DocketNumber: No. 0123428
Citation Numbers: 1995 Conn. Super. Ct. 14591
Judges: SULLIVAN, J.
Filed Date: 12/11/1995
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
The action arises out of an automobile collision between a police cruiser owned by the City of Waterbury and operated by its police officer, William Lallier, and a vehicle operated by the plaintiff Cheryl Hurdle and occupied by the minor plaintiff, Phillip Hurdle.
The first two counts pertain to the plaintiff Cheryl Hurdle. Count one is a cause of action in negligence against William Lallier, alleging negligent operation of the vehicle. Count two incorporates the paragraphs of the first count and asserts a claim against the City of Waterbury by virtue of General Statutes §
Count four and count five are asserted for the plaintiff passenger Phillip Hurdle. They set forth the same cause of action as are set forth for the plaintiff Cheryl Hurdle, and hence are treated the same for the purposes of this decision.
The second special defense sets forth a claim of common law governmental immunity as concerns the first and second, and as concerns the fourth and fifth counts of the complaint. The third special defense asserts that "the plaintiffs cause of action are barred by Connecticut General Statutes §
The first question which the court addresses is whether the provisions of General Statutes §
At common law a municipality is not responsible for damage or injury while performing a governmental act which requires the exercise of discretion: ". . .; for the decision is one within their discretion, and unless they act maliciously, or wantonly, or in abuse of the discretion vested in them, they ought not to be held liable, and by the weight of authority they cannot be held liable". Wadsworth v. Middletown,
This court determines that the provisions of General Statutes §
General Statutes §
The Connecticut Supreme Court has declined to interpret this statute as providing a blanket abrogation of governmental immunity in all circumstances where it is claimed that a person has sustained physical injury to person or property by virtue of the negligence of the governmental agency acting through its employees. See Tanga v. New Haven,
Governmental immunity has been recognized where the governmental employee, in the exercise of discretion, chooses CT Page 14593 inaction rather than to choose a course of affirmative action. See Shore v. Stonington,
In general, it is clear that, absent limited special exceptions, an otherwise negligent choice of a course or action, a choice of a plan of action, including a choice of inaction, will not deprive the governmental entity or, in an evolving body of law, the governmental employee, of the protection of governmental immunity. As to the employee himself see Evon v.Andrews,
It is clear to this court that the employee having embarked upon, chosen, a course of action, a plan of action, which involved the operation of a motor vehicle on the public highways, the employee is duty bound to physically operate the vehicle in a reasonable manner (within the parameters of the special prerogatives granted to emergency vehicles by General Statutes §
This court is in accord with this same conclusion as CT Page 14594 articulated in Letowt v. Norwalk,
For the reasons set forth herein, the court grants the motion to strike the second special defense and the third special defense as pertains to the first and the second count, and as pertains to the fourth and the fifth count of the complaint.
L. PAUL SULLIVAN, J.
CT Page 14595
Tango v. City of New Haven , 173 Conn. 203 ( 1977 )
Sestito v. City of Groton , 178 Conn. 520 ( 1979 )
Borchetta v. Brown , 41 Conn. Super. Ct. 420 ( 1990 )
Shore v. Town of Stonington , 187 Conn. 147 ( 1982 )
Wadsworth v. Middletown , 94 Conn. 435 ( 1920 )
Voltz v. Orange Volunteer Fire Asso., Inc. , 118 Conn. 307 ( 1934 )