DocketNumber: No. CV970570076
Citation Numbers: 1998 Conn. Super. Ct. 3608, 21 Conn. L. Rptr. 498
Judges: DiPENTIMA, J.
Filed Date: 3/25/1998
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
This appeal arose from a May 15, 1996 request made by Karp, a police officer employed by the plaintiff, for case reports and accompanying documents regarding two incidents involving minors. The plaintiff referred the request to the town attorney and did CT Page 3609 not disclose the documents to Karp. On June 20, 1996, Karp complained to the FOIC that the plaintiff's failure to disclose the requested documents violated the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The FOIC held a hearing on November 25, 1996, and issued a proposed final decision on February 21, 1997. On March 12, 1997, there was oral argument on the proposed final decision, when the plaintiff argued that the requested documents were exempt under General Statutes §§
10. It is found that §
46b-124 (a), G.S., relates to judicial records only.11. It is therefore concluded that the requested records are not exempt from disclosure pursuant to §§
1-19 (a) and46b-124 (a), G.S.13. It is found that the requested records are police investigation records that pertain to the activities of minors.
14. It is also found that the respondent failed to prove that the disclosure of the requested records, redacted as requested by the complainant, would result in the disclosure of arrest records of a juvenile within the meaning of §
1-19 (b)(3)(E), G.S.15. It is therefore concluded that the respondent violated §§
1-19 (a) and1-15 (a), G.S., by failing to provide the complainant with copies of the requested records described in paragraphs 2a) and b) above.
(Return of Record (ROR), Item 18.)
In this appeal, the plaintiff raises two issues. It first argues that the FOIC's conclusion that the requested documents were not exempt under General Statutes §
"Judicial review of an administrative agency decision requires a court to determine whether there is substantial CT Page 3610 evidence in the administrative record to support the agency's findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dolgner v. Alander,
Notwithstanding the language of Perkins, however, the Supreme Court has recently stated that the deferential standard does not apply to a court's review of an "agency's construction of a statute, which is a pure question of law, particularly when the question has not been subjected to prior judicial review."Connecticut Light Power Co. v. Texas-Ohio Power, Inc.,
General Statutes §
(a) All records of cases of juvenile matters, as defined in section
46b-121 , except proceedings concerning delinquent children, or any part thereof, and all records of appeals from probate brought to the superior court for juvenile matters pursuant to subsection (b) of section45a-186 , including studies and reports by probation officers, social agencies and clinics, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters, and open to inspection or disclosure to any third party, including bona fide researchers commissioned by a state agency, only upon order of the Superior Court, except that (1) the CT Page 3611 records concerning any matter transferred from a court of probate pursuant to section45a-623 or subsection (g) of section45a-715 or any appeal from probate to the superior court for juvenile matters pursuant to subsection (b) of section45a-186 shall be available to the court of probate from which such matter was transferred or from which such appeal was taken, (2) such records shall be available to the attorney representing the child or youth, his parents or guardian and to an adult adopted person in accordance with the provisions of sections45a-736 ,45a-737 and45a-743 to45a-757 , inclusive, and to another court under the provisions of section 46b-111, and (3) psychological evaluations shall be available to the Commissioner of Children and Families for purposes of diagnosing, caring for or treating a child in the care or custody of the commissioner. Any record or any part thereof forwarded by said court or any of its employees to any persons, governmental and private agencies, and institutions, shall not be disclosed, directly or indirectly, to any third party not specified in subsection (c) of this section save upon order of said court or except in the report required under section54-76d or 54-19a.(b) All records of cases of juvenile matters involving proceedings concerning delinquent children, or any part thereof, including court records, records of law enforcement agencies including fingerprints, photographs and physical descriptions, and medical, psychological, psychiatric and social welfare studies and reports by probation officers, public or private institutions, social agencies and clinics, shall be confidential and for the use of the court in juvenile matters and shall not be disclosed except as provided in this section.
(Emphases added.) General Statutes §
The plaintiff claims that the statute protects more than the records contained in the juvenile court file and in fact protects the police department records concerning minors. It argues that the language of the statute is ambiguous as to the scope of the CT Page 3612 matters to be kept confidential so that the court should use other tools of statutory construction beyond a reading of the statutory language. While the court appreciates the thoughtfulness of and the purpose behind the plaintiff's argument, the court finds that the statute is clear in its meaning. "When the plain language of a statute is ambiguous, we do not normally look further to determine its meaning." Butch v.Thangamuthu,
The purpose behind the FOIA is to promote the policy favoring open conduct of government and free public access to government records. Accordingly, the court's construction of the FOIA "must be guided by the policy favoring disclosure, and exceptions to disclosure must be narrowly construed." Superintendent of Policev. Freedom of Information Commission,
The plaintiff also claims that the FOIC erroneously concluded that General Statutes §
(b) Nothing in sections
1-15 ,1-18a ,1-19 to1-19b , inclusive, and1-21 to1-21k , inclusive, shall be construed to require disclosure of . . .(3) records of law enforcement agencies not otherwise available to the public which records were compiled in connection with the detection or investigation of crime, if the disclosure of said records would not be in the public interest CT Page 3613 because it would result in the disclosure of (A) the identity of informants not otherwise known or the identity of witnesses not otherwise known whose safety would be endangered or who would be subject to threat or intimidation if their identity was made known, (B) signed statements of witnesses, (C) information to be used in a prospective law enforcement action if prejudicial to such action, (D) investigatory techniques not otherwise known to the general public, (E) arrest records of a juvenile, which shall also include any investigatory files, concerning the arrest of such juvenile, compiled for law enforcement purposes, (F) the name and address of the victim of a sexual assault under section
53a-70 ,53a-70a ,53a-71 ,53a-72a ,53a-72b or53a-73a , or injury or risk of injury, or impairing of morals under section53-21 , or of an attempt thereof or (G) uncorroborated allegations subject to destruction pursuant to section 1-20c.
(Emphasis added.)
There is no evidence in the record to show that the minors involved in the incident were arrested. Accordingly, §
The plaintiff finally raises an argument not raised before the FOIC. It claims that the FOIC should not have ordered disclosure because General Statutes §
The plaintiff argues that the FOIC's decision ordering the release of the documents in redacted form is unauthorized by General Statutes §
The appeal is dismissed.
DiPENTIMA, J.