DocketNumber: No. FA94 0046243S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 3277
Judges: GROGINS, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 3/9/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
At the hearing before Magistrate Miller, the respondent testified that he is currently employed by a different company and his gross income is $440 per week, plus an additional $25 per week for overtime pay. The respondent submitted pay stubs as evidence of his current income. When questioned by the petitioner, the respondent also testified that he: earned $14.50 per hour at his former job, even though evidence was submitted by the petitioner demonstrating that the respondent earned $24 an hour by his former employer; made an effort to seek higher paying employment until he secured his present job; did not know if he was presently pursuing a potential workers' compensation claim he had been pursuing back in June of 1999, even though he had secured counsel to represent his interest on the workers' compensation claim; had no knowledge of a retirement plan with his former employer in the amount of $909.22; and had given his three vehicles and his motorcycle to his girlfriend, even though he retained possession of one of the vehicles and the motorcycle.
On April 25, 2000, the respondent was ordered to pay $3500 of the $5,137.92 arrearage. The court reserved judgment on the motion for modification of child support.
In a memorandum of decision filed on October 3, 2000, the respondent's motion to modify child support was denied. Magistrate Miller found that none of the respondent's testimony given at the April 25, 2000 hearing was credible; that based upon the evidence the respondent's earning capacity is at least equal to the amount he was earning at the time of the divorce; and that the respondent failed to establish either a substantial change in circumstances or a substantial deviation from the guidelines to support a modification of his child support obligation.
On October 17, 2000, the respondent appealed the magistrate's order in this court.
"The right to appeal from a family magistrate order to the Superior Court is created by §
The test for determining whether a party is aggrieved by a particular decision is two-fold: (1) the party claiming to be aggrieved must have a specific, personal, and legal interest in the subject matter of the decision, and (2) the party must show that this personal and legal interest has been specially and injuriously affected by the decision.Newman v. Newman,
The respondent argues that Magistrate Miller erred in admitting an income verification form into evidence over a hearsay objection. The respondent also argues that because the evidence demonstrated that the respondent lost his former job due to a corporate buy-out, that the magistrate's findings on the issue of the defendant's earning capacity was arbitrary and erroneous, and contrary to the evidence submitted. Further, the respondent argues that the magistrate's findings concerning the respondent's credibility is insufficient to justify the magistrate's decision because the findings concerning the respondent's credibility does not affect the child support obligation suggested by the child support guidelines.
The Connecticut Code of Evidence §
"It is well established that in a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony . . ." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Powers v. Olson,
"The well settled standard of review in domestic relations cases is that this court will not disturb trial court orders unless the trial court has abused its legal discretion or its findings have no reasonable basis in the facts . . . [T]he foundation for this standard is that the trial court is in a clearly advantageous position to assess the personal factors significant to a domestic relations case, such as demeanor and attitude of the parties at the hearing. . . . In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether the court could reasonably conclude as it did." (Citations omitted; internal CT Page 3281 quotation marks omitted.) Simmons v. Simmons,
In its memorandum of decision, "the court [did] not find any of the defendant's testimony credible. The defendant was only forthright when confronted with the truth on cross-examination. He misled the court and the plaintiff with much of his testimony, as well as through the selective disclosure of assets on his financial affidavit." This language clearly indicates that because the magistrate did not find any of the respondent's testimony credible, the respondent's testimony was not considered when determining whether a modification in child support was warranted. "A party moving for a modification of a child support order must clearly and definitely establish the occurrence of a substantial change in the circumstances of either party that makes the continuation of the prior order unfair and improper . . ." (Citation omitted.) Savagev. Savage,
For the foregoing reasons, the October 3, 2000 order of Magistrate Miller is affirmed.
The Court
By Grogins, J.