DocketNumber: No. CV 00-0802948 S
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 5951
Judges: RITTENBAND, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 5/2/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/5/2016
1. Fleet obtained a judgment of approximately $114,000 against Oriental Tile Importers, Inc. (hereinafter "Oriental") and Arnold Agnoli (hereinafter "Agnoli"). Fleet then filed a post judgment personal property lien with the Connecticut Secretary of State on July 23, 1998. Fleet then did nothing to execute on its judgment, and Narco, the landlord of Oriental, evicted Oriental from its premises on or about September 17, 1999. At or about the time of eviction, Narco, under authority of C.G.S. §
"If the defendant or occupant has not removed his possessions and personal effects from the premises, the plaintiff, in the presence of the State Marshal, shall prepare an inventory of such possessions and personal effects and provide a copy of such inventory to the State Marshal. The plaintiff shall remove and store such possessions or personal effects or shall store the same in the premises. Such removal and storage or storage in the premises shall be at the expense of the defendant. If such possessions and effects are not called for by the defendant or occupant and the expense of such removal and storage or storage in the premises is not paid to the plaintiff within fifteen days after such eviction, the defendant or occupant shall forfeit such possessions and personal effects to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff may dispose of them as he deems appropriate."
CT Page 5953 2. In this case Narco, as the plaintiff in the summary process action, did store the personal property aforementioned in the premises. The defendant and occupant are the same in this case, Oriental and Agnoli, and they have neither called for such possessions nor paid the expense of storage. The fifteen days have obviously elapsed, and based upon that, Narco, following said statute, attempted to dispose of said personal property. It sold part of the personal property for the sum of $6,350.00. The rest remains on the premises.
3. At the hearing before this Court on April 24, 2001, J.T. Hostetter, Fleet National Bank Managed Assets Director, testified on behalf of the plaintiff. When asked by this Court whether or not Fleet wanted to take possession of the remaining property, he indicated "not at this time." The plaintiff's claim, therefore, boils down to a claim for the $6,350.00 being the proceeds of that part of the personal property sold by Narco.
4. The question then becomes whether or not Narco converted the $6,350.00 worth of personal property.
5. "Conversion occurs when one, without authorization, assumes and exercises the right of ownership over property belonging to another, to the exclusion of the owner's rights." Maroun v. Tarro,
6. Fleet relies on C.G.S. §
"Any such judgment lien shall be effective, in the same manner and to the same extent as a similar security interest under the provisions of Title 42a, CT Page 5954 for five years from the date of filing, provided the filing shall not give the judgment creditor any right to take possession of the property on which the lien has been placed other than by writ of execution or other judicial process." (Emphasis added).
It is clear that Fleet did not have ownership of the personal property. As stated in Devitt v. Manulik, supra, at page 660, the alternative is to prove "an immediate right to possession at the time of conversion." This Court concludes that since Fleet never executed on the personal property, it never had an immediate right to possession at the time of the alleged conversion on or subsequent to the eviction on September 17, 1999.
7. It is well-settled law in Connecticut that the legislature has intended to adopt statutes which are consistent with each other. C.G.S. §
Accordingly, Fleet has failed to sustain its burden of proving conversion on the part of Narco. Judgment on the conversion count is, therefore, entered for the defendant.
Rittenband, JTR CT Page 5955