DocketNumber: No. CV 930134679
Citation Numbers: 2001 Conn. Super. Ct. 11999
Judges: LEWIS, JUDGE TRIAL REFEREE.
Filed Date: 8/28/2001
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/17/2021
The case was referred to Attorney Samuel V. Schoonmaker, III, an attorney trial referee, in accordance with General Statutes §
Under the HIA, in the absence of bad faith, a homeowner is entitled to rescind a home improvement contract that fails to comply with the requirements in that act. Barrett Builders v. Miller,
The plaintiff argues that the bad faith in this case was perpetrated by the defendants and their agents, an architect and/or attorney, who prepared a contract that they knew did not comply with the HIA requirement regarding notice of the right to cancel. General Statutes §
Before this court decided whether to accept the attorney trial referee's report regarding the HIA and the bad faith exception, the case was remanded to the attorney trial referee to comment on three matters. The first was whether the case of Wright Bros. Builders, Inc. v.Dowling,
Second, the referee was asked what significance, if any, he attributed to the fact that the contract was not prepared by the plaintiff contractor but rather by the defendant homeowner and his agents. Third, what significance, if any, did the referee attribute to the fact that the defendants and their former attorney were familiar with and previously invoked the HIA as illustrated by their defense of Meadows v. Higgins, supra,
The attorney trial referee and the parties had previously agreed that the trial would be bifurcated and the issue of the alleged bad faith exception to the HIA would be ruled upon first. The second stage of the trial involved the counterclaim filed by the defendants, which alleges that the plaintiff did not perform his work adequately and was overpaid. Thus, this case was remanded to the referee for two reasons, the first for further comment on the HIA and the bad faith exception, and also to complete the trial regarding the defendants' counterclaim.
The attorney trial referee responded to the three queries from the court by indicating that: (1) the only issue before him was the alleged bad faith of the defendants because the parties had stipulated that the contract did not comply with the HIA because there was no cancellation clause at all, whereas Wright Bros. v. Dowling, supra,
The plaintiff filed objections to the attorney trial referee's report as further clarified by the referee's response to the three inquires pertaining to the "bad faith exception" to the HIA. The objections reiterate the plaintiffs position that the defendants used the HIA in this case "in reverse of the legislative intent, as it was designed to protect homeowners against unscrupulous contractors, but is being used against small contractors by a savvy unscrupulous homeowner."
The plaintiff presented a plausible argument by bringing to light that defendants and their former attorney, described by the attorney trial referee as knowledgeable about the HIA, prepared the contract and had both been involved in Meadows v. Higgins, supra,
Additionally, the referee conducted a trial on the defendants' counterclaim and issued a report dated February 1, 2001, finding the following facts: (1) the plaintiff did not walk off the job voluntarily because his services were terminated by the defendant homeowners on August 7, 1992; (2) on that date, the plaintiff had already completed 80% of the work at the defendants' home; (3) the total contract price, including a number of change orders, was $277,938, and the plaintiff had been paid $271,241, which included approximately $46,000 paid by the defendants directly to subcontractors, and therefore the difference between the contract price and the amount paid to or on behalf of the plaintiff was only $6,697(4) as of August 19, 1992, after payment to a subcontractor, 98% of the work called for in the contract between the parties had been completed; and (5) the defendants' contention that they had spent $164,350 to complete the project pursuant to the contract between the parties "is not credible," and was obviously spent for work outside the scope of that contract.
Based on these facts, the referee drew the following conclusions: (1) the defendants did not prove that the plaintiff had been overpaid; (2) the defendants did not prove that they expended a large sum of money to complete the project as specified in the contract; and (3) the defendants did not suffer any "ascertainable loss of money or property;" General Statutes §
On March 15, 2001, the defendants filed objections to the attorney trial referee's report as authorized by Practice Book §
Practice Book §
The case of Killion v. Davis,
Other principles governing attorney trial referee reports provide that: "A reviewing authority may not substitute its findings for those of the trier of the facts. This principle applies no matter whether the reviewing authority is the Supreme Court . . . the Appellate Court . . . or the Superior Court reviewing the findings of attorney trial referees." (Citations omitted.) Wilcox Trucking, Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc.,
The findings of fact in a contract action, such as this case, "should be overturned only when they are clearly erroneous." Wilcox Trucking,Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc., supra,
First, this court will address the issue of whether there is support in the record for the referee's findings of fact that were challenged by the defendants. The objections involve two distinct claims by the defendants: what percentage of the work specified in the contract and change orders had been completed at the time when the plaintiff no longer was working on the project, as compared with the amount he had received from the defendants, and, secondly, how much, if anything, did the defendants spend to complete the project.
A review of the transcript indicates that there is sufficient support in the record for the referee's key findings that there had been not been any overpayment to the plaintiff and that the defendants did not spend any money to complete the work required by the original contract between the parties, although they clearly spent a lot of money for work that was not part of the contract and constituted extras or was the result of change orders.4
The court finds that the referee chose to believe the testimony offered by the plaintiff and not that of the defendants regarding how much work remained to be performed when the plaintiff stopped working at the defendants' home and whether the plaintiff had been overpaid. "The finder of fact is in a better position to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony." Beizer v. Goepfert,
The trier of fact determined that the plaintiff was not overpaid and that the defendants were not obliged to spend money to complete the project. These findings cannot be said to be "clearly erroneous." WilcoxTrucking, Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc., supra,
Based upon a review of the report regarding the counterclaim by the defendants, the court finds that the attorney trial referee's conclusions and recommendations are supported by the subordinate facts that he found. The ultimate conclusions that the defendants are not entitled to recover any money from the plaintiff on their counterclaim follows logically and legally from the findings by the attorney trial referee that the defendants had not been obliged to expend the amount claimed to CT Page 12005 finish the project, and that the plaintiff had not been overpaid.
Accordingly, judgment enters in favor of the plaintiff as to the defendants' counterclaim. Costs are not taxed in favor of either party.
So Ordered.
Dated at Stamford, Connecticut, this 28th day of August, 2001.
William B. Lewis, Judge Trial Referee.