minimum contacts" with the state of Connecticut.
In their opposing memorandum, the plaintiffs essentially argue that this court may exercise personal jurisdiction over International pursuant to § 33-411 because the defendant transacts and solicits business in Connecticut. In addition, the plaintiffs argue that International is present in Connecticut and subject to personal jurisdiction in this state as a result of its obligation to exercise quality control over the services rendered CT Page 7158 by its Connecticut franchisees.1
General Statutes § 33-411 (b) provides that "[e]very foreign corporation which transacts business in this state in violation of section
"If a challenge to the court's personal jurisdiction is raised by a defendant, either by a foreign corporation or by a nonresident individual, the plaintiff must bear the burden of proving the court's jurisdiction." Knipple v. VikingCommunications, Ltd., supra,
The affidavit of Dennis Johnson submitted in support of the defendant's motion states that International is a Georgia corporation with its principal place of business in Florida. May 17, 1996 Affidavit of Dennis Johnson, ¶ 2. Although its franchisee, HSA, may be a Connecticut corporation, International CT Page 7159 is not authorized to transact business in Connecticut and does not have any offices, employees or telephone numbers in the state of Connecticut. Id., ¶¶ 6 and 7. International also does not have any bank accounts or posses any real property in the state of Connecticut. Id., ¶ 8 and 9. Furthermore, Johnson attests that International has never purchased advertising for HSA in Connecticut or solicited members for HSA in Connecticut. Id., ¶ 10. Finally, International was not a party to the contract between the plaintiffs and HSA. Id., ¶ 13. The plaintiff has failed to submit evidence to rebut the defendant's affidavit and establish that International "transacts business" in Connecticut as required by section 33-411 (b). See Dacourt Group, Inc. v.Babcock Industries, Inc.,
The advertising brochure submitted by the plaintiffs in opposition to the defendant's motion was distributed by the local franchisee, HSA, rather than International. July 3, 1996 Reply Affidavit of Dennis Johnson, ¶ 3. Even if this brochure could be construed as solicitation by International, the plaintiffs have submitted no evidence of repeated solicitation as required by § 33-411 (c)(2). See Lombard Bros., Inc. v. General AssetManagement Co., supra,
The plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden of establishing that the defendant either "transacts business" or repeatedly "solicited business" in Connecticut pursuant to General Statutes §§ 33-411 (b) and 33-411 (c)(2).
Accordingly, the defendants motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted as to the defendant, Home Services Alliance International, Inc.
KARAZIN, J.